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Abstract 
 
 
Vanuatu’s common property natural resources provide essential ecological 
services for the global community and sustain the livelihoods of 80% of the 
Vanuatu population. Sustainable management of natural resources is 
dependent on locally developed systems that govern common property 
resources. Understanding the drivers of commons management problems 
from local resource-users’ perspectives is essential to know how local 
governance systems can be supported and strengthened. I explore locally 
identified drivers of commons management problems using a case study of 
the Tangoa Island community of South Santo, Vanuatu. Methods include 
participatory rural appraisal (PRA) techniques and 31 interviews with local 
people. Literature from Vanuatu as well as 18 interviews with Vanuatu 
government departments, NGOs, and aid donors informs how relevant the 
issues identified in the case study are for other communities across 
Vanuatu. I found that drivers at different contextual scales, from local to 
global, affect two main elements of a community’s cooperative capacity for 
commons management - social cohesion and governance systems. The 
issues identified by the Tangoa Island community affect many Vanuatu 
communities because they are driven by wider processes of social, cultural, 
economic, and institutional change.  Approaches to support and strengthen 
local social and governance systems can target drivers at multiple 
contextual scales. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1.1 The Big Picture:  Sustainable resource management in collective 
property regimes        
 Just as people are dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods, they are 
also dependent on each others’ cooperation for natural resource management. 
For as long as people have managed natural resources, they have engaged in 
forms of collective action, collaborating on management of farm, forest, 
grassland, and aquatic resources.   
 
 Collective action is particularly important for “common pool resources” also 
referred to as “commons resources”, which are communally used and managed 
by a group of owners under common property regimes.  The term “common 
property regime” (CPR) represents a set of institutions, regulations and 
management practices subject to collective-decision-making.1  It is the common 
property regime that distinguishes commons resources from open access 
resources, which are unregulated and free for anyone to use (Adhikari, 2001). 
This thesis is about how communities cooperate, and take collective action to 
manage their natural resources. 
 
 Collective action is the basis for management of commons resources around the 
world. The term “collective action” can refer to people working together or 
participating in activities for the purpose of producing collective or shared 
benefits (Garcia et al., 2006, p. 83). The sustainability of shared resources is 
dependent on the cooperation of local people who communally use and manage 
them.   
 
                                                 
1
 The term common property refers to the kind of tenure that exists, not the resource itself (Fuys et al., 
2006). Common property is said to be similar to private property in a sense that there is exclusion of non-
owners (Adhikari, 2001). Common property regimes are also distinct from (but related to) communal 
tenure, which refers more broadly to community-based tenure systems, in which some form of customary 
authority (e.g. and extended family, clan or other social grouping) holds allocation rights. Resources 
under communal tenure may, in practice, be used and controlled individually or collectively. Common 
property can take up a large share of communal lands (Fuys et al., 2006). 
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 The importance of collective action for commons management may be 
increasing.  Many countries around the world are implementing policies of 
decentralisation, where control over natural resources is shifted from 
governments to local resource users (Agrawal, 2003).   In fact, a global survey of 
forest policies (FAO, 1999) reported that governments in over 50 countries 
claim to be decentralising control over forest resources, placing the onus on 
local people to manage them.   
 
 Common property resources provide essential ecological services, as well as 
sustaining millions of commons resource dependent livelihoods (Beck and 
Nesmith, 2001; Adhikari, 2005; Fuys et al., 2006). Access to natural resources 
through common property regimes has been shown to sustain and enhance the 
livelihoods of the rural poor, by fulfilling subsistence and commercial needs.  
Common property regimes also often act as a resource safety net for vulnerable 
households during difficult times. They are especially important for those who 
might be excluded from land and resources if the commons were individualised 
(Fuys et al. 2006).  For example, in many parts of the world where women are 
not able to own land and resources or only have secondary access through their 
husbands, access through common property regimes provides essential 
livelihood security (Ibid). 
 
1.2 The issue 
 Collective action problems are a major barrier to sustainable natural resource 
management. Failure to overcome collective action problems contributes to the 
degradation and destruction of natural resources in many parts of the world. At 
the community level, collective action problems prevent the sustainable use and 
development of the communities’ natural resources. When people are unable to 
work together and equitably share the benefits from their cooperation, the 
common property resources may be treated as open access where use is 
unregulated. Open access results from the absence or breakdown of management 
and authority systems (Adhikari, 2001). In these situations the incentives 
described by Hardin’s (1968) “tragedy of the commons” are at work. People 
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may harvest unsustainably and/or sell resource rights (e.g. to logging companies) 
to gain benefits before anyone else does.2   
 
1.3 The topic 
 This thesis studies commons management in Vanuatu, and focuses on one 
community in particular. The study has been designed to align with the current 
emphasis of commons research on finding appropriate solutions to context 
specific commons management problems.  
 
 The research for this study is in three parts:  a literature review; a community 
case study; and resource management research at a national level.  The research 
results are analysed to determine the factors that affect one particular 
community’s management of shared resources. A case study of the Tangoa 
community of South Santo, Vanuatu specifically explores the factors that affect 
collective action for commons management in this setting.  The purpose of this 
study is not to hypothesise about preconceived determinants, but to allow the 
important determining factors to emerge from participatory research with the 
Tangoa community.  Context specificity is further explored by looking at how 
widely other communities in Vanuatu experience the same issues. Vanuatu 
based literature and interviews with government, NGOs, and aid donors provide 
information about the wider Vanuatu context.  
 
 Like most commons research, my study is also concerned with using the 
understanding gained from analysis of local commons management problems to 
identify solutions and opportunities to support more sustainable and effective 
management.  
 
1.4 Purpose and objectives   
 The purpose of this thesis is: to determine the locally identified issues affecting 
the Tangoa Island community’s management of common pool resources; to put 
the case study results into the wider Vanuatu context; and to identify 
                                                 
2
 In an open access situation, over harvesting and resource degradation is common, and as individuals 
cannot capture the benefits of investments in resources – investment in any kind of development is very 
low (Adhikari, 2001). 
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opportunities for supporting communities to overcome commons management 
problems. 
 
 This purpose can be broken down into four main objectives in the form of 
questions to be answered: 
 1. What are the important factors that affect local level commons 
management? 
 2. What are the locally identified factors that affect the ability of the 
Tangoa community in South Santo, Vanuatu, to manage their commons 
resources? 
 3. How widely relevant are the case study findings for other Vanuatu 
communities?  
 4. How can information from the case study and wider Vanuatu based 
research inform how external assistance (from NGOs, donor 
organisations, researchers, and government) can support sustainable 
commons management in Vanuatu?  
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
 Chapter two addresses the first objective by reviewing the literature on common 
property resource management. An overview of collective action theory is 
provided, and factors that affect local communities’ ability to sustainably 
manage common pool resources are identified.  
 
 Chapter three describes the methodology for this study and the reasons for using 
a case study, grounded theory, and participatory research.  An introduction to 
Vanuatu and the case study community provides some essential background 
information about the history, geography, social, cultural and natural 
characteristics of the study site.  Various methodological issues are outlined and 
the main research activities are described.  
 
 Chapter four and five presents the results in two parts. Chapter four addresses 
objective two by presenting the case study results. Chapter five addresses 
objective three by presenting the findings from wider Vanuatu based research. 
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This allows analysis of the wider relevance of case study results and the 
interaction between national policies and community issues.  
 
 In Chapter six, I incorporate the results of the literature review, the case study, 
and the wider Vanuatu research into a model and discuss their significance for 
local livelihoods. The analysis is used to identify opportunities to support the 
Tangoa community, and other communities that are experiencing similar issues, 
to manage their shared resources effectively and sustainably. I highlight 
potential areas where external support and assistance from NGOs, donor 
agencies, researchers, and governments could benefit local commons 
management.  
 
 Finally, Chapter seven summarises what I learned from this study and outlines 
some recommendations for individuals, organisations, government and 
researchers who are interested in supporting local communities to sustain the 
social and environmental systems upon which livelihoods depend.     
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Chapter 2 - Literature review: the findings of commons 
research 
 
 Literature has established that commons management is largely dependent on 
local people’s “cooperative capacity” – their ability to act collectively to achieve 
shared goals, and to solve collective action problems (McCarthy et al., 2002, 
p7). Empirically informed theory about collective action has been developed, 
and scholarship has focused on studying the factors that affect local commons 
management.  
 
 This literature review first provides an overview of some basic theories about 
collective action. Then the key factors that affect collective action for 
management of commons resources are identified.  The review provides 
information about why the different factors are important for commons 
management and the discussion highlights areas of agreement and debate in the 
literature. Since the purpose of this study is to allow the local data to inform 
what factors are important in the context of the case study community, literature 
related to the contextually relevant factors identified in this study will be further 
explored in the discussion chapter. 
 
2.1 Historical roots of commons research and current aims 
 For almost two decades, twentieth century ecologist Garrett Hardin's (1968) 
theory of the "tragedy of the commons" was the basis for a mainstream 
understanding of commons management problems. Hardin envisioned a pasture 
open to all in which each herder received a direct benefit from adding animals to 
graze on the pasture and suffered only delayed costs from overgrazing. The 
theory describes how people that are dependant on the use of common-property 
resources will act “rationally” without restraint to maximise their personal short-
term gain by over exploiting the resource (Hardin, 1968, p. 1244).3  Hardin’s 
theory has been used in policy justifications for centralisation and privatisation 
                                                 
3
 The intellectual roots of the "tragedy of the commons" argument trace back to Aristotle who noted 
that "what is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it" (cited in Ostrom, 
1990) 
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of the commons. Advocates of these policies see local resource users are a major 
threat to natural resource user systems. They accept, as a central tenet, that 
institutional change must come from the outside and be imposed on the 
individuals affected (Ostrom, 1990).4    
 
 The field of study that we know today as ‘commons research’ arose as a 
response to the failures of privatisation and exclusionary conservation, and to 
meet the pressing need for more empirically based and effective mechanisms to 
support sustainable management of commons resources (Ostrom, 1990).  The 
focus of commons research has developed, evolved, and influenced policy 
perspectives concerning natural resource management. 
 
 Early research was focused on finding examples and case studies of sustainable 
and effective locally developed common property resource regimes. A growing 
body of evidence shows that, in spite of various incentives against cooperation, 
local resource-user groups often find local solutions to collective dilemmas and 
devise institutions that manage commons resources and allocate benefits 
equitably and relatively efficiently over the long term (Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal 
and Gibson, 1999; Gautam and Shivakoti, 2005; Gibson and Becker, 2000). 
Evidence not only shows that local institutions can manage natural resources 
successfully, but also that when resources are privatised or appropriated by the 
state, traditional users rights are seldom recognised.  The result of this is the 
destruction of traditional entitlements systems and efficient arrangements that 
have evolved to suit local needs (Baland and Platteau 1996; Maggs and 
Hoddinott, 1999). Ostrom (1990) provides an example where the imposition of 
state control of the Nova Scotian fisheries resulted in disruption of local systems 
of management, conflict between different user groups and government 
authorities, and acceleration of unsustainable fish harvest. 
 
 This research has played an important part in challenging Hardin’s long-
dominant concept and arguments for centralisation and privatisation of the 
                                                 
4
 Arguments for an interventionalist state can be traced to Thomas Hobbes (1651) who stated the need for 
a “leviathan” – a coercive force outside of the individual’s psyche that will impose order in society and 
thus preventing “the war of all against all” (Cited in Ostrom, 1990) 
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commons.  Research has supported a growing focus on conservation and 
development approaches which see local resource-users as the appropriate locus 
for interventions and emphasise ‘local participation’ and ‘empowerment’ 
(Mohan and Stokke, 2000). Such an approach includes community-based 
conservation where “natural resources or biodiversity protection by, for, and 
with the local community” (Western et al., 1994, p. 7).5  Community can be 
broadly defined as “a group of people who interact directly, frequently and in 
multifaceted ways” (Bowels and Gintis, 2001, p. 3).  
 
 Commons research has now moved away from its original aim of finding a 
generalised model for solving commons management problems. The new focus 
is on ‘diagnosing’ which variables are relevant to particular problems in 
particular social-ecological systems (Ostrom, 2007). This aim is based on recent 
consensus in the literature that commons management problems are highly 
context specific. The key factors that affect one community’s ability to manage 
commons resources at a particular time and place may not be important for a 
different community, or at a different time and place (Agrawal, 2003; Ostrom, 
2007). There is also a recent emphasis on analysing how the wider socio-
political and economic contextual processes have shaped local situations 
(Agrawal, 2003). This focus derives from criticisms suggesting that a heavy 
research focus on local drivers of collective action has resulted in a lack of 
understanding of the wider context.  
 
2.2 Collective action theory 
 Collective action theory provides a good starting point for understanding the 
dynamics of cooperation, from which commons management regimes are built. 
Some well established theory about what affects people’s decisions to cooperate 
is described by Ostrom’s (1990) framework of an institutional-choice situation. 
She uses a general concept of rational choice where people will weigh expected 
costs and benefits which are affected by their internal norms and discount rates, 
and select strategies that are expected to result in greater benefit than cost.   
                                                 
5
 Although there has been a trend in increasing preference for community-based NRM in mainstream 
environmental and development discourse, there are still strong arguments for state enforced protected 
areas (Lovejoy, 2006; Terborgh, 1999), and privitisation of natural resources (Armstrong, 2001). 
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 Ostrom also explains how people adopt contingent strategies, where choices of 
action are contingent on the actions and behaviors of others. When multiple 
users of a common-pool resource are dependent on that resource, each user is 
affected by the actions of others. People will choose to work cooperatively 
towards sustainable management of common-pool resources under certain 
conditions (e.g. “I’ll do this, if you do that,”) and if they expect the long-term 
benefit of cooperation to be greater than the long-term costs. Game theorists 
describe this as an equivalent retaliation or “tit for tat” strategy6 (Levi, 1988; 
Ostrom 1990).  
 
 Recent theoretical developments have lead to a greater understanding about the 
processes involved in making contingent strategies related to the cost and 
benefits of cooperating. Several assumptions underlying Hardin’s (1968) 
Tragedy of the Commons, and Mancur Olson’s (1965) Logic of Collective 
Action, have been revised. The new theoretical understandings are described in 
Kahan’s (2002) “reciprocity theory.” The reciprocity theory makes four 
important contributions to collective action theory. It asserts that: 
 
  People are emotional reciprocators instead of wealth maximisers. 
  Trust among people may promote cooperation better than imposed 
material incentives. 
  The rate of cooperation among a group can have multiple equilibria. 
  Tendencies towards cooperation vary between individuals in a group. 
 
2.2.1 People are emotional reciprocators instead of wealth maximisers 
 Hardin (1968) and Mancur Olson (1965) assumed that people are, by nature, 
selfish wealth maximisers, and will choose to free-ride on the contributions of 
others rather than contributing to public good themselves. These assumptions are 
challenged by Kahan’s reciprocity theory, which draws on evidence from 
                                                 
6
 A contingent cooperator is a person or agent who is willing to act in the collective interest, rather than 
his/her short-term selfish interest, if he/she observes a majority of the other agents in the collective doing 
the same.  ‘Tit for tat’ is equivalent to the concept of reciprocal altruism in the context of biology (Moore, 
1984).  
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“public good” experiments. These experiments show that people’s decisions to 
act selfishly for personal gain, or cooperatively for the collective good, are 
highly conditional on what others are doing.  Further research into reciprocity 
theory shows individuals reciprocate the behaviour of others to give (or not give) 
to charity (Reingen, 1982), to refrain (or not) from littering (Aronson, 1995 and 
Cialdini et al., 1990), to wait their turn (or not) in lines (Schmitt et al, 1992).  
 
 This evidence supports and builds upon Ostrom’s idea of contingent strategies, 
which strengthening understanding that people’s decisions are emotionally 
nuanced and based on individual sense of morals (Ostrom, 1990). When people 
perceive that others are behaving cooperatively, they are moved by honour and 
altruism7 to contribute to public goods, even without material incentives. In 
contrast, when individuals perceive that others are taking advantage of them they 
are moved by resentment and pride to retaliate.  They may choose not to 
cooperate in order to avoid feeling exploited, even if doing so exposes them to 
significant material disadvantage (Gintis et al., 2005).8  
 
2.2.2 Trust among people may promote cooperation better than imposed 
material incentives 
 There is increased emphasis on the importance of trust as a natural social 
incentive for cooperation rather than externally imposed material incentives 
(such as fines, rewards and sanctions) (Ostrom, 2000; Kahan, 2002; Seabright, 
1993). Empirical and theoretical work indicates that social interactions between 
people can build trust, and that people will only accept rules that restrict their 
involvement in an economically important activity if they trust that others will 
too (Adhikari and Lovett, 2006; Janssen and Ostrom, 2001). People that share 
norms that restrain opportunistic behavior and encourage trust will be more able 
to agree on resource management rule changes, and adopt changes that will be 
less costly to operate (Ostrom, 1990).  This is supported by Seabright’s (1993) 
                                                 
7
 Altruism can be defined as “a benefit conferred on others at a cost to oneself (Bowles and Gintis, 2001, 
p.10).  
8
 This is supported by “public good” experiments – labouratory constructs designed to simulate collective 
action problems, as well as empirical studies of real-world behaviour. Individuals have been shown to 
reciprocate the behaviour of others to give (or not give) to charity, to refrain (or not) from littering, to 
wait their turn (or not) in lines. For a review of this literature see (Kahan, 2002).  
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model of ‘habit forming’ cooperation, which demonstrates that the more people 
trust in each other, the more they are willing to cooperate with one another.9   
 
 Kahan (2002) reviews literature from the fields of economics, law, and social 
policy to show that provision of material incentives can actually have an adverse 
effect on cooperation. The review showed incentives such as fines result in: 
increased abuse of day care centre rules by parents (Gneezy and Rustichini, 
2000a); decreased performance of individuals soliciting charitable donations 
(Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b); and suppressed donations of blood (Titmuss, 
1971). These studies show that the existence of an incentive scheme can be seen 
as a cue that other individuals are not inclined to cooperate voluntarily. If they 
were, incentives would not be necessary. This inference can, in turn, trigger 
people to withhold voluntary cooperation. In addition, incentives can mask 
voluntary contributions to public goods, thereby diluting the power of such 
contributions to trigger reciprocal cooperation. Incentives can also crowd out 
dispositions such as altruism by denying the opportunity of individuals to 
demonstrate (to themselves and others) that they are willing to sacrifice material 
gain for the public good (Kahan, 2002).  
 
 Material incentives do not always have a negative effect on cooperation or 
contribution to a public good. Rather, the effect is contextually variable. 
Imposed incentives are most likely to have a negative effect when trust – the 
belief that most people are likely to contribute voluntarily – already exists within 
a group.  Then material incentives can result in cueing, masking and crowding 
out such trust (Kahan, 2002).  However if there is not a great deal of trust within 
a group, and most people believe that others are likely to free-ride, then rewards 
or penalties may be needed to more strongly enforce cooperation in order to 
positively change people’s impression of the willingness of others to cooperate 
(Kahan, 2002). 
 
                                                 
9 A core aspect of most definitions of “trust” is the “intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intentions of the behaviour of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998). Trust is 
affected by the amount of information people have about each other, the likelihood that they will be 
interacting with one another in the future, the identity and similarities between individuals involved 
(Janssen and Ostrom, 2001). 
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2.2.3 The rate of cooperation among a group can have multiple equilibria 
 Previously, it was assumed that among a particular group of social actors a 
single equilibrium exists where cooperation is at a relatively stable state, and 
that this equilibrium could be upset when compliance drops to a level that 
triggers a domino effect of rule breaking (Levi, 1988).10  Kahan’s reciprocity 
theory, on the other hand, explains that the interdependent and contingent nature 
of individual choice tends to generate patterns of multiple equilibria punctuated 
by tipping points. If people in a collective action setting perceive that around 
half of the other people involved will contribute to a public good, then about half 
will chose to contribute also. However as Fig. 2.1 shows, this middle 
equilibrium is unstable and can be tipped to start a chain reaction of positive or 
negative contribution. If more than half of a group, say 60%, decided to 
contribute, then even more people will be willing to contribute (70%), and 
contributions will increase until a high cooperation equilibrium is reached (top 
right corner of graph). Similarly, if less than half cooperate, a process of 
declining cooperation is triggered, and will continue until it reaches a low 
cooperation equilibrium (bottom left corner). 
                                                 
10
 The critical compliance rate will differ from one setting to the next and over time – depending on the 
socio-economic and environmental circumstances. For an example, people may be more tolerant of rule 
breaking during a depression as long as the higher rate is temporary and will not destroy the survival of 
the CPR (Ostrom, 1990). 
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  Figure 2.1, Multiple equilibria of intra-community cooperation (adapted from Kahan, 2002, p.5).   
 
2.2.4 Tendencies towards cooperation vary between individuals in a 
group 
 Hardin (1968) and Olson (1965) assume that the disposition to act self 
interestedly and free-ride is relatively uniform throughout a group. The 
reciprocity theory suggests that the disposition to cooperate varies across a 
population. A small number of people are likely to be “committed free-riders” 
who shirk no matter what anyone else does. Another small amount of people are 
likely to be “dedicated cooperators” who contribute no matter what (Kahan, 
2002, p.9). Some people may be quite intolerant, defecting as soon as they see 
anyone free-riding. Others are more tolerant, continuing to contribute even when 
they see a relatively modest degree of defection. A large proportion of people, 
termed by Kahan, (2002, p.9) “neutral reciprocators,” fall somewhere in 
between.  The distribution of preferences to cooperate within a community is 
illustrated in Fig. 2.2 below. 
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 Figure 2.2, Heterogeneity of collective action dispositions (adapted from Kahan, 2002, p.10) 
  
 Understanding how dispositions towards cooperation vary indicates the 
importance of “appropriately tailored incentives” (Kahan, 2002, p.11) such as 
penalties that specifically target persistent free-riders. These people are the 
biggest threat to cooperation because their non-cooperative behaviour is likely to 
affect the less tolerant reciprocators whose decision not to cooperate may 
prompt even the neutral reciprocators to stop cooperating.  The existence of 
penalties that can push the persistent free-riders into line will assure the less 
tolerant reciprocators that their cooperation will not be exploited. Because 
people are generally aware (from social experience) that there are some 
committed free-riders out there, penalties aimed at these types do not create the 
cuing, masking, or crowding out effects associated with more generalised 
incentive regimes (Kahan, 2002).  
  
 The concept of appropriate incentives can be seen in studies of campaigns 
against tax evasion. The most successful campaigns against tax evasion are those 
that balance the information that most people pay their taxes, and that only a few 
do not, and are punished for it (Cowell, 1990; Adreoni et al, 1998). The least 
successful campaigns are those that communicate there is a problem with tax 
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evasion, suggesting there is a strong norm not to comply and therefore 
encouraging others to not comply (ibid). 
 
2.3 Important factors affecting commons management  
 The theory of collective action discussed above provides the basis for 
understanding this topic. This section will outline the important factors that 
affect local community cooperation for commons management, and the 
effectiveness of local commons institutions. Agrawal (2001) synthesises what he 
considers to be the three most significant analyses of local, community-based 
efforts to manage common-pool resources. The works of Baland and Platteau 
(1996), Ostrom (1990), and Wade (1988) are comprehensive attempts to provide 
theoretically informed generalisations about the conditions under which groups 
of self-organised resource users are successful in managing their common 
resources.11  Each author arrives at a summary set of conditions and conclusions 
believed to be critical to successful commons institutions. “Success” can be 
generalised across the three works as the ability of institutions to sustain 
common-pool resources and to sustain resource user compliance to management 
rules (Agrawal, 2003).12   
 
 Collectively, the three works identify 24 different factors that affect successful 
management of the commons. Much of the more recent literature has challenged 
and built upon the conclusions of these works (Agrawal, 2003; Gautam and 
Shivakoti, 2005).13  Table 2.1 provides a full list of variables identified in the 
                                                 
11 Wade (1988) uses primary data from his studies of 31 South Indian Villages to examine when 
institutions arise in these villages and what makes them successful in resolving commons dilemmas. 
Ostrom (1990) analyses 14 detailed studies that others have generated – examining each case using 
the same set of variables to look at where resource users attempted, with varying degrees of success, 
to build, adapt, and sustain institutions to manage the commons. Baland and Platteau (1996) use a 
wide ranging review of economic literature on property rights and use a variety of different case 
studies with no specific model or set of variables. 
12
 Wade (1994, p.215) is concerned with institutions’ “success in resolving commons dilemmas.” Ostrom 
(1990, p. 90) looks for ‘design principles’ which account for “the success of institutions in sustaining the 
common pool resources and gaining compliance of generation after generation of appropriators to the 
rules in use.” Baland and Platteau (1996 p.343) consider successful institutions those which “achieve 
cooperation for the sustainable management of natural resources.”  
13 Gautam and Shivakoti (2005) have studied the role of local institutions in forest management 
assessing whether Ostrom’s design principles are applicable in common pool forest management. 
They ask two key questions including: what roles the local institutions play in determining condition 
of a forest, and how to evaluate the institutional robustness of a local forest governance system. 
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works of Baland and Platteau (1996), Ostrom (1990), and Wade (1988). The 
important factors identified in the three works are organised under four broad 
categories including: resource system characteristics; group characteristics; 
institutional arrangements; and external environment (Agrawal, 2003). Each of 
these four categories will be explained in more detail in the remainder of this 
section.   
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Table 2.1, Critical factors enabling sustainability of the commons (adapted from Agrawal, 2003) 
 
Abbreviations: Wade (1994) – RW, Ostrom (1990) – EO, and Baland and Platteau (1996) – BandP. 
(Table adapted from Agrawal, 2003)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) Resource system characteristics 
     i) Small size (RW) 
     ii) Well-defined boundaries (RW, EO) 
     iii) Low levels of mobility 
     iv) Possibilities of storage of benefits from the resource 
     v) Predictability 
2) Group characteristics 
     i) Small size (RW, BandP) 
     ii) Clearly defined boundaries (RW, EO) 
     iii) Shared norms (BandP) 
     iv) Past successful experiences—social capital (RW, BandP) 
     v) Appropriate leadership—young, familiar with changing external environments, 
         connected to local traditional elite (BandP) 
     vi) Interdependence among group members (RW, BandP) 
     vii) Heterogeneity of endowments, homogeneity of identities and interests (BandP) 
     viii) Low levels of poverty 
(1 and 2) Relationship between resource system characteristics and group characteristics 
     i) Overlap between user-group residential location and resource location (RW, BandP) 
     ii) High levels of dependence by group members on resource system (RW) 
     iii) Fairness in allocation of benefits from common resources (BandP) 
     iv) Low levels of user demand 
     v) Gradual change in levels of demand 
3) Institutional arrangements 
     i) Rules are simple and easy to understand (BandP) 
     ii) Locally devised access and management rules (RW, EO, BandP) 
     iii) Ease in enforcement of rules (RW, EO, BandP) 
     iv) Graduated sanctions (RW, EO) 
     v) Availability of low-cost adjudication (EO) 
     vi) Accountability of monitors and other officials to users (EO, BandP) 
(1 and 3) Relationship between resource system and institutional arrangements 
     i) Match restrictions on harvests to regeneration of resources (RW, EO) 
4) External environment 
     i) Technology 
          a) Low-cost exclusion technology (RW) 
          b) Time for adaptation to new technologies related to the commons 
     ii) Low levels of articulation with external markets 
     iii) Gradual change in articulation with external markets 
     iv) State 
          a) Central governments should not undermine local authority (RW, EO) 
          b) Supportive external sanctioning institutions (BandP) 
          c) Appropriate levels of external aid to compensate local users for conservation 
              activities (BandP) 
          d) Nested levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement, governance (EO) 
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2.3.1 Resource system characteristics 
 Characteristics of a resource system that studies show to be conducive to 
sustainable management include small size, well-defined boundaries, low levels 
of mobility, possibilities for storage of benefits from the resource, and 
predictability. Large resource systems are often more difficult to monitor and 
manage, which raises the cost of management (Wade, 1994). Clarity of resource 
system boundaries improves collective understanding of where (in the 
landscape) management responsibly starts and ends (Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 
1994). Clear boundaries can enable greater certainty and authority to exclude 
outsiders, which is often essential for effective commons management regimes 
(Fuys et al., 2006; Ostrom, 1990). 
 
 Information about the condition of the resource and how the flow of benefits 
from it might change in the future is needed for people to make to contingent 
strategies to cooperate with management rules (Ostrom, 1990). Incentives to 
invest in management will be low if people are uncertain about whether 
restriction on resource-use is really necessary, and whether it will secure future 
benefits (Gibson and Becker, 2000).  Information is also needed in order to 
determine how the resource can be sustained (i.e. appropriate harvest rates). The 
cost of obtaining accurate information can be a major barrier to collective action 
(Ostrom 1990).14   
 
 Costs of obtaining information can vary depending on the mobility and 
predictability of the resource system (Agrawal, 2003).  If the resource units are 
highly mobile (e.g. migratory fish), the costs of obtaining information about 
resource scarcity and abundance are likely to be higher than when there are low 
levels of mobility (ibid). Predictability of the resource system can determine the 
difficulty that resource users face in creating, sustaining and adapting resource 
management systems that will ensure sustainability (ibid). 
 
                                                 
14 Game theorists use ‘assurance games’ to illustrate how coordination for natural resource 
management becomes difficult, despite common goals, when there is a lack of information about the 
resource systems and the social environment (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004). 
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2.3.2 Group characteristics 
 Characteristics of the resource user group that are considered favorable for 
sustainable commons management include: clarity of group membership; shared 
norms; social capital built on past successful experiences; appropriate 
leadership; and interdependence among group members (Agrawal, 2003; Ostrom 
1990; Wade, 1994; Baland and Plateau, 1996). Group size, various forms of 
intra-community heterogeneity, and poverty are also widely recognised as 
important factors that affect commons management. However, conflicting 
evidence about these last three factors has lead to debate about their effect. 
 
 Clarity of group membership 
 Just as the resource system needs to be clearly defined for sustainable 
management, the resource user group must also be defined. A shared 
understanding of who has access and use rights and what rules apply to whom is 
essential to prevent commons resources from becoming open access resources 
(where there are no rules to manage resources) (Wade 1994; Ostrom 1990). 
  
 Shared norms 
 People that share norms that restrain opportunistic behavior and encourage trust 
will be more able to agree on resource management rule changes, and adopt 
changes that will be less costly to operate (Ostrom, 1990).  Shared norms can be 
identified in two ways.  One way is to study how groups function. This may 
include looking at the structure of communication within and between different 
people and groups. The second is to study how people interact with each other –
looking at such things as norms of politeness and how people show respect 
(Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 2006).  
 
 Shared norms arise where people that have a shared past and expect to have a 
shared future, where they live side by side and use the same resource area, and 
where they expect that their resources will have to sustain the livelihoods of 
their children and grandchildren. In these situations it is often important for 
people to share social norms that help them to maintain good relationships and 
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to maintain their reputations as reliable members of the community (Gibson and 
Becker, 2000; Ostrom, 1990). 
 
 Social capital 
 Many studies show that social capital is an essential factor in the capacity for 
collective action in the context of commons management (Krishna, 2003; 
Plummer and Fitzgibbon; 2006; Ostrom and Ahn, 2003; Pretty et al., 2004). 
Social capital is the “quality of human relations within some well-defined social 
group that enables members of this group to act in cooperation with one another 
for achieving mutual benefits” (Krishna, 2003). More formally, it is defined as 
“networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate 
cooperation within or among groups” (OECD, 2001, p. 41).15 
 
 Four important features of social capital assist in cooperation for commons 
management including: relations of trust; reciprocity and exchanges; common 
rules, norms, and sanctions, and connectedness in networks and groups (Pretty 
and Ward, 2001). In simple terms, reciprocity can be considered the exchange 
between individuals for mutual benefit (Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 2006). 
Specific reciprocity refers to simultaneous exchanges of goods and knowledge 
of roughly equal value. Diffuse reciprocity refers to a continued relationship of 
exchange that is eventually repaid (Pretty et al., 2003). Common rules, norms, 
and sanctions are the mutually agreed upon or handed-down norms of behavior 
that ensure a group’s interests are complimentary with those of individuals 
(ibid).  
 
 Social capital is classified in various ways. Social capital can be “institutional” – 
based on transactions governed by roles, rules, procedures, and organisations; or 
“relational” – governed by norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs (Westermann et 
al., 2005). Commonly, there are considered to be three kinds of social capital 
defined by the important connections people have in networks within, between, 
                                                 
15
 Other definitions include: “features of social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that 
facilitate cooperation and coordination for mutual benefit.” (Putnam 1995, p67). 
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and beyond communities. These include bonding, bridging and linking types of 
social capital (Woolcock, 2001).  
 
 Bonding social capital describes the close association among people such as 
friends or members of a particular sub-group, who are likely to have similar 
outlooks and objectives (Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 2006). Strong bonding social 
capital includes stocks of trust, shared norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs 
which provide the incentives to cooperate and maintain positive social 
relationships (Westermann et al., 2005). Bridging social capital describes the 
capacity of people to develop relationships between individuals of greater social 
distance such as colleagues or other community members, who may have quite 
different views (Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 2006; Pretty and Smith, 2004). 
Linking social capital describes the ability of groups to engage vertically with 
external agencies, either to influence their policies or to draw on useful 
resources (Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 2006; Pretty and Smith, 2004).  
 
 Appropriate leadership 
 Baland and Platteau (1996) emphasise that often the most appropriate leaders are 
young and familiar with the changing external environment, as well as 
connected with local traditional elites. They explain that leadership should 
enable change and adaptation to address modern issues as well as sustaining the 
benefits of traditional authorities. This is supported by Krishna’s (2003) study of 
69 north Indian village communities.  Is the study, the presence of a new set of 
young village leaders, termed ‘village agents’16 enabled the relative success of 
some villages in comparison with others in terms of development performance17 
and commons management. These village agents characteristically have 
relatively high literacy and other types of skills and knowledge that assist their 
communities. For example, they know what programs are available with state 
agencies, what market opportunities exist, and they can connect with these 
external resources and opportunities.   
                                                 
16
 “Village agents” are defined according to Sen’s (1999: 18-19) understanding of agent as “someone who 
acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of their on values and 
objectives, whether or not we asses them in terms of some external criteria as well.”) 
17
 Development performance was measured by factors such as livelihood stability, poverty assistance, 
employment generation and quality of basic services (Krishna, 2003) 
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 Interdependence among group members 
 People are most likely to act cooperatively when they are highly interdependent 
and socially connected.  This means they are reliant on each-other for economic 
activities, daily social support, and for solidarity in times of emergency or 
extreme need (Wade, 1994; Baland and Plateau, 1996, Garcia et al., 2006). A 
study by Garcia et al. (2006) about prosocial behavior in Bolivian Amazonian 
communities shows that bonding social capital is usually strong and resilient in 
socially and economically interdependent groups. Interdependence results in low 
discount rates on future returns of cooperation (Garcia et al., 2006). 
Commitment to collective action for sustainable resource management is, in 
economic terms, associated with low discount rates (Ostrom, 1990). Discount 
rates are a measure of how much the value or benefit of a 
choice/action/investment is expected to decrease in the future.  
 
 Group size 
 Group size is defined as “the number of individuals in a group that could engage 
in collective action” (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004a, p444). This is one of the 
characteristics where conflicting evidence leads to debate about the effect of 
group size on commons management.  Some studies show that increasing group 
size has a negative effect on collective action. Scholars explain that small groups 
encourage social interaction, trust, reputations, and social norms (Bowles and 
Gintis, 2001).18 Opportunities for frequent social interaction increase as the 
group size decreases, and frequent interactions create opportunities to build 
reputations. Reputations offer a sense of predictability which can be useful for 
people trying to decide on contingent strategies and whether to cooperate with 
management rules (Ostrom, 1990).   
 
 Group size also affects people’s perceptions of how much difference their 
contribution is going to make to the collective outcome, which affects incentives 
                                                 
18
 The importance of group size for the building of social norms has been argued by scholars of the 
commons since Mancur Olson’s seminal work The logic of Collective Action in which he states ‘social 
pressure and social incentives operate only in groups of smaller size, in the groups so small that the 
members can have face-to-face contact with one another’ (Olsen, 1965: 62) 
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to contribute. Perception that contributions are important often decline as group 
size increases (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004). Furthermore, transaction costs of 
management increase with group size, as it becomes increasingly difficult to 
organise greater numbers of people (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004). And finally, 
small groups are expected to be more homogenous in terms of natural resource 
management (NRM) interests. Many studies have found that homogeneity in 
NRM interests is conducive to cooperation (Adhikari, 2005; Adhikari and 
Lovett, 2006; Cooke, 2000; Kant, 2000; Mearns and Scoones 1999; Poteete, and 
Ostrom, 2004a).  
 
 Other studies show that larger groups are better able to manage commons 
resources as they have more resources to draw from than smaller groups 
(Agrawal, 2003; Nagendra et al., 2003). This means that the individual 
contribution needed to provide collective goods decreases as the size of the 
group increases (Sandler, 1992: pp49-51). This is supported by evidence from 
Nepal which shows that higher population concentrations facilitate greater 
human and financial resource mobilisation for management and monitoring of 
forest commons (Nagendra et al., 2003). A study of twenty-eight village 
councils involved in community forest management in the Kumaon Hills in 
India shows that resource mobilisation (measured in total budgets and per 
household contribution) is inhibited when the group size is too small, or too 
big19 (Agrawal and Goyle, 2001; Varughese, 2000).  
 
 Heterogeneity of endowments and homogeneity of identities and 
interests 
 The effect of intra-community heterogeneity on commons management is 
complicated and subject to debate. Research has shown that different types of 
heterogeneity affect the sustainability, equity, and efficiency of commons 
management. This has helped to dismantle outdated assumptions underlying the 
concept of “community” and of the concept that there exists (or once existed) a 
natural state of equilibrium and harmony in the relationship between resource 
                                                 
19
 Across the councils (which have memberships that range from 10 to 175 households), those with sixty-
one to eighty households made the highest resource contributions to management of forests. These figures 
drop off sharply for smaller and larger villages (Agrawal and Goyle, 2001) 
Chapter 2 – Literature review: the findings of commons research 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
dependent communities and the natural environment (Agrawal and Gibson, 
1999; Leach et al, 1999).20  Factors such as ethnicity, gender, age, origins, caste, 
religion, wealth, occupation, location relative to resource-use areas, reliance on 
the resource system, and patterns of resource use, divide and crosscut 
“community” (Poteete, and Ostrom, 2004b).  Velded (2000) specifies the 
diversity of forms of heterogeneity by identifying five variables including: 
heterogeneity in endowments; political heterogeneity; wealth and entitlements; 
cultural heterogeneity; and economic interests.  
 
 Baland and Platteau (2000) assert that heterogeneity of endowments can be a 
trigger for collective action. They build from the work of Mancur Olsen (1965) 
who hypothesised that those with more endowments usually have the most 
economic interests in collective action, and therefore will often pay the start-up 
costs to initiate it. Baland and Platteau (1997) explain that those with less 
interests or ability to contribute to the costs of collective action will, 
nevertheless, cooperate because they can free-ride on the contributions of others. 
Molinas (1998 p. 421) explains that voluntary contributions from some help to 
raise everybody’s expectations about the likely aggregate level of co-operation: 
“The existence of organisational entrepreneurs may signal to the rest of the 
community adequate interest and may act as a catalyst for other’s cooperative 
behavior.” In a study of 104 local peasant committees in a poorer region of 
Paraguay, Molinas finds that in “highly equal communities a coordination 
problem may arise among peasants because nobody has a differentiated 
incentive to be the committee's organiser” (1998, p. 420). 
 
 Whereas some argue that heterogeneity of endowments may encourage 
cooperation for NRM, others argue that endowment disparities are associated 
with heterogeneity of NRM interests, which has a negative effect on commons 
management (Adhikari and Lovett, 2006). Divergent interests are often 
associated with wealth and income disparities which result from heterogeneity in 
                                                 
20 Those concerned with heterogeneity criticise conceptualisations of a “community” as a cohesive 
social unit or closed social system where people are united by culture, morals, common interests and 
mutual dependence derive. This image of a community comes from early theories in the fields of 
sociology and anthropology and can still be found in literature about community based natural 
resource management today (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Leach et al, 1999).  
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resource endowments and entitlements (Kurian and Dietz, 2004; Leach et al., 
1999).21   
 
 Some specific studies that illustrate commons management problems associated 
with divergent NRM interests include: 
 
  farmer-managed irrigation systems in Mexico (Dayton-Johnson, 1998), 
and in Haryana, India (Kurian and Dietz, 2004); 
  maintaining community-managed irrigation canals in India  (Bardhan, 
2000); 
  community forestry management in Nepal (Richards et al, 1998; 
Adhikari and Lovett, 2006); 
  capacity for collective action of forest councils (the Van Panchayat 
system) for the management of pine forests in the Kumaun and Garhwal 
regions, Northern India (Somanathan et al, 2002). 
 
                                                 
21
 Endowments, are “the rights and resources that social actors have,” (for example, environmental goods, 
land, labour, and skills). Resource entitlements are the legitimate and effective command over these 
resources.  Entitlements enhance people’s capacity to use their endowments e.g. customary forest access 
rights allow people to gather fuel wood (Leach et al, 1999, p233; Gasper, 1993). 
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 These studies highlighted that divergent interests are problematic because they 
can: 
 
  be a barrier to developing shared NRM goals as those with divergent 
interests compete to have their interests prioritised in management 
regimes;  
  create and exacerbate NRM cost-benefit distribution issues; 22  
  negatively affect trust;  
  increase transaction costs of processes aimed at accommodating diverse 
interests (Adhikari and Lovett, 2002; Zak and Knack, 2001); and  
  lead to conflict about how resources are used, which has a negative effect 
on cooperation generally (Buckles and Rusnak, 1999).23   
 
 Poverty 
 There is considerable debate about the effect of poverty on commons 
management. Some argue that poverty is positively correlated with 
environmental destruction and that economic development is the means for 
improved natural resource management. Grossman and Krueger’s (1991) 
environmental Kuznets curve (EKC)24 is a hypothesised relationship of various 
indicators of environmental degradation (mostly pollutant emissions) and 
income per capita. The EKC shows that in early stages of economic growth, 
degradation and pollution increase, but that when incomes reach a certain level, 
environmental management improves. In the early 1990’s the EKC strengthened 
an argument that the path of economic development need not be impeded by 
environmental concerns (Stern, 2004).25  
                                                 
22 Game theorists use “Chicken games” describe how if multiple solutions to resource management exist 
but have different distributions consequences, competition over distributional issues (distribution of the 
costs and benefits of management activities) often inhibit cooperation (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004b). 
23
 There are different types of NRM related conflict. Some may be minor conflicts about the routine 
working of the management rules. Some may be more serious – with the potential to disrupt the 
functioning of the management system, and some may be so pervasive and deep rooted (such as when 
there are deep divisions within communities and violent feuds) that the emergence of cooperative 
arrangements may be prevented altogether.  See Warner (2000) for summary of different types and forms 
of NRM related conflict. 
24
 The EKC was named after Kuznets (1955) who hypothesized that income inequality first rises and then 
falls as economic development proceeds (Stern, 2004).  
25 EKC concept was introduced as a background study for the 1992 World Development Report. It was 
well accepted into the report (IBRD, 1992) and attracted enthusiastic advocates who forcefully claimed: 
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 Authors also argue that poverty is associated with high discount rates and low 
levels of concern about sustainable NRM (Adhikari 2005; Baland and Platteau, 
1996; Tisdell, 2005). When people are in poverty, their most immediate priority 
is to survive day-to-day, and they are less concerned with the future state of 
resources (Adhikari, 2005)26 or cooperating for the good of the collective 
(Diekmann and Franzen, 1999). 
 
 Critics of these arguments point out that only a few studies of a very limited 
range of pollutants and environmental impacts support the EKC claim, and that 
“the statistical analysis on which the Kuznets curve is based is not robust” 
(Stern, 2004, p. 1435). The ‘relative needs hypothesis’ also asserts that poverty 
can have a positive effect on discount rates (Wade, 1994). Studies have found 
that the rural poor often depend more heavily on commons resources, such as 
forests (Angelsen and Wunder, 2003). Wade (1994) suggests that this 
dependence means that people are more acutely affected by resource 
degradation, and therefore more motivated to ensure their sustainability (Wade, 
1994).  
 
2.3.3 Relationship between resource system characteristics and group 
characteristics 
 Relationships between resource system characteristics and group characteristics 
that support commons management include: high levels of dependence on the 
resource system; user group residential proximity to resource system; fairness in 
the allocation of benefits from commons resources; low levels of user demand or 
gradual change in levels of demand (Agrawal, 2003; Baland and Platteau, 1996; 
Wade, 1994)  
 
                                                                                                                                               
“there is clear evidence that, although economic growth usually leads to environmental degradation in the 
early stages of the process, in the end the best – and probably the only – way to attain a decent 
environment is to become rich.” (Beakerman, 1992, p491).  
26 In economic terms, poverty tends to result in high individual rate of ‘time preference’ and shorter ‘time 
horizons’ (Adhikari, 2005). 
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 User group residential proximity to resource system 
 Proximity can determine which resource areas people benefit from most. This 
affects perceptions about the value of different resource areas, which in turn, 
influence which areas will receive most management effort (Varughese and 
Ostrom, 2001). Gunatilake (1998) found that substantial differences in the 
distances that households live from a forest can lead to conflict when users are 
discussing the allocation of duties and benefits. People who live close to forests 
spend less time and money traveling to and harvesting from forests, as well as 
carrying out management duties such as monitoring, weeding, and replanting.  
Therefore these people benefit more than people who have to travel further 
(Gunatilake, 1998). 
 
 Dependence on resource system 
 Dependence on the resource system can create direct incentives for local people 
to protect biodiversity and sustainable management of natural resources 
(Salafsky and Wollenberg, 2000; Wade, 1994). Dependence can be affected by 
opportunities for income generation outside of common pool resource-use, 
termed “exit options” (Kurian and Dietz, 2004). Those with exit options tend to 
be less concerned about the sustainability of resources (Bardhan 2000; Dayton-
Johnson, 2000; Adhikari and Lovett, 2006). Diversity in access to exit options 
can be a barrier to defining common objectives for regulating the commons, and 
a barrier to participation and cooperation (Baland and Platteau, 1996; 
Varughese, 2000).  
 
 Fairness in the allocation of benefits from commons resources 
 Cost/benefit distributional issues related to commons management can be a 
serious barrier to the sustainability and effectiveness of institutions. 
Distributional issues may lead to conflict between those who are benefiting and 
those who are not. Conflict weakens local management institutions (Leach et al, 
1999; Poteete and Ostrom, 2004; Kurian and Dietz, 2004) and has a negative 
effect on cooperation generally (Buckles and Rusnak, 1999). 
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 Cost/benefit distributional issues can arise from political and power inequalities 
which determine the norms of social inclusion and exclusion.27  The most 
powerful people in society usually hold the most rights and entitlements in 
decision-making processes. Those who are excluded from decision-making 
processes involving natural resource management are likely to gain fewer 
benefits and will often be less motivated to cooperate in management regimes. 
Adhikari and Lovett (2006) provide a good example of how poor cooperation in 
one Nepalese forest user group (FUGs) resulted because some members felt that 
they would not be able to change the inequitable distribution of NRM costs and 
benefits because a relatively clearly defined interest group of ‘more wealthy’ 
people were able to influence decisions in their favor. Dissatisfaction due to 
equity issues resulted in conflict within this FUG.  
 
 While power inequalities can negatively affect participation and motivation to 
cooperate, power can also coerce people into cooperating even if they are 
marginalised from decision-making processes, and even when decisions are not 
in their interests. There is a “dark side” to social capital, where social norms can 
reinforce and reproduce unequal power relations, resulting in the continued 
exclusion and exploitation of marginalised groups (Pretty and Smith, 2004; 
Krishna, 2003). 
 
2.3.4 Institutional arrangements  
 The importance of institutional arrangements for NRM is well established in 
commons literature. In this thesis institutions refer to the rules, arrangements, 
and regularised patterns of behaviour that are developed by local people for the 
management of common property resources.Much of the literature analyses 
common property institutions and factors that affect their emergence, 
sustainability, and effectiveness at managing resource systems.  Most studies 
have an implicit sense of successful commons institutions as “those that last 
                                                 
27
 Political and power inequality can derive from socio-economic inequality, socio-cultural inequality, 
and other power defining social norms. Some common indicators of political heterogeneity are: 
leadership status of individuals and different subgroups in the decision-making authority; extent of 
agreement over legitimacy of local leaders; level of agreement on authority structure and support from 
community members; and inequalities in decision-making power between different individuals and within 
and between different groups (Adhikari and Lovett, 2006; Baland and Platteau, 1996) 
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over time, constrain users to safeguard the resource, and produce fair outcomes” 
(Agrawal, 2003 p. 1650). In a very broad sense, institutions can be seen as 
“regularised patterns of behaviour between individuals and groups in society” 
(Mearns, 1995, p. 103).  They emerge from underlying structures or sets of 
‘rules in use’ which are constantly made and remade though people’s practices 
(Leach et al, 1999).28   
 
 There is relative consensus in the literature that rules about access and 
management of commons resources should be simple and easy to understand, 
locally devised, and easy to enforce. There should be graduated sanctions, low 
cost adjudication and dispute resolutions mechanisms, and monitors and 
officials should be accountable to users (Ostrom, 1990, Baland and Platteau, 
1999). Recent and widely supported findings include that institutional 
arrangements play a vital role in mediating the effect of many other factors such 
as heterogeneity in endowments and interests (Adhikari and Lovett, 2006). 
 
 Graduated sanctions  
 Graduated sanctions refer to sanctions that are lenient for small infringements, 
and first time rule breakers, and increase in severity for serious infringements 
and persistent rule breakers. Scholars argue that sanctioning should also be 
lenient in extreme circumstances where people may need to break rules and 
ignore responsibilities (e.g. when a family member is sick). This can encourage 
participation in cooperative institutions by assuring people that they will not be 
severely punished or disadvantaged by such arrangements (Ostrom, 1990). 
There is also evidence that sanctions should avoid masking or undermine 
reciprocity, and other social motives (Kahan, 2002; Cardenas, et al., 2000). 
 
 Mutual monitoring 
 Monitoring systems provide the information about the rate of cooperation which 
people need to make contingent strategies. This information can enable 
                                                 
28
 Formal institutions may be thought of as rules that require external enforcement by a third-party 
organisation. The rule of law is and example of a formal institution that is upheld by the state though law 
courts and prisons etc.  Informal institutions may be internally enforced and upheld by mutual agreement 
by social actors involved, or by relations of power and authority between them (Leach et al, 1999, p238). 
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normative pressures to work as incentives for cooperation (Kahan, 2002). The 
costs of monitoring can be reduced by institutional designs that allow resource 
users to engage in mutual monitoring of each other. Ostrom (1990) provides an 
example where monitoring was especially successful in a Spanish irrigation 
system where the rules brought together those who would be tempted to cheat 
and those who would be particularly harmed by such cheating.  In this case, 
irrigators in Murcia and Orihuela were assigned time slots where they could 
receive the water for their fields. Each irrigator was motivated to be sure to 
receive the full time slot of water, and to watch that the next irrigator does not 
try to take water too soon (Ostrom, 1990).   
 
 The mediating effect of institutions 
 Examples of how institutions can mediate the affects of heterogeneity are 
provided by studies of forest user groups in Nepal (Adhikari and Lovett, 2006).  
One group was able to manage inequality in costs and benefits associated with 
proximity to common-pool resources. A system allowed those who lived further 
away from community forests to pay an extra fee in exchange for reduced 
monitoring duties. Another group was able to develop organisational 
arrangements to ensure women’s representation. A major barrier to women’s 
participation was that they were generally too busy with household and other 
livelihood duties to attend meetings. Efforts to addressed unequal gender 
representation included ensuring that one or two women, who could represent 
the concerns of other women members, attended each meeting.  
 
2.3.5 External environment 
 Commons resource management is affected by technology, markets, and state 
governments in complex ways. Conflicting evidence has resulted in debate about 
how some of these factors affect commons management.  
 
 Technology 
 It is generally agreed that management can be supported by low cost 
exclusionary technologies (Wade, 1994), and when resource user communities 
have time to adapt to new technologies related to the commons (Agrawal, 2003).  
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However, introduction of new harvesting technologies (such as mobile 
chainsaws, new fishing boats and nets) can lead to rapid increase in harvest rates 
(Vadez et al., 2004).  
 
 Other research shows that new technologies and NRM practices can allow 
increased productivity of resource systems, which has slowed the clearing of 
forest for agriculture in some tropical forest margins (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 
2001). Agro-forestry has provided slash and burn farmers with a more 
productive way to use commons land (van Noordwijk et al., 2002), and new 
technologies and practices (such as planting legumes) can regenerate soil 
fertility (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 2001). 
 
 Market integration 
 Agrawal, (2001) identifies low levels of integration with external markets and 
gradual change in articulation with external markets as conducive to sustainable 
management. Market integration can negatively affect local commons 
management institutions. Especially when change occurs at a faster rate than 
institutions can adapt to meet new challenges associated with markets (Oates, 
1999).   
 
 As local economies become better connected to larger markets, subsistence users 
tend to increase harvesting levels as people exploit resources for cash income 
(Oates, 1999; Young, 1994). Closer links between rural areas, towns and urban 
centers can also create pressure to change use of the commons (conversion to 
agricultural land) and the form of tenure that governs them (e.g., conversion to 
private property) (Fuys et al., 2006).  
 
 A study by Vadez et al, (2004) shows that as Tsimane’ Indian households 
integrated into the market economy, they deforest about twice as much to 
cultivate rice (the main cash crop) compared with more autarkic (economic self-
sufficient) households. There are similar findings from Cameroon (Mertens et 
al., 2000). Out of 41 case studies from 20 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and 
Latin America, commercialisation of natural resources and the products derived 
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from them was the most frequently discussed pressure on commons property 
systems (Fuys et al., 2006). However, there are also examples where 
commercialisation can create new incentives for joint management of the 
commons. An example is the case of Nepal’s leaseholder forests where poor 
communities are restoring degraded forests, planting timber trees and growing 
herbal plants for sale in local markets (Shrestha, 2005).  
 
 Commercialisation is also associated with a trend of growing wealth inequality 
both within and between resource user communities (Fuys et al., 2006). In this 
way markets impact social capital (including trust and reciprocity) (Godoy, et 
al., 2005; Putsche, 2000).  Market integration resulting from gold mining in Peru 
eroded inter-household social capital and created distrust, social differentiation 
and conflict between households (Bury, 2004). Contrary evidence from Ghana 
shows that traditional forms of kin group reciprocity remain important forms of 
credit and economic insurance as they permeate and adapt to new institutions 
(La Ferrara, 2003). 
 
 Recent literature from the field of anthropology highlight that markets impact 
traditional use of resources, social capital, and traditional ecological knowledge 
(TEK) (Godoy, et al., 2005). This can be a problem for commons management 
as TEK is the basis for many traditional common property regimes. Empirical 
evidence from Mexico (Benz et al., 2000), and Venezuela (Zent, 2001), shows 
that acculturation (the acquiring new language skills, attitudes, and values29) 
associated with integration into new economic markets can cause the loss of 
traditional knowledge (TEK). Loss of TEK can occur as markets provide access 
to substitutes for traditional products (Godoy, et al., 2005). On the other hand, 
literature also suggests that integration into market economies through an 
activity based on use of the natural environment could accelerate the acquisition 
of local ecological knowledge (Guest, 2002).  
  
                                                 
29
 Standard proxies for acculturation include language skills, years of schooling, and direct measures of 
values (Godoy et al., 2004) 
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 State 
 It is widely accepted that central governments should not undermine the ability 
of local authorities to manage resources (Wade, 1994; Ostrom 1990). State-
supported policies such as privatisation or nationalisation tend to challenge the 
authority of customary systems, with negative impacts for both security of 
access to the commons as well as to their sustainable management (Ostrom, 
1990, Fuys et al., 2006).  
 
 States can also play a positive role in supporting local institutions with external 
sanctioning as well as providing appropriate levels of external aid to compensate 
local users for conservation activities (Baland and Platteau, 1996). Ostrom 
(1990) shows that nested levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement, and 
governance can support local commons management institutions. Governments 
can support local autonomy and build social capital by promoting development 
of civil society, democracy, and true decentralisation – where communities 
decide for themselves what kind of ‘development’ they want (Evens, 1996; 
Heller, 1996). Heller (1996) shows that high levels of social development and 
social capital in Kerala are the products of mutually reinforcing relations 
between a democratic state and a well organised labour movement.  Karim 
(1999) details the work of NGOs in Bangladesh that pressed for reform of the 
government’s decentralisation program to make it genuinely devolved and 
responsive. Having done this, the structures were in place for more integrated, 
co-operative and large-scale rural development. 
   
2.3.6 Summary  
 This chapter has outlined the research on commons management, collective 
action theory and the factors that drive community cooperation. Commons 
research has enabled greater understanding of how various factors affect the 
ability of local commons regimes to sustainably manage resources. However 
there is still considerable debate due to conflicting evidence. The conflicting 
evidence alludes to the complexity and interlinked nature of the factors. The 
effect of one factor on commons management is often dependent on other 
factors and varies across different contexts (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004b). 
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Researchers have decided that instead of working to develop “final conclusions” 
about their direction of influence, it is more useful to study how they interrelate 
in causal links (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004; Agrawal, 2003).   
 
 Leading commons scholars have also highlighted a gap in understanding about 
how local commons problems are affected by wider socio-economic, political, 
and ecological processes (Ostrom, 2007; Perrings, 2007).  My thesis addresses 
this identified gap by looking at how the results of my case study fit within the 
wider local, national and global context. 
 
 The next chapter describes the methodology used to study the factors that affect 
commons management in the particular context of Tangoa Island community, 
and the wider context of Vanuatu.  
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Chapter 3 – Methodology 
 
 This chapter describes the research methods used for the Tangoa Island study. 
The first section explains and justifies the choice of methodological approach. 
The next section then introduces the study site, providing some background 
information about Vanuatu and Tangoa Island. The third section outlines some 
methodological issues and considerations including ethics, positionality and 
biases, translation issues and managing expectations. The two main methods for 
collecting data – participatory research activities and interviews – are described 
in the next two sections.  Finally, the method of data analysis is outlined with a 
summary and a table of all the methods used.   
 
3.1 Methodological approach  
 
3.1.1 Case study approach  
 The second objective of this study as set out in Chapter 1, section 1.6 was to 
answer the question about what factors affect the Tangoa community’s 
management of commons resources. A qualitative, case study research approach 
was used to answer this question. Due to the complexity and context specificity 
of commons management problems, detailed case studies are a widely used 
methodology in commons research (McCarthy, 2002). Case studies are valuable 
because they can provide context specific detail and variation in causal 
relationships that multiple cross-case analysis may not identify (Gerring, 2007).  
Case study research was undertaken over five weeks during June and July 2006. 
 
 The literature review in Chapter 2 identified a drawback of a qualitative case 
study. It was that it is difficult to know whether the findings have wider 
relevance beyond the particular setting (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004). The third 
objective of my study is to determine whether the Tangoa study is relevant for 
other communities.  I address this issue through the use of interviews and 
literature-based research to examine the case study findings in the wider context 
of Vanuatu. Interviews were undertaken with government officials, NGOs and 
donors during January and February 2007. 
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3.1.2 Grounded theory and participatory research approach  
 Underlying the methodology used for the case study is the idea that theory 
related to commons management should emerge from local perspectives and 
knowledge. Connell and Waddell (2007) argue that appropriate rural 
environmental management and development should be grounded in local 
empirical knowledge, rather than unsophisticated and ungrounded scientific or 
universal generalisations. Such an approach requires a powerful contextual 
understanding of the behavior of rural communities, of their knowledge and 
actions, with respect to social and natural environments. According to Charmaz, 
(2006) and Cresswell (2006), theoretical development concerning contextually 
situated processes (i.e. commons management) should be generated from local 
people’s perspectives and experiences of those processes. Grounded theory is a 
qualitative research design that compliments this focus on local perspectives and 
knowledge and provides a framework for analysis of qualitative data (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998). 
 
 Using a grounded theory approach, the enquirer generates a general explanation 
(a theory) of a process, action or interaction shaped by the views of a number of 
participants (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In this case, the study generates a theory 
of commons management in the Tangoa community. A key idea is that this 
theory-development does not come from existing literature or from testing of 
hypotheses conceived prior to field research, but rather is generated or 
“grounded” in data from participants who have experienced the process (ibid).  
 
 Grounded theory is considered particularly useful where models and theories 
exist in literature, but were developed and tested on samples and populations 
other than those of interest for a particular study (Cresswell, 2006).  This is the 
case here, because the literature review shows a gap in collective action research 
in Vanuatu. Grounded theory can therefore be useful for studies of local-level 
commons management situations, considering that there is no one-size-fits-all 
theory about the factors that affect commons management (Poteete and Ostrom, 
2004). 
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 Commons scholars also argue that studies of hypothesised relationships of 
certain variables can mean that other important variables are missed, and that 
hypothesis-based studies must therefore be based on some prior understanding 
of the study socio-ecological system (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004; Ostrom 2007).  
Since I had little pre-field research knowledge and information about the Tangoa 
socio-ecological system from which to develop informed hypotheses, grounded 
theory approach allows the most important factors affecting commons 
management to arise from local perspectives and collective analysis, without the 
discrimination of pre-defined hypotheses. 
 
 A participatory research approach is effective with grounded theory as the 
combination can generate contextually relevant theory, developed from local 
perspectives and knowledge. A participatory research approach was also chosen 
because the research process can potentially benefit research participants by 
engaging local people in collective learning and analysis of issues that are of 
importance and concern to them (Chambers, 1994). Participatory research 
approaches have been effectively used in Vanuatu in recent years, with proven 
benefits for local communities, including increased motivation and action to 
achieve local goals concerning natural resource management and development 
(Bronson et al., 1995).   
 
 The main methodological tools used include interviews and group activities 
commonly employed in Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA).  PRA is a set of 
methods for ascertaining features of local groups and situations in ways that are 
meant to empower the people being researched, as well as being faster to carry 
out and to analyse than other techniques (Brockington and Sullivan, 2003)  
 
 The research in this study was designed to overcome some identified 
weaknesses in PRA. Careful selection of participant group composition, and 
triangulation of findings (by using multiple research tools) were two strategies 
employed. One weakness is that some people and groups may not feel 
comfortable expressing their views the public forum where PRA exercises take 
place (Mohan, 2001). Participatory methodologies often seek community 
consensus, which means that diversity of perspectives can be lost. Also, 
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consolidation of dominant perspectives and norms as “legitimated” participatory 
knowledge can result in the marginalisation of more “quiet” or less powerful 
voices (ibid).30  Knowledge produced in research “are always versions of the 
truth, representing one out of other possible truths” (Mohammad, 2001, p114).  
To reduce power-related data distortions, PRA activities were done with groups 
of men, women, youth and elders separately. Data from different group activities 
were triangulated and compared with data from individual interviews in order to 
elicit the diversity of views and perspectives, and to calibrate the informative 
value of any given assessment.  
 
3.2 The research site 
 
3.2.1 Vanuatu 
 Vanuatu is a Y-shaped archipelago, roughly 1000 km long, located in the 
western South Pacific (Fig.3.1). There are 82 islands, mostly volcanic in origin. 
Highly productive fringing reefs surround most islands.31 Forests cover about 
75% of total land area (Rosillo-Calle and Woods, 2003).  Due to high levels of 
endemic biodiversity, Vanuatu is part of the East Melanesian Islands 
biodiversity hotspot (Conservation International 2005).  
 
 Vanuatu has a total population of 221,507 (National Statistics Office, 2006). 
There is great linguistic and cultural diversity in Vanuatu, with approximately 
106 Austronesian languages spoken by a predominantly Melanesian population 
(which is the greatest number of languages per capita in the world) (Lynch and 
Crowley 2001). Bislama is the national language, and is widely spoken and 
taught in schools. Vanuatu is one of the youngest independent countries in the 
Pacific region, having achieved political independence from the joint Anglo-
French condominium in 1980.   
                                                 
30
 The social and institutional dynamics of a community affect how different social groups within a 
community participate in the process of constructing “social knowledge”. It has been claimed that 
“because participation is a social act that springs from a pre-existing set of social relations it is more 
readily applied in situations that condone and reinforce the set of social relations (da Cunha et al., 1997) 
31
 For a good source of information about marine resources of Vanuatu see: Chillaurren E., David, G., and 
Grandperin R., 2001, Coastal fisheries atlas of Vanuatu: A 10-year development assessment. Paris, IRD 
editions. 
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Figure 3.1, Location of Vanuatu in the Pacific  
 
 The economy in Vanuatu is dominated by subsistence agriculture, however there 
are two main commercial centres, one on the island of Efate, where the capital 
Port Vila is situated, and the island of Santo, which has the town of Luganville 
and a port.  The great majority of the population uses minimal amounts of cash, 
but are supported by the traditional subsistence economy (Baezely and Mullen, 
2006).  
 
 Around 80 percent of Vanuatu’s population lives in rural villages with other 
members of their traditional extended families on land which is theirs under the 
rules of ‘kastom’ (which translates to ‘custom’)32 (Regnevanu, 2007). About 
90% of land in Vanuatu is customarily owned, with the balance owned by the 
government and a small portion by the private sector (FAO, 2005). Indigenous 
land ownership is protected in the constitution. “True” customary landowners 
                                                 
32
 ‘Kastom’ in Vanuatu refers to “the traditional beliefs, values and common law that underpins the life of 
ni-Vanuatu (the indigenous people of Vanuatu).” Kastom differs widely and has evolved over millennia 
(Whyte et al, 1999, p.5) 
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are ni-Vanuatu33 whose origins are linked to the nakamal (men’s house), varea 
(village), or nasara (dancing grounds, public square, ritual clearing or place) 
associated with that land. In parts of the country the right to own land is held by 
women, but in the majority of cases, the right is given to men.  
 
 Under customary communal tenure systems, each family in a community is 
allocated rights to land for gardening (Rockell, 2007). This provides important 
livelihood security.  Land can be obtained by non-indigenous people through 
long-term leases ranging from 50-75 years. Much of the prime cultivable land in 
Vanuatu is devoted to agricultural leases which result in the transformation of 
land into agricultural production, predominantly for cattle, coconut and cocoa 
(FAO, 2000). 
 
3.2.2 Tangoa Island 
 Tangoa Island is situated in South Santo, 50 km south of Luganville (see fig. 
3.2). Luganville is the largest town on Santo (and second largest in Vanuatu 
after Port Vila), with a population of 10,738.  Two of the most important 
industries for the South Santo region are cattle and copra.34   
 
 Tangoa is a raised coral island, approximately 1.35 km long and 0.56 km wide 
about 230 metres off shore (see fig. 3.2). Seven different clan groups (extended 
family) with a total of 500 people live on Tangoa Island. Tangoans speak a local 
vernacular language unique to South Santo. Tangoan people travel by locally 
crafted outrigger canoe from their village on the Island to the mainland, where 
they carry out their subsistence and income generating activities. Tangoan 
livelihoods are predominantly dependent on gardening/farming, fishing, and 
working on copra and cocoa plantations.  
 
 A fence dissects Tangoa Island, marking the boundary between Tangoa village 
land and Presbyterian Church land. The Church’s side of the island is used for 
the Bible Translator’s house, a primary school, coconut plantations and cattle. 
                                                 
33
 In common use ‘ni-Vanuatu’ refers to an indigenous citizen of Vanuatu. The Vanuatu Constitution 
defines ni-Vanuatu as a person who has had 4 grandparents who belong to a tribe of communities 
indigenous to Vanuatu (Whyte et al. 1999, p.6) 
34
 Copra is the dried meat (or kernel) of a coconut. It is processed and made into various products.  
Chapter 3 – Methodology 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
 
The benefits of the copra and cattle raised on Church land go to the Church. 
These tenure arrangements reflect a colonial history.  The first missionaries set 
foot on Tangoa in 1887 and established the first church in 1895. During the 
colonial government, the cultivable land surrounding the Tangoa resource area 
was allocated to the Presbyterian Church and several ‘mission traders’,35 who 
established farms and plantations of predominantly coconuts and coffee. Mission 
traders were entrepreneurs who also harvested sandalwood, and imported and 
traded labour (Melanesian, Chinese and Vietnamese).  
 
 While indigenous ownership of all land in Vanuatu was written into the 
Constitution at independence (1980),36 no land owner registry system was put in 
place, and much of the land in the South Santo region stayed with the church and 
mission traders. Land was transferred into long term leases.37 Leasehold 
provisions were established to allow land users to pay custom owners for the use 
of the land (Rockell, 2007).  However in Tangoa’s case, small fees were paid by 
the leaseholders to the Vanuatu government as indigenous ownership has not yet 
been determined. 
                                                 
35
 Mission traders were entrepreneurs who established plantations, farms, imported and traded labour 
(Melanesian, Chinese and Vietnamise, harvested sandalwood etc. they were not necessarily missionaries, 
or part of a church, but were associated with missionaries as they would set up their bases or homes near 
missions (because they were safer places) and traded with and sold stuff too the missionaries. 
(MacClancy, 2002) 
36
 Articles 71-72 state that “All land in the Republic belongs to the indigenous custom owners and their 
decedents” and the “The rules of custom shall form the basis of ownership and use of land in the 
Republic.” 
37
 Leases were initially for thirty years; however the most productive farmers were given the opportunity 
to extend to fifty. Leases were extended to 75 years under the 1988 Land Lease Act (Rockell, 2007). 
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Fig 3.2, South Santo, Vanuatu 
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3.2.3 Background history of the relationship between Tangoa Island and 
Victoria University of Wellington 
 The Tangoa Island community was chosen as a site for research because a 
relationship had already been built between Victoria University and the 
community when Dr. Sean Weaver from Victoria University stayed with the 
community in 2005. Olivia Warrick (co-researcher) and I were invited to Tangoa 
Island by the Pelviji family to conduct participatory research with the Tangoa 
community during June and July 2006.  Olivia and I conducted all the field 
research as a team even though our research focus is different.  Olivia is 
focusing on local adaptation to climate change and my focus is on the four 
objectives outlined in Chapter 1.   
 
3.3 Methodological issues 
 
3.3.1 Ethics 
 The Human Ethics Committee of Victoria University of Wellington approved 
my research with the Tangoa Island community and research interviews with 
government and NGOs in Luganville and Port Vila (Approval number 43/2006). 
Contributions from individual Tangoan research participants from the Tangoa 
Island will remain confidential, which means that individual participants are not 
identifiable in my thesis. Interviews with Provincial government and NGOs in 
Luganville, as well as interviews with government representatives in Port Vila, 
are also confidential except in cases where participants’ permission was 
expressly gained to use their names. The permission to use the names of several 
Port Vila based interviewees was sought where referring to them by name would 
add context and relevance to important quotes.   
 
 In addition to gaining formal ethics approval from my university, several ethical 
considerations related to doing cross-cultural field research were integral to my 
research design and practice. My concerns were related to some ethical issues 
and possible negative effects for the people that are being ‘researched.’ There is 
the potential for research to be used to legitimise of the voices of Western 
‘experts’ while undermining those of local people, and to represent local 
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knowledge in a way that colonises it reinforces patterns of domination 
(Scheyvens and Storey, 2003).38   
 
 Several steps were incorporated in this study to maximise the benefit of the 
research for the Tangoa community and to avoid acting and carrying out 
research in a way that was intrusive and exploitative.  These steps included:  
 
  Ensuring that we had the permission of the community to do the 
research, which involved meeting with the community leaders; 
  Involving several leaders and other people that offered research support, 
in deciding what kind of research would be useful for the community, 
and how would be the best way out carry the research;  
  Not asking too much of people’s time; 
  Arranging group activities in times that suited the participants; 
  Being aware of sensitive issues and avoiding questions that are intrusive 
and inappropriate; 
  Being aware of when to stop asking questions (e.g. when, or before, 
people were tired of answering questions); 
  Helping our host family with household activities when possible and 
where appropriate (e.g. cooking dinner etc); and  
  Communicating respect and gratitude by reciprocating where possible. 
This included giving appropriate gifts of thanks at the end of the 
research, and giving the research back in a variety of locally appropriate 
forms.39   
 
3.3.2 Positionality and Biases 
 According to the interpretive paradigm in social science research, the social 
world is “local, temporal and historically situated, fluid, context-specific and 
                                                 
38
 Colonial research has been described as research that promotes, deliberately or inadvertently, a 
colonising (and now globalising) agenda that includes political, economic, and cultural imperialism and 
neo-colonialism; national, transnational, and global exploitation and comodification of resources (natural 
and human). Colonial research also promotes Western or other colonial discourses about ‘civilisation’, 
‘development’, or ‘conservation’; Western conceptions of ‘science’; and a Western over-preoccupation 
with ‘self’ and self-gratification. (Stevens, and Howitt, 2000) 
39
 Gifts included offering the local kindergarten and primary schools story books, art supplies, and 
exercise books. These had been donated by the staff and students at Victoria University). We also gave 
framed photos to our host family and friends.  
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shaped in conjunction with the researcher” (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p109). 
Positionality, in terms of race, nationality, age, gender, social and economic 
status, and sexuality, may influence the data (Madge, 1993; Walsh, 1996, Rose, 
1997). Important characteristics that determined mine and my co-researcher’s 
status or positionality include: young females, relatively educated and wealthy, 
and from a western culture. 
 
 Our positionality influenced how people related to us and would have affected 
what people were willing to talk to us about, and their portrayals of reality.40  
Bias may have come from factors such as the willingness of people to please us 
by giving us the information that they knew we wanted.  Although we were 
interested in eliciting local knowledge and perspectives, my personal values, 
assumptions, experiences and priorities have, to an immeasurable extent, 
affected how I have interpreted and given meaning to data.  
 
 There is also a risk that this study has been affected by bias associated with 
interacting with some people more than others. Even though we tried to separate 
our research time and our family or social time, the many conversations over the 
dinner table provided a richer understanding of the particular concerns and 
perspectives of our host family. There may be also biases associated with 
interviewing more Tangoan men (18) than women (13), and more adults than 
youth. We had more male interviewees as women had less time available for 
interviews, and also because our research assistant/translator told many of his 
male friends to come meet us for an interview. We tried to mediate this bias as 
much as possible by actively seeking women participants and ensuring that 
women and youth were involved in focus group activities.    
 
 We tried to manage bias by triangulating data, and ensuring that we did not lead 
questions or prompt answers. We also minimised bias through the timing of 
activities and data collection. For example, we chose to do a focus group 
exercise that explored key community issues in general before an exercise where 
                                                 
40
 ‘Reflexivity’ is, in part, critically thinking about how one’s status characteristics, values, and history as 
well as the numerous choices one has made during the research, affects the results (Bailey, 2007). 
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people analysed major threats to the environment. This was done so people 
would identify and talk about their priority issues – whether they are economic, 
social or environmental. This was to ensure the groups would not be influenced 
by our focus on environmental issues and our underlying conservation values. 
This seemed to work as most of the issues raised in the first exercise were of a 
social/economic nature rather than purely environmental. 
 
3.3.3 Translation issues 
 Language barriers were an initial difficulty in the first few weeks of the research. 
Tangoan people speak their local language as well as Bislama. A 
translator/research assistant was assigned by our host family to assist us. Acting 
as both gatekeeper and translator, he helped us gain access to research 
participants and acceptance into the community. There are some biases 
associated with utilising a translator/research assistant, including his influence 
over the choice of participants. Efforts to minimize this bias included ensuring 
that our assistant understood that we wanted to get a good cross section of 
people, and also seeking our own interview participants. 
 
 We were also aware of bias that could arise from our assistant’s translation. To 
mitigate this risk, we communicated clearly to him the importance of letting 
participants answer the questions themselves and to translate the participant 
responses as closely as possible. Our translator was not used during any group 
activities with women in order to avoid biases related to gender power relations. 
In situations where a male translator might influence how women feel about 
discussing certain topics (Kumar, 2002), several women participants helped with 
translating during women’s group activities.  
 
3.3.4 Managing expectations  
 Managing expectations was an important ethical responsibility, which was vital 
for ensuring that our participants could give informed consent. Managing 
expectations involved building understanding about why we were there, the 
intent of the research, what will come from the research, and especially what 
will not come from the research. This understanding was necessary to avoid any 
deception and suspicion, and to avoid being associated with community politics.   
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 We worked out a communication strategy to ensure that the purpose of the 
research was as clear and transparent as possible, and to facilitate easy access to 
all the information that participants would need in order to make an informed 
decision to participate. When we met people, we explained this information to 
them face-to-face. We also translated an information sheet into Bislama and put 
it up on the notice board of the local store, on a tree at the canoe landing area, 
and on a notice board on the mainland. The information sheet contained the 
following points: 
 
 1. We are Amanda Leathers and Olivia Warrick, we are students from 
Victoria University in New Zealand.  
 2. We have been invited to Tangoa by Ioan Viji to do some research about 
how people use natural resources; what threatens the environment; the 
main problems that concern Tangoa people; and their ideas to solve the 
problems. 
 3. We will be staying at the Vetabe Guest house for 5 weeks, and anyone is 
welcome to come to talk with us and to ask us any questions about the 
research. 
 4. Anyone can participate in the research if they want to. 
 5. Details about the research activities (i.e. when and where they will be 
held) will be announced during the Tangoa Church services. 
 6. We plan to use the research to write theses for our university study.  
 7. We will present the results of the research to the community at the end of 
our stay.  
 8. Once we go home we will write a report which compiles the local 
knowledge generated through the research and send the report to the 
community.  
 9. Information that people personally contribute in interviews will be 
confidential - no individual names will be included in the presentation, or 
published in the report or our theses. 
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 We made posters in both English and Bislama that listed the main research 
questions (see figure 3.3). These posters were displayed on the walls in the 
meeting area outside the guesthouse.  
 
Figure 3.3, Posters listing main research questions 
 
3.4 Participatory research activities 
 The information gathered in the Tangoa case study and field work is the primary 
source of data to meet the second main objective of this thesis (see Chapter 1, 
section 1.6).  That objective was to determine the “locally identified factors 
affecting the ability of the Tangoa community to manage their commons 
resources”.  Within this thesis objective, eight specific case study objectives 
were developed to provide the focus for gathering data from participants. 
  
 Participatory Rural Appraisal methods were used in answering the eight case 
study objective questions.  PRA methodologies use various participatory 
research techniques when involving groups of participants.  Table 3.1 lists the 
objective questions that were used to guide case study field work.  Table 3.2  
lists the group research activities, which objectives they address, and some 
summary details about participants. 
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Table 3.1, Case-study objective questions and corresponding methods 
Objective 
numbers 
Objective questions 
a Where are the important natural resources that the Tangoa community uses?  
b What are the important resource area (or land-use) types? 
c How are Tangoa’s natural resource used and valued? 
d Who uses and manages Tangoa natural resources and how? 
e What are the threats to Tangoa’s natural resources?  
f What are the causes of resource degradation?  
g What are the locally identified strategies and solutions to the problems that drive 
resource degradation? 
h What are the strategy constraints and barriers to over-coming problems? 
 
Table 3.2, Group Research Activities 
 
Research activity 
 
Objective 
questions 
 
Number of 
activities 
 
Participant 
groups 
 
Gender 
composition 
Participatory mapping 2a -2e 
 
6 
(Includes maps of 
Tangoa resource 
area, marine 
maps, social 
map) 
Women 
Men 
Mixed 
20 women 
30 men 
 
 
 
 
Transects 2a - 2e 4 Women 
Men 
Mixed 
4 women 
10 men 
Seasonal calendar 2b - 2c 2 Women 
Men 
13 women 
12 men 
Resource rating matrix 2b - 2c 2 Women 
Men 
15 women 
15 men 
Focus group activity 1: 
goals identification 
2b- 2g 2 Women 
Youth 
13 women 
35 youth     
(mixed gender) 
Focus group activity 2: 
Problems and 
solutions cognitive 
mapping 
2f - 2h 2 Women 
Youth 
 
 
15 women 
37 youth     
(mixed gender) 
Focus group activity 3: 
Resource threats 
identification 
2d - 2e 2 Mixed men, 
women, youth 
and children 
30 – 40 
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3.4.1 Mapping 
 Community mapping is a means of gathering information about natural 
resources, special sites and local perceptions within a shared geographical 
framework (Sheil et al, 2002)41. Separate groups of men and women were 
involved in making maps of the Tangoa Resource area. We asked them to 
illustrate important areas that they use and to explain to us what they are used 
for, how they are managed, and what resource threats might exist (field work 
objectives 2a-2f). 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.4, Men’s resource map 
 
                                                 
41
 Also see Sheil and Liswanti, 2006. 
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 Several fishermen and women made marine resource maps, showing important 
fishing areas including reefs, islands, fish and crab breeding areas, and areas 
where they collect palolo worms (a type of sea worm with the scientific name 
Eunice viridis) and shellfish. These maps served as a good focal point for 
discussion about the environmental and social factors that affect fishing-based 
livelihoods, what the major threats are and how people cope with them, as well 
as ideas about how threats might be mitigated (case study objectives 2a – 2f). 
The marine maps were used as a basis for discussion during interviews, and 
were revised over time as a consequence of people’s input.  
 
 Some key informants made a map of Tangoa Island which shows where the 
different extended families live and where important infrastructure and cultural 
sites are, such as water pipes and tanks, church buildings, schools, and 
cemeteries. This social map was used in discussions with several key informants 
about intra-community socio-economic and wellbeing variation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5, Women making their resource map 
 
3.4.2 Transects 
 Transect walks involve walking with participants through major zones of land-
use and resource types within the community’s resource area, observing, 
discussing and noting details of specific characteristics. The walks are an 
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excellent method of gathering data on the interactions between human activities 
and the physical environment (Kumar, 2002). Transect activities can also help 
local people to recognise the issues confronting them, increase awareness about 
destructive behaviors, and create awareness of the need for change (Bronson et 
al. 1995). During transect activities participants provided information about: 
how different areas and resources are used and governed; who uses and manages 
them; social or environmental issues; and land-use history and environmental 
change over time. This provided data for case study objectives 2a – 2e.  
 
 Over five weeks we did three transect walks and one transect drive.42  Table 3.3 
below provides the details of where the transect took place and what participants 
were involved. 
 
 Table 3.3, Transects and participants involved 
 
 Transect Participants 
1 Through the garden area Elderly Tangoan couple 
2 Through the garden area Four young men and two women 
3 Through the whole Tangoa 
resource area 
Three men 
4 Through the South Santo 
province on the bus from 
Tangoa to Luganville Town 
One woman and one man 
 
 
3.4.3 Seasonal calendar  
 Seasonal calendars are a popular PRA method for analysis of annual cycles and 
seasonal variation in social and natural resource use (Kumar, 2002).  A group of 
12 men (ages ranged from 26-75) and 13 women (ages 19-60) were  involved in 
making seasonal calendars. These activities were used to further explore how 
resources are used and valued, who uses them, and how they are managed 
(objective questions 2b–2c).  
 
                                                 
42 The transect drive provided about the social, political and economic processes going on in the wider 
regional context.   
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 Participants were asked to describe the seasonal cycles of community activities 
such as when in the year different activities take place and how different groups 
(i.e. men women and children) are involved. The calendars showed how 
community activities are determined by natural resources use patterns and 
seasonal cycles; and how social, cultural and governance activities also related 
to seasonal cycles and natural resource-use patterns. Figure 3.6 is the men’s 
calendar and figure 3.7 is the women’s group calendar. 
   
 
 Figure 3.6, Men’s seasonal calendar 
 
 During the activity, discussion was focused on what times of year are most busy 
and/or difficult, why, and how people cope. This highlighted issues of food 
security, livelihood needs, and gender roles in fulfilling needs. When the 
calendar was finished, participants explained to us what they had drawn and 
written.  
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  Figure 3.7, Women’s group seasonal calendar 
 
3.4.4 Rating landscape areas  
 Resource rating activities are regarded as simple tools for generating information 
about how and why people make choices, and what choices they make 
(Nemarundwe, 2002, p179; Sheil D. and Liswanti N., 2006).  The tool was used 
to explore how people value different landscape/resource areas and why, and for 
determining the main preference and priorities of gender groups for landscape 
areas and resources-uses. This information directly addressed objective 2b–2c, 
(what are the important resource area types and how are they used and valued). 
Discussion throughout the exercise also contributed to objectives 2d–2g (about 
resource governance, resource management problems and threats, and local 
perceptions about how to solve them). 
 
 One group of fifteen men (ages 20-60 years) and one group of fifteen women 
(ages 24-55) were involved in a rating activity to ascertain what landscape areas 
are most important for what uses.  The rating activity involved three steps or 
activities that are explained in more detail below: a mapping of area types and 
resource use categories; a matrix table with ratings; and the explanation of how 
to use the matrix table and map. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 – Methodology 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
 
 
 Defining resource area types and resource-use categories  
 The numerous conversations with people about resource use and group 
activities, such as an initial mapping of resource area by key informants, gave a 
clear picture of various general resource area types. From this we were able to 
define some broad resource-use categories. These categories were checked with 
the participant group and participants added or changed the categories as they 
saw fit. It was important to make sure that participants had a shared 
understanding of the categories. 
 
 Making a matrix table  
 The matrix (see figure 3.8) was made from picture cards with Bislama labels to 
represent each of the resource area types and resource-use categories, with 
resource area cards on one axis and resource-use cards on the other axis. The 
pictures ensured that even non-literate participants would have a shared 
understanding of what the categories were. 
 
 
Figure 3.8, The resource rating matrix 
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 Facilitating the exercise 
 We asked participants to place 0 to 5 markers in each square, explaining that 
zero markers meant that an area is ‘not important’ for a particular use, 1 marker 
would be ‘a little important’ and 5 markers represented ‘very important’. Along 
the lines of Sheil et al. (2002), we assumed that ‘importance’ can be expressed 
as relative preference and usefulness. We used prompting questions like “how 
important are the plantation areas for medicine? Do you use medicines from 
plantation areas more than river areas?  And “are the medicines that you get 
from the plantations better than the medicine in the dark-bush?”  
 
 At the end of the activity participants explained the results.  
 
3.4.5 Trend analysis 
 Trend analysis was used to 
obtain data about the causes 
of resource degradation 
(objective 2f). Trend lines are 
a useful method of analyzing 
perceptions of change over 
time, and facilitating 
discussion of the factors 
affecting change (Kumar, 
2002). Trend lines were 
mostly utilised during 
interviews with individuals to 
explore aspects of both social 
and environmental change 
that participants brought up 
in discussion.  
 
 Trend lines were most often started at 1950 because the participants were 
confident about their knowledge back 50-60 years. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9, Traditional medicine specialist making a 
trend line (use of custom medicine) in the sand 
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3.4.6 Focus groups  
 Focus group activities are useful to engage groups of people, usually about 6-8 
participants per group, in collective discussion and analysis of specific topics 
(Margoluis and Salafsky, 1998).  Focus group activities were undertaken with 
sub-sets of the Tangoa population including groups of men, women, youth and 
elders. These groupings were based on methodological recommendations that 
these groups often have distinctive perspectives, and that people are often more 
comfortable interacting with their “peers” than in groups of mixed age and 
gender. Therefore these groups are more able to engage in rich discussions and 
generate new and valuable thoughts (Kumar, 2002). Tangoa’s church system 
already organises people into groupings of men, women, youth and elders. 
Therefore this structure was utilised to organise most group activities. Three 
different focus activities were carried out with participants. Each activity took 
1½-2 hours  
 
 Focus group activity 1: Identification of community values and 
goals 
 The first focus group activity was designed to explore Tangoan people’s goals, 
and to provides a foundation from which to further explore community issues in 
the second group activity.  Thirty five members of the youth group (aged 10-25) 
and 13 women aged (19-60) participated. In order to explore people’s goals, 
these focus groups of youth and women discussed two questions: “What do 
people value about life on Tangoa?”; and “What changes would make life on 
Tangoa even better?”.   
 
 Focus group activity 2: Problems and solutions cognitive mapping 
 The second activity built from the first to elicit data for three case study 
objectives: to understand the underlying causes of community problems, 
including resource degradation (objective 2f); local strategies and solutions 
(objective 2g); and strategy constraints and barriers to overcoming problems 
(objective 2h).  It involved 37 youth and 15 women in exploring focus 
questions: “What are the main issues and problems that people of Tangoa are 
concerned with?”; and  “How can the problems be solved?”.  In relation to the 
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Figure 3.10, Youth group working 
second question, we asked groups to explain the steps of any solution processes 
and who would be involved. 
 
 Both focus group activities 1 and 2 followed a similar methodological format 
which involved: 
 
 An introduction to ensure that participants understood the purpose of the 
activity;  
  Dividing participants into groups. The youth group leader divided youth into 
four groups (ranging from 5-8 per group) by counting 1 – 4 around the 
group. The women divided themselves into three groups for the first exercise 
and four groups for the second (group sizes ranged from 4-5); 
 Supplying groups with large sheets of paper, colored pens and large colored 
crayons;  
  Asking the groups to discuss the first question together and write and draw 
on the paper to explain and illustrate their ideas; and 
  Asking the groups to 
present their ideas (after 
about working for 15-20 
minutes).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Focus group activity three: Resource threats identification  
 The final focus group activity was designed to elicit data about what local 
people perceive as threats to the environment and natural resources (objectives 
2e and 2f). The question was focused on the main locally defined 
conceptualisations of ‘environment’ including: sea, reef, rivers, and forest. In 
order to attract as many participants as possible, we carried out the activity in an 
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open outdoor area where an old community meeting house once stood.  About 
28 people actively participated from the beginning and another 10-12 people 
joined as the exercise progressed. Participants were divided into four mixed 
gender and mixed aged groups ranging from 5 to 12 participants in each. Paper, 
crayons and colored pens were provided, and groups worked together to write 
and illustrate their ideas on the large sheets of paper.  
 
3.5 Census 
 At the time of the research there had not been an official census of the Tangoa 
population since the National census in 1999. Therefore, to ascertain the Tangoa 
population it was necessary to do our own census. We were fortunate that 
Chairman of the development committee offered to carry out the census for us. 
He visited representative from each clan and recorded the clans’ population of 
men women and children. Age categories included: <5; <20; <50; and >50.    
  
3.6 Interviews 
 Besides the participatory methods described above, interviews were the other 
key methodology used for this study. Interviews were carried out with: Tangoa 
community members; provincial government and NGOs in Luganville; and 
Government, NGOs and aid donors in Port Vila. 
 
3.6.1 Interviews with Tangoans 
 Thirty one interviews were undertaken with local Tangoans. These interviews 
were either unstructured, where no particular set or order of questions was used, 
or semi-structured, where a set of ordered questions was used to guide the 
interview (Bernard, 2002, p.205). These interview styles were used because they 
allow a conversational flow and flexibility of topic (Davidson and Tolich, 1999). 
The purpose of these interviews was to triangulate group activity data, to explore 
the objective questions in more detail and depth, and to investigate diversity in 
individual perspectives and responses. In both unstructured and semi-structured 
interviews, participants were encouraged to talk about ideas and issues of 
particular interest and importance to them. Interviewees were recruited with help 
of our translator who introduced us to people and then through ‘snowballing’, 
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where participants introduced and connected us with other willing participants 
(Davidson and Tolich, 1999). 
 
 The topics covered in interviews had relevance to all case study objectives (2a–
2h) and included: 
 
  livelihood practices of the particular informant;  
  the most important resources for their livelihoods;  
  where the important resource areas are;  
  what threatens the resources or what affects the abundance and quality of 
the resources over time and seasonally;  
  what rules and management practices exist to protect resources;  
  how well are these rules respected and why; and  
  how the management of the resources can be improved.  
 
3.6.2 Interviews with provincial government and NGOs in Luganville  
 We carried out semi-structured interviews with people from non-governmental 
organisations and Provincial Government departments in Lugainville (see table 
3.4 for a list of participant organisations). The purpose of these interviews was 
to gain some understanding of the wider socio-economic, political and 
institutional context in which Tangoa community is situated. These interviews 
also contributed to the third thesis objective, which asks how applicable the 
commons management issues identified in the local case study are for other 
communities in Vanuatu. The interview topics covered:  
 
  the role of the institutions or organisations and how they are involved in 
community level development and environmental management;  and 
  participant perspectives about the main environmental threats and local-
level community issues in the region and the main drivers of these 
problems.  
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 Table 3.4, Interview participants in Luganville   
 
 
Provincial government 
The Environment Unit 
The Rural Economic Development Initiative 
The National Tourism Development Office  
 
 
NGOs  
Sanma Provincial Council of Women 
Wantok Environment Centre 
The Sanma Council of Chiefs 
 
3.6.3 Interviews with government, NGOs and donor agencies in Port Vila 
 During a second trip to Vanuatu over four weeks during January and February 
2007, we carried out semi-structured interviews based in Port Vila with 
government (see table 3.5 for list of participant organisations). Key interview 
questions elicited data that contributes to answering thesis objective three which 
asks how widely experienced the commons management issues seen in the local 
case study are for other communities in Vanuatu. The aim was to gain a national 
level perspective of local commons management problems. Interviews covered 
topics including: 
 
  The role of the institutions or organisations and how they are involved in 
community level development and environmental management;   
  Main issues affecting community level development and sustainable 
management of natural resources in Vanuatu. This question was focused 
so that it related to the various community-based conservation and 
development initiatives that the interviewees had been involved with 
(which ranged from marine and land-based conservation, protected areas, 
sustainable forestry, agricultural developments, and other income 
generating projects); and 
  Underlying causes of problems, and opportunities for overcoming 
problems. 
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 Table 3.5, Interview participants in Port Vila 
 
 
Participants from government 
Department of Agriculture  
National Council of Women  
Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources  
Environment Unit  
Rural Economic Development Initiative (REDI)  
Department of Forests  
 
Participants from NGOs 
Vanuatu Cultural Centre  
VANGO (Vanuatu Alliance of NGOs)  
Wan Smolbag  
Peace Corps USA  
Foundation for the People of the South Pacific 
Vanuatu (FSP) 
 
Malvatumauri (National Council of Chiefs)  
 
Participants from aid donor organizations 
NZAID  
AusAID  
European Union  
 
3.6.4 Giving the Tangoa based research results back to the community 
 We were able to compile the community’s research and give a presentation at 
the conclusion of the field trip as well as providing a report of the research 
results.  The presentation covered the following:  
 
  things people value about life on Tangoa; 
  main problems affecting the Tangoa Community;  
  ideas about how to solve the problems; 
  main threats to natural resources; and 
  ideas about how threats to natural resources could be managed.  
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 The research report was presented during a return trip to Tangoa in February 
2007. The report compiled the main results from the group activities in the same 
structure as the presentation, and included some photographs and diagrams 
showing trend-lines and maps. Several color copies were given to the Paramount 
Chief, the Pastor, the youth group and women’s group leaders. Our research 
assistant/translator and the Chairman of the Development Committee also each 
received a copy.  
 
3.7 Data analysis 
 As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, this study uses a grounded theory 
approach to data analysis because it allows theories and insights to emerge from 
data, while avoiding potential biases in research associated with testing 
preconceived hypotheses (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  Grounded theory data 
analysis was used with all case study data, as well as interview data collected in 
Port Vila. Following the systematic approach to grounded theory described by 
Strauss and Corbin (1990), analysis progressed along three stages of coding: 
open coding; axial coding; and selective coding.   
 
 Open coding - Data was initially coded through a process of “breaking down, 
examining, comparing, conceptualising, and categorising data.” (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990, p61) Data was organised into nine major categories,43 and within 
each category subcategories were determined by their different dimensions 
(range of variations).  
 
 Axial coding - Data was further categorised, re-organised and linked through 
analysis of causal conditions, responses/strategies, intervening conditions, and 
outcomes.  
 
 Selective coding - Hypotheses that describe the interrelationships of selected 
categories were developed in a final process of data analysis.  
                                                 
43
 A category represents a unit of information composed of events, happenings, and instances 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
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3.8 Summary of methods used 
 This chapter has described the methods used for a case study of the factors that 
affect Tangoa community’s management of commons resources (objective 2), 
and how relevant the case study data is for the wider context of Vanuatu 
(objective 3).  A participatory research and grounded theory approach was the 
foundation for the methodology.  
 
 For the case study, multiple participatory research tools were employed to allow 
for the triangulation of data and identification of diversity in perspectives and 
knowledge. Group activities were supplemented and triangulated with 
interviews with local people. Interviews and the review of secondary, literature-
based research from Vanuatu allows me to answer the question of how widely 
the issues identified by the Tangoa community are relevant for other 
communities across Vanuatu.  These results will be discussed in more detail in 
the results, Chapters 4 and 5.  Table 3.6 provides a summary of the different 
methods used to explore each objective.   
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Table 3.6, Summary table of objectives and methods  
 
Objective 
numbers Objective questions Methods 
2 
 
What are the factors that affect Tangoa 
community’s management of commons 
resources? 
Case study using a participatory 
research and grounded theory 
approach 
2a 
 
Where are the important natural resources 
that the Tangoa community uses?  
 
Participatory mapping 
Transects 
Interviews 
2b 
What are the important resource area (or 
land-use) types? 
 
 
Participatory mapping 
Transects 
Seasonal calendar 
Resource rating matrix 
Interviews 
2c 
How are Tangoa’s natural resource used and 
valued? 
 
 
Participatory mapping 
Transects 
Seasonal calendar 
Resource rating matrix 
Interviews 
 
2d 
 
Who uses and manages Tangoa natural 
resources and how? 
 
 
Participatory mapping 
Transects 
Seasonal calendar 
Resource rating matrix 
Focus group activity 3 
Interviews 
 
2e 
 
What are the threats to Tangoa’s natural 
resources?  
 
 
Participatory mapping 
Transects 
Interviews 
 
2f 
 
What are the causes of resource 
degradation?  
 
 
Focus group activity 1 
Focus group activity 2 
Focus group activity 3 
Interviews 
 
2g 
 
What are the locally identified strategies and 
solutions to the issues and problems that 
drive resource degradation? 
 
Focus group activity 1 
Focus group activity 2 
Interviews 
 
2h 
 
What are the strategy constraints and 
barriers to over-coming problems? 
 
Focus group activity 2 
Interviews 
 
3 
 
How applicable or relevant are the case study 
data is for the wider context of Vanuatu 
(objective 3). 
 
Interviews and literature based 
research  
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Chapter 4 - Results Part 1: Tangoa Island Case Study 
 
 
 This chapter presents the case study data, which is focused on answering the 
second objective question identified in Chapter 1: “What factors affect the 
ability of the Tangoa community in South Santo, Vanuatu, to manage their 
commons resources?” The case study results are based on local perceptions of 
commons management issues. Findings are presented according to eight sub-
questions: 
 
  Where are the important natural resources that the Tangoa community 
uses?  
  What are the important resource area (or land-use) types? 
  How are Tangoa’s natural resource used and valued? 
  Who uses and manages Tangoa natural resources and how? 
  What are the threats to Tangoa’s natural resources?  
  What are the causes of resource degradation?  
  What are the locally identified strategies and solutions to the issues and 
problems that drive resource degradation? 
  What are the strategy constraints and barriers to over-coming problems? 
 
4.1 Where are the important natural resources that the Tangoa 
community uses?  
 The Tangoa resource area (TRA) is the area that Tangoa people use for their 
livelihoods, as well as for their subsistence and cash needs. During mapping 
activities with groups of men and groups of women, the boundaries of the TRA 
were explained. Figure 4.1 shows a men’s map of the resource area on the 
mainland (Tangoa Island is not on this map, but see fig. 4.2 to see where Tangoa 
Island is in relation to the TRA). At the top of the map a road marks the end of 
the TRA and the beginning of Narongo community’s resource area. To the left, 
the boundary is met by the Hasavia people’s territory and to the right the TRA 
stops where church land starts.  
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Figure 4.1, Boundaries of the Tangoa resource area shown on a men’s resource map 
 
4.2 What are the important resource area types? 
 The major resource types identified during mapping, transect walks, and 
resource rating excercises include: dark-bush44, gardens (including water taro 
plots), plantations (coconut and mixed coconut, cocoa and cattle), rivers, water 
sources, beaches, crab breeding and turtle breeding areas, reefs, and ocean. Fig 
4.2 is a map of the TRA and the different resource areas. The map has been 
created by combining maps drawn by separate women’s and men’s focus groups 
and displaying the information on a digital map.45  The most notable difference 
between the men’s and women’s maps was their depiction of garden land and 
dark-bush boundaries. This ambiguity reflects that gardens transition into dark-
bush on a continuum. Once an area of dark-bush is planted, it starts to transition 
into the category of “garden”.  These areas of transition are represented in fig. 
4.2 by the purple diagonal lines.  
                                                 
44 
‘Dark-bush’ is the local term for lowland tropical forest.  Dark-bush is defined by its use and level of 
cultivation. By different informants, dark-bush has been described as “natural areas, forest that has grown 
by itself” and “free-use”. Dark-bush is generally uncultivated; it grows naturally and is not cleared or 
planted with crops. This differentiates it from other types of bush areas which are more closely defined as 
agro-forestry or gardens, where crops and trees are planted. 
45
 The digital map is sourced from the VANRIS database (Landuse and Planning Office, Vanuatu 
Government, 1998) 
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Figure 4.2, Map of the Tangoa Resource Area  
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4.3 How are Tangoa’s natural resources used? 
 The main resource-use categories that emerged from interviews and mapping 
exercises were: food; money; house-building; canoe building; weaving; and 
medicine. During the resource rating exercise, the men’s focus group decided to 
include hunting as an additional important category.  
 
 Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the results from the resource rating exercises. Results 
from men and women vary. This is because they utilise different areas in 
different ways, and hence value them differently. The main findings of the 
resource rating excercises are discussed below.  The differences in how men and 
women use and value different resources are also explained. The matrix scores 
have relative values from 0 (not at all important) to 5 (very important).  
 
 One unexpected outcome was that some participants saw relationships within 
and between the categories of resource areas and uses. Instead of just 
considering how important garden areas or ocean and marine areas are for canoe 
building, the men also considered the importance of canoes for fishing, and to 
transport garden produce to their homes on Tangoa Island. This may indicate 
that we did not clearly explain that we were asking what resource areas are 
important for canoe building. This may affect the informative value of 
comparing the ratings of men and women. However, the information provided in 
discussions during the rating exercise helps to clarify and explain the results. 
 
 Gardens 
 Both men and women scored gardens as the second most important resource 
area type over all, after forests. Both men and women gave gardens the highest 
value score of five for the use-categories of food and money. The essential staple 
foods are grown in the garden. Tangoan staples include varieties of yams, 
bananas, and other fruits and vegetables. Surplus subsistence produce from the 
gardens is sold at local markets and in the main market at Luganville. Women 
are usually in charge of selling garden produce at the markets. 
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 Women also highly value gardens for house building, medicine, and weaving.  
People plant in their gardens important resources for these uses. Men explained 
that gardens attract wild animals (such as pigs and birds) and are therefore 
valuable hunting grounds. 
 
 Table 4.1, Men’s Matrix 
 
 Food House Money Canoe Medicine Weaving Hunting Total 
Gardens 5 2 5 5 2 3 2 24 
Ocean and 
marine areas 2 3 5 5 2 1 2 20 
Rivers 3 2 5 2 3 4 3 22 
Plantations 
(coconut + 
cocoa) 
5 2 2 2 5 2 3 21 
Forest (dark-
bush) 3 5 3 5 5 2 5 28 
 
 Table 4.2, Women’s matrix 
 
 Food House Money Canoe Medicine Weaving Total 
Gardens 5 5 5 3 5 5 28 
Ocean and marine areas 5 2 5 1 2 1 16 
Rivers 5 5 5 1 0 2 18 
Plantations (coconut + 
cocoa) 5 5 5 5 1 3 24 
Forest (dark-bush) 5 5 5 2 5 5 27 
 
 
 Marine resources 
 Marine resources are valuable for family subsistence and for cash generation. 
Both men and women harvest marine resources but do so in different ways. Men 
often fish with nets from canoes and dive to spear fish and collect crustaceans. 
Women generally collect crabs and shellfish from the shore or coastal forest 
areas (the important crab breeding areas are shown on fig. 4.2).  Fish and crabs 
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are an important source of protein for local diets, and seasonal calendars indicate 
the cultural significance of harvesting the palolo worm (a type of sea worm) in 
the seven days after the full moon in October.46  Fishing was considered by 
many interviewees as the most lucrative income generating activity. This is 
reflected in a “money” score of 5 from both men and women. According to the 
local primary school teacher: “Children from families that fish mostly [rather 
than work cutting copra] are healthier, dressed better, and can often stay in 
school longer because they can pay school fees.”  
 
 Plantations  
 Families earn cash from coconut plantations, where they work cutting, drying 
and transporting copra.47  Coconut foliage is locally used for weaving mats 
while the fruit and coconut milk is a staple ingredient in cooking. Coconut can 
also be used in medicinal preparations. Coconut timber from old non-productive 
plantations is used for house and fence building.   
 
 Several interviewees explained that historically, those who owned coconut 
plantations were usually wealthier than those later migrants to the Tangoa area 
who did not have plantations.  Coconut trees are still an essential element in the 
lives and culture of Tangoans. However, market prices for copra are volatile and 
currently very low. This means that the returns from copra production are low 
and unreliable. One man explained: “All the coconuts lay on the ground. People 
don’t bother with them because the price is too low now. It is better to feed them 
to the pigs.” 
 
 Other important cash crops are cocoa, vanilla and kava.48  While the market 
value of these products far outweighs that of copra, the area planted in these 
crops is relatively small. Vanilla, in particular, has only recently been planted 
and the vines have not yet reached maturity. Economic data about the relative 
values of copra and cocoa was gathered from an interview with an owner of a 
                                                 
46
 A certain type of yam (soft yam) is planted so that its harvesting coincides with that of the sea worm. 
The harvesting of the sea worm was an important event on both men’s and women’s calendars.   
47
 Copra is the flesh of a coconut. It is first cut out of the shell, then dried in a large oven (copra dryer), 
and then it is transported to the processing plants in Luganville.  
48
 A mildly tranquilizing, ceremonial drink made from the root of Piper methysticum.   
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copra plantation, as well as a meeting with a group of three women. The women 
explained that cocoa is three times more valuable than copra by weight. One big 
bag of copra fetches a price of about 1000 Vatu, ($14) where as a big bag of 
cocoa earns 3,000 Vatu ($42). However cocoa crops tend to be smaller because 
it is much harder work. The women explained that the young shoots on a cocoa 
plant need to be cleaned every day, or the yield will be small. 
 
 While it would have been valuable to do a full agricultural census of the Tangoa 
population, this was beyond the scope of this study. However, several key 
informants provided some estimates about the number of households that had 
their own coconuts. Five estimates ranged from about 40% to about 65%. These 
informants estimated that over 50% of households were growing kava, about 
20% - 30% of households were growing cocoa, and a smaller number were 
growing vanilla. An increasing number of people are also planting timber crops 
such as white wood, mahogany, and nangai49.   
 
  Interviews with a group of three women and a Tangoan man who owned a 
coconut plantation provided information that Tangoans that have cocoa usually 
harvest two big bags per year, which earns 6,000 vatu annually. Those that have 
their own coconut trees mostly have about 0.5 hectares, which can produce 
about one tone of copra four times a year. Currently, the annual earning from 
four tones of copra is about 76,000 Vatu ($5429 NZD). This becomes 52,000 
Vatu (3714$NZD) after labour expenses are paid.50 A plantation owner 
explained that 6000 Vatu is paid to about 10-15 men who work for one week 
when it is time to cut copra. Copra is cut four times a year. 
 
 Freshwater resources 
 Freshwater resources such as noura (freshwater crayfish) and watercress have 
both subsistence and market value. These resources related to the ‘river’ 
resource category result in a rating of 5 for the use category of ‘money‘ by both 
men and women.  This rating reflects the cash component from selling to the 
                                                 
49
 Nangai is a nut tree of the scientific name: Canarium indicum. 
50
 The average price in the past for one ton of copra was 29,000, (2070$NZD) now it is about 19,000 Vatu 
(1357$NZD) 
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market. ‘River’ also includes riparian vegetation and water taro patches. 
Although water taro has little market value, women explained that it is a very 
important subsistence crop, especially in hard times (e.g. after cyclones).  This 
explains their score of 5 for ‘food’ as a use category.  
 
 Women also considered rivers important for house building materials, 
explaining that after collecting vines used to secure thatch roofs, they soak them 
in the river to improve their flexibility.  Men gave rivers a high score for the use 
category of ‘weaving’. This is because men see women soaking weaving 
materials in rivers to soften them. Women generally do the weaving, so they 
have a better idea of where the important weaving materials come from and 
scored the ‘garden’ and ‘dark-bush’ resource areas as most important.  
 
 Dark-bush 
 Dark-bush is a resource type that is valuable for all resource-uses defined by 
participants. Both men and women gave ‘dark-bush’ the highest possible score 
for the use categories ‘house building’ and ‘medicine’. Women also gave it a 
score of five for ‘food’, ‘money’, and ‘weaving’. Men gave it a score of five for 
‘canoe building’ and ‘hunting’. Discussions and activities revealed that men 
generally build canoes, and hunt more than women. 
 
 Products from the dark-bush are gathered for household consumption as well as 
to sell at the local markets. Wild yams grow in the dark-bush and are an essential 
food source in times of emergency, such as after cyclones when garden crops 
have been damaged. The dark-bush also provides plentiful and diverse types of 
fruit and medicinal products. It is the habitat for wild animals that are most 
valued by hunters such as flying fox (bat), wild pig, wild bull, and a variety of 
birds. House-building timbers, thatches and vines grow in the dark-bush, as well 
as trees for making canoes such as blue-water, mahogany, and mango.  
 
 The forest provides timber for firewood and many weaving materials. Some 
weaving materials, such as natangora, are planted in gardens. However the most 
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culturally and economically valued material for the fine craft baskets and mats – 
the fibrous nalu vine – is only gathered from the dark-bush.  
 
4.4 Who uses and manages Tangoa natural resources and how? 
 
4.4.1 Tenure arrangements 
 Access to, use, and authority to manage various resources within the TRA is 
largely defined by tenure arrangements. Today, the land that Tangoa people live 
on has the official (government recognised) tenure status of leased land 
(Landuse and Planning Office, Vanuatu Government, 2000). As discussed in the 
introduction to the research site (section 3.2.2), Tangoa resource area is leased 
from the government by private investors and the Presbyterian Church. 
Indigenous ownership has not yet been determined. Despite this, the area is 
largely governed under a community-based tenure system.  Under communal 
tenure, the allocation rights for land and resources are held under various forms 
of customary authority. In the case of Tangoa, resources under communal tenure 
may be used and controlled individually or collectively  
 
 Access rights to common property resources, and to individual lands under 
communal tenure are based on group membership (clan affiliation) and long-
term residency on Tangoa.  Land and resource allocation and distribution is the 
function of customary institutions, and current demographic pressures. In the 
past, the Chiefly authority could allocate land to new migrants. Rights are now 
generally restricted to members who share a common lineage. During a transect 
walk a Tangoan elder explained: “If you have no land you can make an 
agreement with someone to get some land for a garden…but now most land is 
taken already and there is not much space to share.” One informant explained 
that rights to land are recognised on a long-term basis and are transferred in 
families by inheritance: “This will always be my family’s land.” However, 
another informant explained that the duration of rights can be determined by 
evidence of continuous use. One Tangoan man explained that after being away 
from Tangoa for 10 years, his inherited land had been used by his brothers. Now 
he has no land for his family, and must make a living by running several small 
businesses. 
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 Several key informants explained that one important result of these tenure 
arrangements is that more recent migrants, such as those that came in the early 
1980s, have less quality and quantity of land for gardens. Local data suggested 
that women’s access to land is indirect, through their husbands or sons.51  
 
 Research results about management and tenure of different resource areas show 
that types of resources within the TRA fall under four broad tenure categories. 
This data was gathered from transect walks, mapping exercises with groups of 
men and women and interviews with 3 key informants.  There are three forms of 
communal tenure: common property; areas that are controlled by clans 
(extended family groups); and areas controlled by Tangoa households. The 
fourth type of tenure is privately controlled land and resources by non-
indigenous individuals or organisations. The individuals with tenure over land 
are primarily investors and the most important organisation holding land is the 
Presbyterian Church. Some details about the different tenure arrangements, how 
they are used, and who has the authority to manage them is provided below.  
Figure 4.3 illustrates this information on a map, and it is summarised  
 in table 4.3.   
 
                                                 
51
 Land transfer is complex. While local informants presented a simplistic explanation for us (i.e. from 
father to son), traditions of matrilineal transfer may still be practiced. If so, this would mean that women 
have access to land through their mother’s brother.   
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Figure 4.3, Map showing tenure types within the Tangoa Resource Area  
  
 
In transition 
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Common property  
 Areas and resources that fall under common property or shared resource tenure 
include: marine areas; rivers; water sources; dark-bush (forest areas); and water 
taro patches. During mapping exercises it was established that anyone from the 
Tangoa community can harvest and use these resources (see figure 4.3). The 
common property areas are governed by a customary governance regime which 
is a set of institutions, regulations and management practices which is subject to 
collective decision-making by Tangoan people, lead by Chiefly authority. 
 
 Clan owned 
 Clan owned areas within the TRA include some coconut plantaions, the clan 
villages on Tangoa Island where the households belonging to particular clans are 
situated and marked by gardens, hedges and other forms of landscaping. Figure 
4.4 is picture of a social map made by three men. The circular lines mark clan 
area boundaries. Some clans also have claim to certain areas at the back of the 
island, which is a narrow forested area between the villages and the shore. This 
area is used to keep pigs and one clan has built a meeting house on their land. 
Although these areas are not officially or legally registered to indigenous 
owners, there is a shared understanding of the tenure and boundaries of these 
clan controlled areas on Tangoa Island. Within these boundaries the clans have 
some autonomy from the Paramount chief to decide how to use these areas. 
Decisions are governed by the customary authority/leaders within the clans who 
may be elected chiefs; or councils made up of elders and their first sons.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.4, Social map of Tangoa Island showing clan areas (made by three men) 
Chapter 4 – Results Part 1: Tangoa Island Case Study 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
 
 
 
 Tangoa household owned 
 Gardens and some coconut plantations are owned by individual households. 
During a transect walk a Tangoan elder explained: “Once you plant your family 
owns it. People respect that.” Triangulation with others revealed that different 
forms of tenure relate to fruit trees and crops that can be ‘owned’ or retained in 
exclusive use for those who plant them – even when the trees or crops are 
planted in commons or clan owned areas. Customarily, men are considered the 
chief decision-makers concerning household resources; however data from 
interviews and seasonal calendar exercises with groups of men and women 
indicate the management responsibilities and decisions concerning gardens are 
often shared (to varying degrees between households).  One woman explained 
that in terms of decisions about managing gardens: “I decide what to plant. I 
take it to the market and see what will sell.”  
 
 Private leasehold land 
 Some plantations within the TRA are individually/privately used and controlled 
by leaseholders who are non-indigenous individuals or organisations (i.e. 
church, and private investors). Since the early 1960’s the northern side of 
Tangoa Island has been used by the Taulua Bible Training Center (Presbyterian 
Church). While the Church uses the land for coconut and cattle, villagers are 
permitted to fish from the shore, collect shell-fish, crabs and some fruit from this 
side of the island. This is usually done by the “mammas” (women) and children. 
The church hires a caretaker for the leasehold on Tangoa Island and subleases an 
area on the mainland to an Australian investor. This area is called Navota Farm 
and is predominantly used for coconut plantations and cattle.  
 
 While there have been no successful claims by Tangoans for the Church 
controlled land on Tangoa Island and on the mainland, the Customary Lands 
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Tribunal Act of 2001 makes it is possible for customary land owners to win 
ownership and control of this land.52  
 
Table 4.3, Types of tenure, use, and authority to manage in the TRA 
 
Type of tenure Who uses it? Who has authority 
to manage? 
Example of 
resources/areas 
Common property All Tangoans Paramount Chief and 
Chief’s Council have 
ultimate NRM 
authority. All 
Tangoans are 
responsible for 
abiding, 
implementing and 
maintaining 
management 
customs and rules 
Marine areas, rivers, 
water sources, dark-
bush (forest areas), 
water taro patches 
Communal tenure (clan 
owned) 
Clans  Clan leaders. (Clan 
chiefs, committees or  
councils made up of 
elders and their first 
sons) 
Clan village areas on 
Tangoa Island 
Communal tenure  
(Tangoa households) 
Tangoa households  Heads of the 
household (men are 
customarily seen as 
the heads of the 
households, but their 
wives also make 
important NRM 
decisions at the 
household level) 
Gardens, plantations 
Private (Non-
indigenous 
leaseholders) 
Private interests 
(investors, or 
organisations i.e. 
church) 
Leaseholders and 
their managers/ 
caretakers 
Plantations 
 
4.4.2 Governance Institutions 
 
 The Paramount Chief and his council 
 The Paramount Chief is the head decision maker in the community. His role is to 
make and enforce rules that determine access and use of common property 
resources, provide leadership and governance, resolve disputes, and manage 
community funds (e.g. aid/disaster relief). The Chief is supported in his role by 
                                                 
52
 For more information about this Act and the process of its implementation see: Simo, J. Report of the 
National Review of the Customary Land Tribunal Program in Vanuatu. The Vanuatu Cultural Centre, 
Port Vila. http://www.vanuatuculture.org/projects/050627_customarylandtribunalreport.shtml  
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the Council of Chiefs. The council is made up of the chiefs or leaders of each 
different clan53, and representatives of different groups and committees such as a 
youth group, a women’s group, the Congregation Life Committee (church), an 
environment committee, and a development committee. The Paramount Chief 
has an Assistant Chief and a Chairman who help coordinate the council. The 
Tangoa Council of Chiefs and the Paramount Chief makes consensus decisions 
concerning natural resource management. Figure 4.5 illustrates Tangoa’s 
community governance structure as drawn by one Tangoan man and triangulated 
by several others. 
 
 
Figure 4.5, Community governance structure 
 
 The role of women in decision-making 
 Customarily women have a minimal role in decision-making at a community 
level. They have a women’s representative on the Council of Chiefs. This 
representative, however, is a man.  They generally communicate concerns via 
their husbands. As one informant explained: “They will pressure their husbands 
to represent them.” A representative from the Sanma women’s council explained 
that women’s ability to earn money has helped to empower women so that they 
have more respect and influence the household level. Earning money gives 
                                                 
53
 Some clans have elected Chiefs and others have not. Generally the family leaders that are on the 
Council of Chiefs are nominated through a consensus decision-making process involving the eldest male 
or eldest son of each family within the clan.   
Chief 
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women more bargaining power with their men, which in turn increases their 
influence at the community level. A Tangoan weaver explained: “Now as my 
husband is training to be a carpenter, I am making most money for my family 
with my baskets. He has to listen to me more now!” 
 
 Customary law and traditional management practices (TMPs) 
 Customary law and practice or ‘kastom’54, forms the basis of group tenure and 
collective resource management. Traditional management practices (TMPs) 
were discussed in numerous interviews. A vast amount of knowledge about how 
to use, manage, and monitor resources exists in custom stories, songs, and the 
unique local language.  
  
 This kastom knowledge is reflected in such things as the names of particular 
places, species of wildlife and plants, and the way weather is forecast. A 
traditional weather expert explained that certain indicators and events in nature 
signal and predict change in resource abundance, both natural (e.g. seasonal and 
cyclic) or human driven. These predictors are customarily used to guide NRM.  
The most commonly identified example of NRM rules was the use of taboos. 
Taboos are rules that restrict resource use. They may determine when, where, 
and how resources can be used, and by whom. There are traditional management 
practices for soil conservation, conservation of certain species and ecologically 
sensitive areas, management of resource stocks, building habitats, and NRM 
practices for cyclone preparation (see table 4.4 for summary and examples of 
some management practices identified during mapping exercises, transects, and 
interviews).  
                                                 
54
 ‘Kastom’ refers to the unwritten ways, thoughts and conduct that are held to be morally good, right and 
true for the ni-Vanuatu. Kastom refers to the values and rules of behavior upheld by the communities in 
the rural areas (Kalontano et al. 2003). 
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Table 4.4, Select natural resource management practices 
 
Type of management 
practice Example 
Soil conservation Planting pandanas and vemeu along river banks; rules 
about not cutting trees near rivers.  
Species conservation Restrictions on size of and number of coconut crabs; rules 
about when crabs can be harvested 
Conservation of ecologically 
sensitive areas 
Taboos on certain marine areas e.g. rules about where 
canoes can be landed (to minimize damage to reef)  
Management of resource 
stocks 
Rules about where and how trees can be harvested (i.e. 
only where there are seedlings to grow in their place)  
Building habitats 
Women build ‘crab piles’ - mounds of rocks where crabs can 
live. Food scraps and grated coconut flesh is thrown onto 
the piles to feed the crabs 
Use of environmental 
indicators 
Letting environmental indicators (i.e. the flowering of certain 
trees or coral)55 to inform when taboos should be set or lifted 
Cyclone preparation  Planting resilient food crops and housing materials in wind protected areas.  
 
 
4.5 What are the threats to Tangoa’s natural resources?  
 Interviews and group research activities generated detailed information about 
environmental problems, what local people consider to be the immediate causes 
of resource degradation, the secondary environmental effects, and the 
consequences for local livelihoods. This information falls under the four broad 
categories of forest degradation, soil degradation, and degradation of marine and 
freshwater resources. 
 
4.5.1 Forest degradation 
 Ten interviewees and five focus groups (two from ‘problems and solutions 
cognitive mapping’ and three from ‘threats identification’) identified that 
unsustainable rates and practices of harvesting timber are occurring. The result is 
the degradation of the dark-bush, and scarcity of timber resources. The data 
collected show two immediate causes. The first is population pressure: “Too 
                                                 
55
 A traditional weather expert explained that, in a similar way that trees and plants flower in particular 
seasons, particular corals and marine plants also ‘flower’, and go through seasonal changes.   
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many people are taking wood from the dark-bush.” The second is declining 
respect for customary taboos related to the dark-bush: “Before, people would 
only take a big tree in places where small trees will grow in its place. Now 
people do not respect that taboo.”    
 
 Although population growth was a general cause, more specific elements were 
identified. Clearing dark-bush for gardens, plantations and cattle is reducing the 
size of dark-bush areas56 (see figures 4.6 and 4.7).  People identified population 
growth as an immediate cause: “As families grow, people will keep clearing 
more bush for gardens.”  Another element is local people’s lack of authority to 
govern some areas within the TRA as they are under the control of private 
investors and the Church: “The investor can decide to clear more bush for cattle. 
Some local people do not want this, but they will still clear the bush for him 
[investor] because he will pay. If he does not pay us, he will bring other people 
to do it.”  
 
 Social conflict can also be a cause of forest degradation. In the past, people have 
logged trees in dark-bush areas that are under dispute as an act of sabotage 
against rival land claimants57 (see figures 4.6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.6, Focus group poster (mixed gender) “What destroys the dark-bush: logging” 
                                                 
56
 Relatively large scale clearing of dark-bush is occurring to make way for more coconut plantations and 
cattle. A local investor is extending his plantation and coconut farm in an area close to the TRA.  The 
Tangoa community has provided labour for clearing bush for this investor in the past, which funded the 
building of the church and paid the Pastor’s salary, and has been hired to do clearing again.  
57
 ‘Illegal’ logging has occurred in dark-bush on disputed land. When a land claim was almost settled, 
disputed claimers quickly harvested trees. Several informants speculated that the loggers “wanted to 
benefit while they still had a chance” (thinking that once the claim is settled, they will be restricted from 
these benefits). Others considered it to be conflict related sabotage. This type of conflict has resulted in 
resource degradation as well as violence between disputing claimers.   
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 Figure 4.7, Mixed gender focus group illustration of logging 
 
 Degradation of dark-bush has secondary environmental and livelihood effects 
including habitat loss for important wildlife resources such as hunting. Two 
hunters, one young man and one more senior man, identified how the abundance 
of particular species has changed over time. Both separately drew trend lines 
that showed a steady decline in wild animals. The older hunter explained how 
the use of muskets in the 70s and 80s has had a dramatic impact on flying fox 
numbers (see fig. 4.8).  However both hunters identified loss of habitat and over 
harvesting of wild animal resources as current causes. 
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 Figure 4.8, Trend analysis of the abundance of wild animals by two informants  
 
 Another secondary effect of clearing dark-bush is the degradation of fresh water 
and marine resources. During the mapping and resource rating exercise, men 
explained that clearing dark-bush has changed the level of water and direction of 
river and stream flows. This has caused the drying of swamps where water taro 
grows.  This, in turn, has important impacts on food security as water taro is 
valuable back-up crop in times of need.  
 
4.5.2 Soil degradation  
 The main cause of soil degradation is increased land-use intensity in the garden 
areas. Increasing population and limited land area for gardens means that fallow 
periods (times when gardens are left uncultivated in order to allow them to 
regenerate) have shortened. While on a transect walk, a man explained: “In the 
past, people could leave their gardens in fallow for 4-6 years. Now there are 
more people using the same area. They have to clear and use the same ground 
every two years.”   
 
1950 1960 1970 19901980 2000 Today 
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and plantations.” 
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“It’s hard to find 
pigs now. Pig 
habitat has been 
destroyed by 
increasing gardens 
and plantations.”  
 
“Bush clearing 
and over 
harvesting will 
continue.”  
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 Soil erosion is also a problem when bush is cleared for coconuts and cattle, and 
when coastal or riparian trees are cut. Soil erosion has some important secondary 
impacts on freshwater and marine resources systems.  
 
4.5.3 Degradation of marine resources  
 Interviewees and focus groups of men and women identified that the abundance 
of marine resources has declined (see fig. 4.9). The perceived causes were: that 
there are more people fishing (due to growing population); people are catching 
more fish to sell at the market for cash (instead of just for subsistence); and 
because they are using small mesh nets (modern fishing technology) which catch 
all the small fish. Use of small mesh nets makes it difficult for people to respect 
a customary taboo which restricts harvesting of small fish.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.9, Women’s focus group poster illustrating degradation of marine resources: “The 
number of fish and shellfish has gone down” 
 
 Based on trend analysis, Figure 4.10 shows the different perspectives of an older 
fisherman and a younger fisherman. The older considers that a recent marine 
taboo set by the fisheries department has had no effect: “People break the marine 
taboo when they need to make cash by selling fish.” He also believes that fishing 
will increase if a local project to build a freezer to store fish goes ahead, 
enabling access to bigger markets (e.g. Luganville).The younger fisherman 
expressed that a Fisheries Department taboo on a marine area near Tangoa had 
helped increase fish numbers, and that the Department’s artificial fish breeding 
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habitat (a floating raft) might also help to boost numbers. Several others 
considered this unlikely, as the ‘raft’ has been broken for over a year and the 
Fisheries Department has not come to fix it. Also, the raft is not a suitable 
breeding habitat for some of the most important species that are being affected 
by over fishing.  
 
 
 Figure 4.10, Trend analysis of change in fish stocks (by an old fisherman (black line) and a 
young fisherman (blue line) 
 
 Tangoa beach on the north side of Tangoa Island is also being degraded by the 
harvesting of sand to make concrete (for the modern style of house building) and 
for landscaping (i.e. paths) in the village.  Coral reefs are being damaged by the 
landing of canoes, as people no longer respect custom taboos that restrict canoe 
landing to certain areas. Reefs are also affected by sedimentation of rivers from 
land based activities. Marine resources are also degraded by the disposal of 
waste into the sea. Dumping of batteries and iron roofing material was seen a 
particular concern (see fig. 4.11 and note the last item listed translates into 
“cutting all the trees close to the coast”).  Non-biodegradable waste is relatively 
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“Ice machine 
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Luganville 
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new, arriving with western products and packaging.  As a resulte, there are no 
customary taboos or rules to manage this problem.58   
 
 
Figure 4.11 Mixed gender focus group poster identifying causes of marine resource degradation 
 
4.5.4 Degradation of freshwater resources 
 Freshwater resources such as noura (freshwater crayfish) are also declining for 
reasons similar to those for marine degradation above. People are taking too 
many to sell at the market, and more people are harvesting them.  Freshwater 
resources  (as well as coral reefs and marine fish breeding areas) are negatively 
impacted by increased sedimentation from clearing bush and cutting trees near 
rivers and along the coast. There is a customary taboo against harvesting trees 
near rivers and the coast; however people are increasingly breaking the taboo.  
 
 The practice of letting cattle near rivers and water sources was identified by 
focus groups as the cause of water pollution, erosion of river beds, and 
sedimentation. This damages fresh water resources such as fish, noura, water 
taro and water cress. The health of local people that drink the water is also 
affected. Several women perceived that cattle farming on coastal land may also 
be negatively impacting crab breeding areas. There are no customary rules about 
farming cattle near rivers and water sources and local people feel that their 
ability to make rules is overpowered by the cattle owners (private investors). As 
we came to a river along a transect walk, an informant explained: “Cattle come 
                                                 
58
 There lacks an effective waste disposal system on Tangoa. Rubbish is laid out at the back of the island 
to dry and degrade. Some organic waste is fed to pigs. The non-degradable waste is burned. Increase in 
imported food goods is increasing the about of waste and modern food packaging (tin cans, plastic etc.) 
takes a long time to degrade and often ends up in the reefs. Local people explained that cyclones “clean 
the island” (by bowing all the rubbish into the sea). 
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in here and trample the area where water taro grow. They make a mess and 
sometimes people who drink the water get sick. But this is investor land so we 
can’t do anything.” See fig. 4.12. 
 
 
Figure 4.12, Mixed gender focus group poster identifying causes of fresh water resource degradation: 
Buluk (cattle); Katem wut (cutting wood); mining; wasem klos (washing clothes) 
 
 Table 4.5 summarises this section, showing the various resource use practices 
that local people identified as unsustainable, and the resource types that are 
affected.   
 
 Table 4.5 Resource use practices and resources affected 
 
Unsustainable resource use practice Resources affected 
 Dark-bush Soil Freshwater 
and marine 
Timber harvesting     
Clearing dark-bush for gardens    
Clearing dark-bush for plantations and cattle    
Cattle near water sources and rivers    
Cutting trees by rivers and coast    
Over fishing    
Over harvesting of sand from Tangoa beach    
Waste disposal problems    
Expansion of canoe landing area    
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4.6 What are the causes of resource degradation?  
 The previous section mentions several unsustainable resource use practices and 
some of the underlying drivers of these practices. Some of the reasons are 
related to demography, such as population pressures driving increased resource 
use, and in turn, resource scarcity.  Some are related to economic pressures 
which are driving an increase in the use of natural resources for money. Other 
drivers can be considered ‘governance issues’ including: lack of rules; lack of 
respect for rules where they exist (i.e. customary taboos); and issues related to 
whether local Tangoan people have the authority to make rules and govern 
resources. Table 4.6 indicates which of these drivers relate to the resource use 
practices outlined in the previous section. This section looks at all the drivers of 
resource degradation in more detail.  
 
 Table 4.6, Locally identified drivers of unsustainable resource- use practices  
 
Cause  
Unsustainable resource  
use practice 
No rules People 
not 
following 
rules 
Lack of 
authority 
to govern 
Population 
and 
economic 
pressures 
Timber harvesting      
Clearing dark-bush for gardens     
Clearing dark-bush for plantations and 
cattle 
  
  
Cattle near water sources and rivers     
Cutting trees by rivers and coast     
Over fishing     
Over harvesting of sand from Tangoa 
beach 
 
  
 
Waste disposal problems     
Expansion of canoe landing area     
 
4.6.1 Population pressures 
 Population pressures were cited by interviewees, women and youth groups as 
causes of increased: timber harvesting; clearing of dark-bush for gardens; 
fishing; harvesting sand, and waste disposal problems.  In other words, 
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population pressures are affecting every category of natural resource that 
Tangoans identified as important for their livelihoods. A comparison of national 
census data from 1999 (Vanuatu National Statistics Office, 1999) with our own 
census of the Tangoa population in 2006 shows that the number of people living 
on Tangoa has increased 34% (from 373 – 498) over seven years. 
 
 Population pressures were closely linked with economic pressures. Higher 
population leads to higher demand for natural resources and money, while at the 
same time it drives resource degradation and scarcity. Women’s focus groups 
identified that rising population affects the ability for the family to generate 
enough money so that all their children can go to school (see fig 4.13).  The 
result is that few children (especially females) are able to access education past 
primary school, and even fewer children complete high school or access higher 
education.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.13 Women’s focus group problems analysis (“The population is very high, many 
children do not go to school”)  
 
4.6.2 Economic pressures 
 Economic pressures are directly affecting resource degradation as people 
increasingly need to use natural resources to earn cash. This was cited as a cause 
of increased fishing, harvesting products from the dark-bush to sell at the 
market, and engaging in wage labour to clear bush for plantations and cattle. 
This section first looks at what cash is needed for, then outlines how a growing 
monetary economy and lack of land contributes to economic pressures. 
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 Household expenses 
 Focus group activities and interviews identified meeting everyday household 
cash needs as the greatest economic pressure for Tangoa families. Cash is 
needed for goods from the store (such as such as kerosene, sugar, flour and 
soap), medical expenses, transport, clothes, and tithe (money for Church). The 
most problematic economic expense for families is paying school fees. A focus 
group of women explained that school fees are the most problematic expense 
because they need to be paid three times a year, which means that money has to 
be earned and saved for these times. Other expenses such as buying goods from 
the store are spread evenly across the year.  “It is difficult for families to make 
enough money and save it for school fees. Buying rice is a small cost, paid often, 
so you don’t need to save so much.” Fees are due in January, May, and August. 
59
 The seasonal calendars show that much of the year’s work activities, 
especially in the months of January, April, May, July and August, are focused on 
earning cash for school fees. Figure 4.14 is a picture of the women’s seasonal 
calendar showing that people cut copra in January for fees due later in the 
month. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 The costs for primary school: 1st term 2000 vatu ($28NZD) (1st child); 1500 vatu ($21) (2nd child), 
1500 vatu (3rd child). The costs for secondary school are: 17,000v ($235) term 1; 15,000v ($207) term 2; 
15,000 term 3.  The cost of sending children to school for year 11 and 12 is 30,000v ($2143) each term  
(Woman’s group). 
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 Figure 4.14, Women’s seasonal calendar - showing activities for January and February  
 
 The Sanma Council of Women provided some indication of the economic costs 
of a typical family in South Santo (see fig. 4.15). 
Sanma Women's Council estimate of household 
expenses
28%
27%
4%
5%
18%
18% Food from the store(rice, sugar etc)
School fees
Medical expenses
Transport
Clothes
Tithe 
 
 Figure 4.15, Estimate family expenses for households in the Sanma province (Sanma Council of 
Women, 2006)60   
 
 Community contributions  
 On top of household expenses, families often have to fundraise for school (other 
than fees) and church. In discussing all the different responsibilities that the 
church, schools and the various committees require, one woman exclaimed: “It 
is too much to do, we have to cut copra for school fees, it is too hard to spend 
time working and fundraise for these things too.” Economic difficulties are 
exacerbated by poor coordination of these responsibilities. Both men and women 
identified that the various activities often clash because there is no single 
community calendar. 
 
 
                                                 
60 
 Data sources from Minutes of a Sanma Council of Women Conference held over 20th -24th February 
2006 at the Sanma Women’s Resource Centre, Luganville, Santo. Estimates were a result of a meeting 
about budgeting involving 18 women from the Sanma province (mostly from East and South Santo). 
While the estimates are representative of a wider demographic and are not specific to Tangoa, the Council 
Secretary explained that all families in Sanma (including Tangoa families) have to pay these costs, 
transport costs vary a lot but things like school fees and church costs (tithe) are similar for all families in 
this area of Vanuatu.” 
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 Growing monetary economy 
 Trend analysis done by a group of two fishermen (fig. 4.16) shows how the 
monetary economy started to impact livelihoods increasingly in the 80’s.  Store 
bought goods, western housing materials and medicines became normal 
expenses. After independence the need for money increased due to the 
development of a formal (government led) education system where school fees 
had to be paid in cash.  
  
 Globalisation is one factor contributing to an increased need and desire for 
money. Tangoans are increasingly exposed to new ideas and value systems 
through interactions with people from outside their local context, traveling to 
other places within and outside Vanuatu, the formal education system, and by 
increasing access to modern media (radio, TV, films, music). Young people are 
especially keen to have western material goods (i.e. western style clothes, food, 
technologies, and building materials) as they strive for more ‘modern’ lifestyles. 
One Tangoan explained: “Now all young people want block houses [concrete 
blocks and iron roofs]. They don’t want to live like the old days.” An elderly 
woman added: “When a hurricane comes, it will take the iron! The young people 
will be waiting in the rain, or in our houses, until they can buy a new roof! It is 
better to have thatch so they make a new one for free.” This signals a link 
between cultural change, increasing monetary economy, and livelihood 
vulnerability. 
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 Figure 4.16, Trend line of need for cash for the Tangoa community over time 
 
Problem of lack of land 
 More recently, lack of land is a major factor driving a growing monetary 
economy and the need for cash. The area of land available for Tangoans to use 
for gardens is limited, and the number of people using the land is increasing (see 
figures 4.17 and 4.18).61   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.17, Illustration of diminishing land resources per family 
 
                                                 
61
 Other main causes of lack of land were identified as: the Church’s control of land and unwillingness to 
give up Church plantation area for people to make gardens; the complicated and expensive land claims 
process; and governance problems where i.e. the Chief is unable to resolve disputed for various reasons 
including that he is involved in the disputes himself. 
1950 1960 1970 19901980 2000 Today 
Need for Cash 
High 
Low 
More 
children 
going to 
school  
Lack of land 
“People buying 
more store 
goods” 
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 In discussions about economic pressures and the underlying causes several 
interviewees explained that as more people struggle to make a living on limited 
land resources, there has been a transition to more non-gardening based 
livelihoods. Associated with this change is an increased dependence on cash. 
One woman explained: “My garden isn’t big enough now, so my husband goes 
fishing most days.” Her husband added: “We do not have land so we have to buy 
food from others, and exchange fish for yams and cabbage.”  
 
 Land scarcity has a direct impact on agricultural production capacities. The 
effect of population growth on land and soil resources was a predominant 
concern for local people, as it has significant economic consequences.  Three 
focus groups of youth and two focus groups of women, as well as ten 
interviewees expressed concern about lack of land. Many were concerned that 
their children would not have enough land for gardens. While on a transect walk 
through the gardens, one man explained: “My three sons have to share this small 
garden area! This is a problem for many people here.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 4.18, Women’s group poster identifying issue of increasing land use intensity 
  
 
 Over time, declining soil quality due to more intensive land use has restricted the 
diversity and quality of crops that can be produced. Some traditionally important 
staple root crops, such as valued species of yam and taro, no longer grow well in 
some areas. Soils are increasingly unable to produce economically valuable 
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crops such as tomatoes, capsicums, beans and fruit trees. On a transect walk a 
women working in her garden told us: “This soil is used too much. The yams 
that come from this ground are small and they do not sell well at the market.” 
Figure 4.19 is a poster made by a mixed gender focus group. Point three on the 
poster illustrates the reduced size of crops over time. Participants explained that 
this resulted from soil degradation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.19, Mixed gender focus group poster identifying environmental threats 
 
4.6.3 Intra-community heterogeneity in economic wellbeing  
 While all families experience economic pressures described above, some 
struggle more than others depending on their resource endowments and 
entitlements. Several key informants explained how different Tangoan families 
have different quantity and quality of land. The three clans that have resided in 
the area the longest all have garden land, and many have their own coconut 
trees. Local census data show that these three clans make up about 70% of the 
Tangoa population. The other five clans that have settled on Tangoa more 
recently are less well endowed with garden land and coconuts. 
 
 Discussions during transect walks through garden areas revealed that the three 
oldest resident clans also have better quality land. Their gardens are further 
inland where the soil is more fertile than the coastal soil. A woman at a local 
market was well endowed with several garden areas that could each be used for 
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3-4 years because the soil is rich “red ground”. Her garden provides “plenty 
kaekae” (food) for her family and she sells diverse and valuable crops at the 
market.  During a transect walk two men explained that the variation in soil 
quality is reflected in variations in health and wellbeing. “People with gardens 
up near Narongo are strong. They have many kinds of good island kaekae 
(food). Many Tangoa people are weak and sick. Some can’t grow enough for 
their families in this onetasi62soil, and they have to buy food. They eat too much 
rice and sugar, not enough island kaekae. You see many people with rotten 
teeth.”  
 
 Those who do not have enough quality garden land are generally more 
dependent on cash generated from working on copra plantations. While many 
Tangoan families engage in both gardening and plantation work, a distinction 
can be made between those that have plenty of productive gardening land (up to 
70% of the population) and those that do not (up to 30% of the population).  
 
 Figure 4.20 is a generalised diagram to illustrate what people said about 
important differences between gardening-based and cash-based livelihoods. It is 
intended to show why wellbeing varies within the community due to gardening 
land endowments, and why cash-based livelihoods can be more vulnerable due 
to poor food security. Please note that the information illustrated in the diagram 
comes from nine different interviews. Further research such as a village wide 
socio-economic ranking profile would be required to determine more accurately 
the relationship between resource endowments, cash dependency and economic 
vulnerability.  
 
 Figure 4.20 shows the flows of labour, food and money for the different 
livelihoods. A typical subsistence-based livelihood is represented in the diagram 
by a household that is predominantly dependent on productive gardens for their 
livelihood.  A typical cash-based livelihood is represented in the diagram by a 
household that is predominantly dependent on generating cash from either 
owning or working on copra plantations.   
                                                 
62
 Onetasi is the local term for the lowland soil which is more sandy and lighter than the dark red colored 
soil further inland.  
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Figure 4.20, Flow of food and money after a cyclone for 
families with gardens and families without gardens 
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 There are several main differences between the two livelihoods.  For 
subsistence-based livelihoods, gardens are the main source of food (solid green 
arrows) and cash (solid red arrows). These people spend most time gardening 
and selling produce at the local market (see the solid blue arrows). The main 
source of food for the cash dependent household is the local market where they 
can buy it with cash earned from working on copra plantations.  
 
 All Tangoans harvest from commons resources for food and cash (dashed blue 
and green arrows). To keep the diagram simple, I have not shown the use of 
commons resources for money in this diagram, even though resource rating 
exercises clearly show the importance of dark-bush, fresh-water and marine 
commons (section 4.3).  
 
 Several different interviews provided information about how the flows of labour, 
food and money change after a cyclone. The market for copra can collapse after 
a cyclone. There are more than usual wind fallen coconuts, and sometimes the 
trees are destroyed. The copra lying on the ground has to be harvested, so the 
market is flooded with copra which lowers its price.  Without gardens and 
income from plantation work, people harvest from commons resources for food 
(wild yam, water taro, and fish). They also sell some of what they harvest from 
the commons at the local market. Those who have gardens are more likely to 
have enough food to get them through, as some staple crops of taro and yam will 
survive the cyclone. They may also have housing materials which are planted in 
gardens in preparation for when they have to rebuild. 
 
 Interview data provided enough information to make some generalisations about 
how resource endowments and cash dependency can determine economic 
wellbeing and vulnerability However, interviews also revealed that there is 
variation in economic wellbeing depending on the strategies that people employ 
to mitigate vulnerability and address economic challenges.    
 
4.6.4 Local strategies related to economic problems  
 Local people have responded to economic pressures by: changing livelihood 
strategies (e.g. transition from gardening to cash based livelihoods); seeking 
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Figure 4.21, Youth-identified development need  
 
alternative income generating opportunities (exit options); accessing external 
assistance; and claiming for indigenous land rights. 
 
 People want training and advice for new NRM practices and ways to use limited 
land areas. On a transect walk a woman working in her garden told us that her 
son wants to plant some whitewood (timber trees): “It is a good idea because he 
needs new ways to make money for his family.” People are also seeking new 
ways to make money such as small businesses and tourism (see figure 4.21). 
They identified the need for skills building in trades such as carpentry, cooking 
and sewing.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Men, women and youth identified the need for more employment opportunities 
(see fig. 4.22).  Related to this are concerns that their children get a good 
education. During a women’s focus group discussion one woman expressed: “It 
is hard to make enough money from gardening, and working on copra 
plantations. My sons need a good education so they can get a job.”63 Women and 
youth identified the need for family planning services. One women explained: 
“Families have 5-6 children. That’s too many to provide for! We need to have 
more planning.” 
                                                 
63
 However, several women highlighted that the lack of employment opportunities (due to low levels of 
economic development in the area) are external economic constraints that can also be a disincentive for 
families to send their children to school. “We work hard for many years to pay school fees and for what? 
There are no jobs for the children!” 
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 Both women and youth groups identified that the Rural Economic Development 
Initiative (REDI)64 could provide access to training as well as financial 
assistance for projects. Tangoans also look to external actors for financial help to 
achieve community goals (i.e. building a new water tank) because there is rarely 
enough surplus cash, after household needs are fulfilled, for such projects. The 
Fisheries Department and the Environment Unit were identified as possible 
sources of education about how to manage/develop natural resources. Several 
members of a particular clan also considered that a Peace Corp volunteer could 
stay with them and help them with projects. 
 
 Claiming land is seen by some as a way to alleviate land shortages and economic 
pressures. More people are claiming indigenous ownership rights over land. 
During a transect walk, one man explained: “Ten years ago there, was only one 
other clan that wanted to claim this land. Now there are five different groups. 
People in this area are getting desperate for land and will try anything.”  
 
                                                 
64
 The Rural Economic Development Initiative (REDI) is the currently the sole government programme 
specifically aimed at local economic development in rural areas. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.22, Women’s focus group poster identifying lack of employment opportunities   
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4.6.5 Strategy constraints and barriers to achieving local goals  
 There are several strategy constraints and barriers to achieving local goals 
related to economic pressures. Low economic development in the South Santo 
region means that besides working on copra plantations, few young people are 
able to find employment. There are also barriers to accessing external 
development assistance for training, financial assistance, and education. 
Interviews with government and NGOs revealed that communities are often 
required to show that they have a certain amount of organisational and 
governance capacity  before assistance will be provided.   
 
 A representative from REDI provincial office in Luganville explained that 
communities must have “organisational structures for us to work with.” A REDI 
led PRA workshop on Tangoa in 2005 failed because: “Tangoa was too divided 
and unorganised. There were too many problems with disputes and no strong 
leadership.” The National REDI office in Port Vila explained that it is easier to 
provide communities with assistance when they have a development committee, 
and leadership and institutional structures to manage any funds or aid provided. 
A village water committee is a prerequisite for a new water supply and a health 
committee for an Aid Post (REDI pers comm.).  
 
 A major barrier to claiming land is the land claims process. Local people 
explained that the process is complicated, time consuming, and expensive. An 
interview with a member of the Sanma provincial government explained that 
claimants have to save a lot of money for the process and they have to have a 
certain level of literacy. They must draw a map of the land and boundaries, write 
the family genealogy, and write a document describing the land use history. 
They must also be able to stand up in court and argue their case.  
 
 Some representatives from an indigenous organisation in Luganville provided 
details about the costs of the land claims process. There are three stages to the 
claims process. First a claim will be notified in a village and there are 21 days 
for any other claimants to dispute the claim. The claims will be heard at the 
Village Court (involving an elected Village Court Chairman, Member and 
Secretary). At this first stage the costs for a day in court are about 5,000 Vatu 
Chapter 4 – Results Part 1: Tangoa Island Case Study 
 
 
 
 
105 
 
 
 
($357 NZD). If the claim is not determined, it will go to the Area Court. Area 
Courts have their own Chief. The cost of each day in the Area Court is 
approximately 7000 Vatu ($500). The third stage is the Island Court which is 
made up of the area Chiefs and numerous court representatives (Sanma province 
has nine Chiefs and 18 representatives). Each day at the Island Court costs 
10,500 Vatu ($750). The Supreme Court is the final stage. If claimants get this 
far they have to travel to Port Vila to have their case heard in the Supreme 
Court.  
 
 Another major problem is that there is no limit on appeals until the case is at the 
Supreme Court level, in which case appeals can only be about whether the court 
process was followed correctly. This means that a court’s decision (at the 
Village Court or Island Court level) can be appealed an endless number of times 
by new disputing claimants. The case will then have to be heard again, further 
raising the court costs to claimants.  One Tangoan claimant group had been 
working for 20 years to claim their land. They got to the Supreme Court, their 
rights were determined, and at the last moment a rival claimant group 
successfully appealed on grounds that the court process was not followed 
correctly. Shortly after the determination was cancelled, all the files were 
destroyed in a fire and there are no electronic copies of court proceedings.  
 
4.6.6 Summary of points about economic pressures 
 
  Economic pressures are a cause of environmental degradation.  
  The drivers of economic pressures are population pressures, lack of land, 
and the growth of a monetary economy.  
  Population drives lack of land. Lack of land drives growth of the local 
monetary economy as people increasingly need cash because they can no 
longer sustain livelihoods from gardening alone.  
  Cultural change also drives growth of the local monetary economy as 
younger generations strive for more ‘modern’ lifestyles.   
  These underlying drivers make it increasingly difficult for people to meet 
household expenses and make community contributions.  
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  Strategies to deal with economic pressures include claiming land, 
seeking external funding and training, and alternative income generating 
opportunities (i.e. employment). 
  These strategies are met by constraints including low community 
cooperative capacity, lack of employment opportunities due to low 
regional economic development, and ineffective land claims processes.      
 
 Figure 4.23 illustrates the relationship between drivers of economic pressures 
and the various constraints to achieving goals and strategies for overcoming 
economic pressures.  
 
 
 
 Figure 4.23, Drivers of economic pressures, local strategies and constraints 
 
4.7 Governance issues   
 Governance issues that were identified as causes of resource degradation 
include: lack of rules to manage resources; lack of respect for traditional rules 
such as customary taboos where they exist; and issues related to whether local 
Tangoan people have the authority to make rules and govern resources. 
 
4.7.1 Lack of rules  
 There are no customary/traditional rules to manage some of the more recent 
environmental problems such as intensive cattle farming near rivers and water 
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sources, harvesting of sand for concrete, and disposal of non-organic wastes. 
Lack of rules about controlling cattle around water sources and rivers was a 
locally identified cause of degradation of soil resources as well as freshwater and 
marine resources. Lack of rules about harvesting sand from Tangoa Beach is a 
perceived cause of depletion of sand resources. Marine resources are polluted by 
waste disposal practices, which are also non-regulated. Furthermore, some of the 
customary taboos are no longer effective due to modern use practices (e.g., fine 
mesh fishing nets make it difficult to catch only large fish), and increasing land-
use intensities due to growing population and economic pressures.   
 
4.7.2 Causal factors 
 
Leadership problems 
 Leadership problems were cited as a central cause of lack of rules to manage 
resources. As explained in section 4.4.2, it is the Paramount Chief’s role to 
make, and enforce rules concerning community shared resources such as dark-
bush and freshwater and marine resources. In discussing the causes of resource 
management problems, several interviewees expressed that there are no new 
rules established to manage some of the more recent environmental problems 
that have arisen, and that: “The chief has to make new rules.”  
 
 Lack of effective institutions  
 While the Chief and his council were allocated a large share of the responsibility 
(and blame) for the resource management problems, key informants identified 
various other institutional structures, such as a development committee and an 
environment committee, which could play a larger role. However, data from 
varied sources indicates that these institutions are not perceived to be effective. 
Out of 15 women participating in focus group activities, only a few were aware 
that there already existed a development committee, and these women did not 
know who was on it or what they have done.65  As key informants explained, 
attempts to establish various committees, such as an environment committee and 
                                                 
65
 The women were not aware that a development committee had already been established in 2005, which 
indicates their lack of involvement in the process as well as the committee’s lack of effectiveness. 
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a water committee on Tanoga have been limited in their success because: 
“Committees don’t know what to do, especially when the chief does not support 
any ideas that they have.”   
 
 Information about the qualities of strong leadership and institutions emerged 
when people talked about the Church structure. Local definitions of an “effective 
institution” included characteristics of strong leadership and clearly defined 
roles and responsibilities, effective communication structures and networks, and 
regular meetings and activities. The Church is the most effective institution for 
organizing people and facilitating community level cooperation and collective 
action. The Church has a yearly activities calendar which sets out goals and 
events such as attending church meetings and celebrations in other areas. The 
Church organises people to work collectively to raise money for events and to 
pay for church costs. Through the church structure there are weekly meetings of 
a women’s group, a youth group, a men’s/elders group, and weekly meetings of 
church cell groups which are mixed in age and gender.  Each of these groups has 
leaders and people know their roles. These leaders represent and communicate 
the needs and concerns of their cell group members to the Pastor and other 
church leaders.   
 
 Problems associated with lack of effective institutions can be illustrated by 
looking at how water (for house-hold use) is managed on Tangoa. River water is 
delivered to Tangoa via a gravity fed, polythene pipe running under the channel 
between the island and Santo mainland. Water is piped from one main storage 
tank around the village. Water pressure is often low in dry seasons and can stop 
flowing altogether during drought. Furthermore, large storms often break the 
pipe from the mainland water source. When this happens people have to carry 
water in containers from mainland and transport it in canoes to the island.  
 
 Many taps leak, and they are seldom ever fixed, which exacerbates water 
security problems. No rules exist for managing water resources on the island and 
responsibility for water management is not allocated to any particular person or 
organisation. An attempt was made to set up a water committee in order to 
address the water management problems, but the committee is not functioning. 
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The Chairman of the committee reported that they only had one meeting when it 
first was established. Without effective institutions, water management has 
become a commons dilemma problem. No one feels responsibility to bare the 
cost of fixing leaking taps for shared benefit.  
 
4.7.3 Lack of respect for rules 
 As explained in section 4.2.2, custom governance systems are the basis for 
management of Tangoa’s commons resources.  Therefore sustainable 
management of commons resources is dependent on the effectiveness of custom 
governance systems, which is dependent on respect and adherence to custom 
rules and traditional management practices (TMPs). Lack of respect for rules 
where they exist (e.g., customary taboos) was identified as a major cause of 
unsustainable timber harvesting practices. People do not follow custom rules 
about replanting or only harvesting trees where there are seedlings to grow in 
their place. Soil, freshwater and marine resources are negatively impacted by the 
breaking of custom taboos which restrict people from cutting trees near rivers 
and coastlines. Customary laws that restrict the harvesting of small immature 
fish, as well as a customary taboo which defined canoe landing areas are 
disrespected. As a result, fish resources are depleted and the coral reef is 
damaged.  
 
4.7.4 Causal factors  
 
Leadership problems 
 Again, leadership problems are perceived as a key cause of declining respect for 
customary rules. Analysis of data from interviews and group activities indicates 
that it is the role of the Chief and his council to facilitate cooperation, and gain 
respect from people so that they will follow him and abide by his rules.66  
Respect for the chief has declined over time, and people attribute lack of respect 
for custom rules, to declining respect for their leader. One young man explained: 
“Taboos are broken because we don’t have a strong Chief.” 
 
                                                 
66
 Other locally perceived qualities of good leadership include good cooperation with church and other 
leaders, good communication, and the ability to organize people. 
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 The main causes of lack of respect for the chief are attributed to his failure to 
carryout chiefly roles. Often he is not living in the Village.67  One interviewee 
explained that: “All people on Tangoa are hard working, but there needs to be 
strong leadership to organise people. Then we [the Tangoa community] could do 
alot more.” Key informants explained that the Chief often does not attend 
community meetings, or support plans and initiatives made at meetings.  Several 
interviews and focus groups of youth explained that the Chief cannot provide 
support for resolving disputes, which is considered one of the most important 
roles of the Chief. In fact, the Chief is involved in disputes himself. This makes 
resolution of land disputes particularly difficult and it is a cause of disrespect 
towards the chief.  Figure 4.24 is part of a youth group poster which translates to 
say: “Land disputes: Many leaders are involved in land disputes, which is a 
barrier to development.” 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.24, Youth group poster identifying the involvement of leaders in land disputes 
 
 
 Several informants also explained that the lack of respect for the Chief might 
derive from perceptions that he does not have the customary right to be the 
chief. The current Chief inherited his title from his father, who was chosen by 
the government to be the Chief. The colonial government chose local people 
from the local ni-Vanuatu population to be assistants to the government. These 
people were chosen by the government based on their abilities, and given chiefly 
titles. These Chiefs were not the “true” chiefs, who are customarily from chiefly 
decent. Customarily, processes and procedures are necessary to “make a chief” 
such as pig killing rituals. However these processes were not followed for the 
current chief. 
 
                                                 
67
 At the time of the Field work he was ill and living in Luganville Town. 
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Loss of traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) 
 Loss of traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) and traditional natural resource 
management practices (TMPs) drives lack of respect for NRM rules. Loss of 
TEK and TMPs mean that younger generations have less awareness about 
custom resource management and taboos, and less understanding about why 
they are important. One man explained: “Young people don’t know about the 
importance of taboos. They see people cut trees near the river and coast and they 
do the same.”  
 
 Loss of TEK and TMPs was identified as a problem in thirteen different 
interviews, and by men’s and women’s research groups. Loss of TMPs and 
traditional knowledge about medicinal resources, good gardening practices, and 
how to prepare for cyclones, were commonly cited examples.68   
 
 Figure 4.25 is a trend line drawn by one traditional medicine expert. He 
explained that use of kastom medicine started to decline as modern alternatives 
became available in the 1970s. As the price of Western healthcare increased in 
the 1990s, people started to use kastom medicine again. He emphasised that his 
services as a traditional medicine expert are still needed and relevant today 
because his medicine works. Triangulated with other interviews (four men and 
four women) revealed that in contrast to perception of the medicine expert, most 
people perceive that use of kastom medicine is still declining. This may reflect 
bias of the medicine expert as he has a vested interest in promoting the 
continued relevance of kastom medicine, or simply that he continues to use it 
and treat people with it, but that many other families are using it less. 
 
                                                 
68 Concern about loss of TK and TMP was related to its negative affects on livelihoods including 
declining food security. 
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Figure 4.25, Trend analysis of use of customary medicine 
 
 Failure of parents to pass knowledge on to children was identified as a direct 
cause of loss of traditional NRM knowledge and practices in six interviews. 
Interviews where aspects of social and cultural change were explored 
highlighted the significant impact of western style education – established by the 
Missionaries in the 1960s. One elder explained: “In the old day’s education 
would start in the kitchen where parents and grandparents would talk with the 
children every morning. Then they would spend the whole day in the gardens 
and in the bush. This changed when children started to go to school every 
morning.” One community elder explained that formal education has become a 
priority for families, and has crowded out the role of families in informal 
education: “There is not enough talking about values and traditional practices. 
Parents don’t have time to pass on knowledge.”  
 
 A general trend of declining respect for tradition and custom is affecting youth 
culture and young people’s interest in custom knowledge about NRM. 
According to the Nakare Chief, “Young men that are 18-25 years old are lazy. 
They don’t care about custom and they don’t think to the future. By the time 
they get good, the sun is going down and it is too late to teach them custom.” 
Another community elder explained that declining respect for tradition and 
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custom is linked to an increase in monetary society: “There are custom laws of 
the sea but there is not enough awareness. People are more interested in making 
money.”  
 
4.7.4 Lack of authority to govern resources 
 Research clearly shows that Tangoans recognise the need for rules and the 
detrimental effect from not having, or not following rules. In spite of this, a 
perceived lack of authority to make rules and govern resources has prevented 
action to establish the necessary rules. While many Tangoans are concerned 
about further clearing of bush for plantations and cattle (especially as it reduces 
the land area that could potentially be used for gardens), clearing has not 
stopped. As a result, dark-bush is diminishing, soil is degraded and eroded, and 
freshwater and marine resources are affected by sedimentation.  Perceived lack 
of authority to control the access of cattle to water sources and rivers also 
increases sedimentation and damages freshwater resources such as water taro, 
noura, and water cress.  
 
 Tenure can determine whether people have the autonomy and locus of control to 
govern resources. Rights and authority to govern resources can be ambiguous in 
areas where tenure is in transition.  Dark-bush transitions to gardens on a 
continuum. Once crops and trees are planted, the rights to use and harvest from 
the planted area, or particular trees, belong to the people/families that planted 
them. During a mapping exercise, one woman explained that in dark-bush 
transition areas, it may be ok to gather some resources, but not others: “We 
collect nalu (weaving material) and wild yam, but trees that have been 
purposefully planted are owned by the family that planted them, and are not for 
free use.” This pattern of tenure transition means that without strong governance 
to protect dark-bush, the commons is privatised. This has consequences 
especially for people that do not have land for gardens, and for women (who 
only have secondary access through men). 
 
 Tangoans also lack autonomy to govern resources where tenure arrangements 
overlap. Taro patches, water sources, rivers and marine resources within investor 
leasehold land are considered common property by Tangoans.  However, access 
Chapter 4 – Results Part 1: Tangoa Island Case Study 
 
 
 
 
114 
 
 
 
to, use, and management of these resources can be restricted by private 
leaseholders who have the authority to decide whether to put up fences. 
Tangoans expressed concern that leaseholder cattle get into taro patches, water 
sources and rivers, and trample crab breeding areas. However they feel 
powerless to manage these problems. One man explained: “We can not make 
rules and put up fences on this [investor’s] land. We have to ask permission” A 
Tangoan women provided another example. A local investor put up fences to 
keep cattle in his leasehold. However these fences also kept people from using 
area for gathering crabs and taro plots: “Many people were angry and they took 
the fences down!” 
 
4.7.5 Strategies to overcome governance problems  
 Ideas about how to improve NRM included strengthening taboos, TEK and 
TMPs by raising awareness about taboos and encouraging better teaching about 
taboos in families. In discussions about how natural resource could be managed 
better, focus groups and interviewees often responded that it is the responsibility 
of the Chief. Several interviewees also identified that the government’s 
Environment Unit and Fisheries Department could play a role in education about 
NRM: “Fisheries can come to Tangoa and educate the people about taboos on 
marine areas and taboos on catching turtles and coconut crabs.” 
 
 A few key informants explained that claiming land could be one way to gain 
more control of NRM. If a clan wins a claim: “Then they can elect their own 
chief to govern that land”. Several claimants expressed that if they win their 
claim it will be easier to set rules and govern dark-bush areas: “People will 
respect the custom owner.” Formal recognition will give them legal rights: “We 
will have the law behind us.”   
 
4.7.6 Summary of points about governance issues  
 
  Governance issues cause environmental degradation.  
  Governance issues include lack of rules, lack of respect for rules, and 
lack of authority to govern natural resources.  
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  Leadership problems and lack of effective institutions mean that rules 
have not been established to manage recent environmental problems.  
  Institutional change, including change from traditional education systems 
to a formal western model of education, as well as cultural change, 
resulting from processes of globalisation, are key drivers of  loss of TEK 
and TMPs. 
  Leadership problems and loss of TEK and TMPs drive a declining 
respect for rules that do exist.  
  Overlapping and ambiguous tenure arrangements mean that people do 
not feel that they have the control or authority to govern some resources 
that are communally used in the Tangoa resource area.  
  Teaching children about the importance of taboos was identified as a 
strategy to strengthen respect for rules.  
  Claiming land was considered a strategy to gain control and authority to 
govern resources. Legally recognised custom owners would have the 
authority to elect their own chief and demand respect of NRM rules. 
However, a difficult land claims process is a major constraint to this 
strategy. 
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These points are summarised in figure 4.26 below. 
Figure 4.26, Drivers of governance issues, local strategies and constraints  
 
4.8 Declining social cohesion  
 Social problems, such as declining social cohesion, have had a direct negative 
impact on commons resources including acts of sabotage where trees are cut 
down. Social problems also undermine social capital and trust, thereby 
significantly impacting the community’s cooperative capacity and the 
management of commons resources.  
 
 Tangoan people perceive that there has been a general decline in cooperation, 
social cohesion and what one informant termed as a “culture of sharing.” Groups 
of youth and women identified that this is negatively affecting cooperation and 
respect within the community. Two main indicators of declining social cohesion 
were identified as an increase in individualism and  an increase in disputes, 
conflicts, and divisions between different Tangoan families and clans.  
 
4.8.1 Individualism 
 Interview data and trend analysis (see fig. 4.28) describe a process of social 
change from more communal in nature, to more individualistic. This can be seen 
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in local perceptions of community cohesiveness: “Everyone was one family [in 
the 1950s-60s]”, and also in changing patterns of social behavior: “People used 
to share food together on Sundays. The whole community would eat together. 
Now people share food less, and they don’t eat together. They stay in their 
houses.”   
 
 Several people used the example of collective action to plant gardens as an 
indicator of how community cooperation has changed over time. “In the past, 
when someone needed to make a new garden, people would help and plant 
gardens together, now only family members help.” Key informants also 
emphasised that social cohesion affects community governance capacity: “The 
community could still call meetings [when the community was more cohesive].” 
 
 Figure 4.28, Trend analysis of culture of sharing 
 
 Sharing and helping each other in times of need has long been a practice that 
people consider vital for social and livelihood security. This practice is still 
strong within families today.  Evidence of this came from interviews where 
questions explored how people cope in times of extreme need, such as after a 
cyclone, as well as data collected during a trend analysis focus group exercise 
with male elders. One elder explained that: “After a hurricane, it is important to 
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help others when you can – give them food, wood and natangora (a plant used 
for roof building and weaving), let them live in your house – because next time 
it might be your house or your garden that is destroyed.”  
 
 While cooperation and reciprocal exchanges in times of extreme need still 
occurs within families and clans, trend analysis and interviews show that 
reciprocity is declining between families and different clans. When asked how 
people help each other after a cyclone one woman said: “You will help your own 
family first, and they will help you. But you will not get much help from other 
clans anymore. The relationship is not so good between some families.” 
 
 Similarly, people used to work together to help clear each others gardens, and 
cut each others copra, trusting that the assistance will be reciprocated. However: 
“Some people do not have gardens, and few have their own coconuts, so people 
only work in groups if they are helping their own family, or for cash.” This 
indicates a link between economic heterogeneity (associated with resource 
endowments), and individualism.  
 
4.8.2 Increased conflict, divisions, and disputes  
 Increase in conflict and divisions within the community are key concerns, which 
are largely related to land issues: “The land divides us”; and “The number one 
problem of Tangoa is this ground.” Figures 4.29 and 4.30 show women’s group 
posters identifying social conflict (locally termed: raurau) as a main community 
problem linked to land disputes. Other locally defined indicators of increased 
conflict include: increased stealing from gardens; people killing each other’s 
pigs; fighting in gardens; and trees and crops being cut down in acts of sabotage. 
 
 Disputes relating to land issues lead to uncertainty and distrust about allocation 
of benefits from collective action. One informant explained that: “People can’t 
work together for community projects because they don’t trust each other. There 
are too many disputes”. This problem is illustrated in the failure to build a clinic 
on Tangoa:  “People are afraid that when the clinic is built, land claimers might 
arise, and if they win they might benefit more from the clinic or might prevent 
people from using the clinic.” In discussing the non-cooperation for water 
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management on Tangoa one man explained that disputes have been so damaging 
for social relations that: “No one wants to do anything that others will benefit 
from.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.29, Women’s group poster identifying social conflict (“raurau”) as main community 
problem  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.30, Women’s group poster identifying link between land disputes, social conflict, 
selfishness, and lack of trust  
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4.8.3 Causal factors 
 
Economic pressures 
 Multiple data sources (focus groups, interviews, and trend analysis) draw links 
and positive correlations between increasing economic pressures and declining 
community social cohesion. Several Tangoans explained how the culture of 
sharing and reciprocity has declined as people have become more concerned 
with money: “Now money comes into it all the time, if you want something you 
have to pay for it.” Another informant explained that difficulty providing for 
families means: “There is not enough left over to share and we have less time to 
spend with the community. In the past we would do more things together.” 
Economic pressures were also seen to drive individualism: “Families are 
struggling with too many costs and responsibilities so they decide to just work 
for themselves.” 
 
Governance problems 
 Leadership problems are causally linked to social cohesion problems. The 
importance of a good relationship between the Chief and the Church was 
emphasised. An elderly woman explains: “When the [previous] chief and church 
worked well together, everybody helped plant gardens together when needed. 
These days the Chief does not work with the Church.”  
 
 Lack of coordination of different and competing economic responsibilities (such 
as the schools and the church) shows that governance problems (i.e. poor 
coordination) can contribute to economic pressures, which drive individualism 
and declining social cohesion. Similarly, the situation where the Chief is 
involved in land disputes shows that such governance problems inhibit the 
resolution of disputes and conflicts, thereby further degrading social cohesion. 
 
4.8.4 Variation in social capital between intra-community subgroups  
 While social cohesion problems negatively impact social capital, including trust 
and cooperative capacity, social capital is still strong in some intra-community 
sub-groups including women and youth, and certain clans. The various factors 
Chapter 4 – Results Part 1: Tangoa Island Case Study 
 
 
 
 
121 
 
 
 
and determinants that contribute to strong social capital and cooperative capacity 
in these groups are described in this section. 
 
Cooperation among women  
 Data that came from discussions about women’s roles in the community 
highlighted that they are a social group that has highly effective networks for 
communication, organisation and cooperation. Many men perceived women to 
be key drivers of collective action, with important roles in achieving goals. They 
work out the details and plans, which are largely defined by men, and implement 
them: “Women make things happen.” They are also effective in organisations 
and institutions. A female key informant explained that: “The [bible] translation 
and school committee are the only ones that work, and it is because women are 
on them.”  
 
 Women are particularly skilled at managing money, planning and providing for 
their families’ needs. One Chief described women as “action mamas” because 
they “move, move, move from sun rise to sun down.”  
 
 Women have very effective communication networks. One man explains: “If 
you want to spread information and awareness, talk to some women. They are 
always talking, and they are the first to hear news and new ideas.” Tangoan 
women also have linking social capital. They utilise wider women’s networks 
including the National Council of Women, to access training for small business 
generation (i.e. sewing and cooking), budgeting advice, health and family 
planning workshops, counseling other types of support.69 
 
 The strong relational social capital of Tangoan women is attributed to high 
frequency of social interaction and cooperation. In an interview with a group of 
women, they explained “We work together all the time.” Women consider 
working together, pooling resources, sharing and cooperating to be ways to 
manage their workloads and meet essential livelihood needs. A group of women 
                                                 
69
 The National Council of Women is a nation wide NGO network that has offices at national and 
provincial levels and holds biannual meetings at provincial levels and more frequent meetings of 
representatives at more local levels. 
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weavers explained that: “We take turns going to the market, so that we can share 
the travel costs. We take all the women’s baskets and mats and sell them for 
each other.” They also considered that further developing coordination between 
women as a principle means to develop their weaving business and access new 
markets. Their ideas about how to do this included pooling enough resources to 
travel to markets in the Capital, Port Vila, and establishing networks with 
women there.  
 
 Women also cooperate in order for their concerns and ideas to influence 
community-level decisions, which are customarily made by men. Gender power 
relations generally determine that it is not a woman’s role to speak in public 
decision-making forums (i.e. community meetings). A key informant explained 
that Tangoa women have, on occasion, managed to speak at community 
meetings: “They work up a lot of support among themselves, deciding together 
what they want to say, and represent themselves as a collective voice.”   
 
 Data indicates that women have a strong internal locus of control. They believe 
that they have the ability to bring about change. Women want to be more 
involved in community decision-making structures because they feel that they 
can help solve problems. Women’s focus groups talked together about the need 
for a development committee in order to access external assistance: “We need to 
make a development committee. Women need to be on the committee so that it 
works.”  
 
Cooperation among youth  
 Youth are another social group that has high levels of relational and linking 
social capital. They interact often socially. They have sports teams (soccer, 
boxing, and volleyball) and organise tournaments with other communities in the 
region. They have a very successful string band and have managed to generate 
money for a tour around Vanuatu. They have high levels of concern about 
community issues, and in 2003 they were the key motivators and organisers for a 
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community meeting to address issues.70 They seem to have a strong internal 
locus of control for action to solve problems. During a resource mapping 
exercise, men discussed concerns about water quality and the potential impact of 
a coal mine in the hills above Tangoa’s water sources. The next day several 
youth that were involved in this discussion took the initiative to make posters 
about concerns related to the mine and put them up around Tangoa Island.  
 
Collection action within particular clans  
 The Pelviji clan has achieved several collective initiatives and goals. In 
comparison to the six other clans on Tangoa, they were the first to elect their 
own Chief after the paramount Chief recommended that all clans do so. They are 
also the only clan on Tangoa to have built their own Nakamal. They established 
a Pelviji cooperative, which is the only shop on the island. They have come 
close to winning a land claims process and have successfully developed a timber 
nursery project.  Interviews with the heads of each family in the Pelviji clan 
highlighted some of the factors that have enabled collective action to occur 
within this sub-group.  
 
 Interviews highlighted five key enabling factors of Pelviji collective action: 1) a 
strong sense of necessity to act; 2) governance capacity, including human 
resource endowments (skilled and educated leaders); 3) financial resources; 4) 
accomplished goals and experienced benefits of collective action; and all of the 
above factors contribute to 5) a strong internal locus of control (confidence in 
their ability to act cooperatively), which can have a catalytic effect on 
cooperation within the clan and to others in the community. 
 
 Sense of necessity to act 
 A sense of necessity has motivated Pelviji initiatives.  One Pelviji leader 
explained: “We believed that it was important to build the strength of our own 
family by working together on the Nakamal and choosing a leader that can take 
us into the future.”  Another member added: “There was a sense in my family 
                                                 
70
 At this meeting they presented a petition for the building of a community nakamal, which they 
considered would be a project that would help solve community problems.   
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that if we don’t do something now, we will never do anything.” Motivation to 
work together through the land claims process was attributed in part to the 
pressing needs to escape the over crowing on Tangoa Island and increasing 
social tensions. 
 
 Governance capacity leadership of respected individuals and families 
 The Pelviji clan is one original Tangoa clans which means that they are 
relatively well endowed with quality garden land resources, as well as their own 
coconut plantations. This has contributed to the clan’s relative wealth, and 
access to education. The Pelviji family is endowed with several well educated 
and respected leaders that provide the support and motivation needed for 
collective action. These leaders are educated, they possess valued and respected 
knowledge which is shared with the community, and they have shown that 
projects that they initiate resulted in benefit for those who participate.  
 
 Funds 
 Due to  several highly educated individuals who have relatively high paying jobs, 
the clan has access to some extra funds for projects and links to funding sources. 
For example, one important leader in the family was able to access funds for the 
timber nursery project through the Department of Forests.71    
 
 Benefits from collective action 
 The Pelviji clan has accomplished goals and experienced the benefits of 
collective action, which have in turn, further built cooperative capacity in the 
clan (including increased social cohesion and cooperation). The Pelviji Chief 
explained: “The opening of the Pelviji Nakamal and the chief making ceremony 
was very important for my family. It helped to build pride and strength.” 
Initiatives have increased economic security (economic benefits from 
cooperative store) and built trust in their ability to allocate benefits, as well as 
providing experience with coordination, role allocation, money management, 
and communication. 
 
                                                 
71
 Success is also attributed to the fact that the clan recognised land rights for where the Nakamal was 
built, which allowed them the autonomy to decide how to use the land, and manage it themselves 
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 Strong internal locus of control 
 Accomplishments have increased Pelviji’s confidence in their ability to act 
cooperatively and gain benefits from collective action, which has encouraged 
developing further goals and initiatives. One man explained, “After we built the 
Nakamal, we knew we could do more. We decided to make a cooperative. 
Everyone contributed money to set up the shop. Now each Pelviji family has 
shares and benefits.” Human capital also contributes to Pelviji’s strong locus of 
control. They have people with the skills and knowledge needed to progress 
through a land claims process including: knowledge about ancestral land 
ownership, literacy (which is necessary in order to document the family tree and 
land history), the ability to make a map of the land boundaries, and the ability to 
stand up in court and argue a case.   
 
 Pelviji achievements have also influenced other families and clans. “When 
people saw Pelviji finish building the Nakamal, and electing chiefs, other clans 
wanted to do the same.” A Pelviji leader ran some workshops on Tangoa about 
timber planting. Initially people from other clans were reluctant to attend timber 
planting workshops because: “They did not have trust. They thought ‘this is not 
for us’.”  However once people saw that they could benefit from timber planting 
too, other families have followed Pelviji in planting timber crops in their own 
clan areas.  
 
4.8.5 Strategies to overcome social problems  
 Youth and women’s focus group explained that leadership and communication 
structures within the community need to be strengthened so that people can 
“work together” to solve problems. Youth and women’s group brainstorming 
described the role that the Chief, the Pastor, and representatives of women’s 
group, youth group and committee leaders could play in resolving problems and 
disputes in the community. Figure 4.31, is a youth group poster showing the 
different groups and the different leaders that would need to be involved in a 
community problem solving process. Figure 4.32 is a women’s group poster 
identifying main leaders who can solve problems including the Chief, Pastor and 
Elders. 
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 Figure 4.31, Youth group poster identifying main community groups  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.32, Women’s group poster identifying main leaders  
 
 
 A group of women brainstormed ideas for an ideal process which could help the 
community “work together” (see figure 4.33). The women considered an 
iterative and transparent process of communication, and consensus building 
would be important. They outlined various steps of such a process:  
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 1. Chief calls a general meeting for everyone can hear about/talk about how 
the community needs to try to work together to solve problems within 
the community and achieve shared goals.   
 
 2. Pastor calls meeting of all session members and the congregation life 
committee (CLC)72. People can talk together and come up with ideas 
about what will make the community work together better.   
 
 3. Chief and pastor work together to call a general community meeting to 
talk about what should be done to help the community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.33, Women’s ideas about the process required to help the community “work  together” 
 
4.8.6 Summary of main points about social cohesion 
 
  Social cohesion problems directly and indirectly impact commons 
management. Conflict and disputes can result in sabotage of resources on 
disputed land and increasing individualism degrades the community’s 
capacity to work together.  
                                                 
72
 The CLC is a Tangoan Church organization.  
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  As cooperation and respect for custom rules are the foundation for 
Tangoa’s commons management, declining social cohesion is a threat to 
the resources on which livelihoods depend.  
  Economic pressures and governance problems are the two main drivers 
of declining social cohesion.  
  Economic pressures have weakened a traditional ‘culture of sharing’ as 
people have become more focused on the needs of their immediate 
families.  
  People have fewer resources to share and less time to spend interacting 
socially.  
  Reciprocity between different families and clans is declining as 
inequalities in wealth (related to resource endowments) increase.  
  Economic pressures drive competition for resources, and in turn, 
conflicts and disputes.  
  Governance problems such as poor leadership make organisation and 
coordination of activities (e.g. church and school activities) difficult. 
This exacerbates economic pressures and contributes to individualism.  
  Governance problems inhibit the resolution of conflicts and disputes 
which are both a cause and consequence of declining social cohesion.  
  Locally identified strategies to solve social cohesion problems include 
getting leaders and the community together in a process of 
communication, planning and action.   
 
 These points are summarised in Figure 2.34 below. 
Chapter 4 – Results Part 1: Tangoa Island Case Study 
 
 
 
 
129 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.34, Drivers of social cohesion problems, and locally identified strategy   
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Chapter 5 - Results Part 2: Relevance of Case-Study 
Findings for the Wider Context of Vanuatu 
 
 Review of Vanuatu literature and interviews with NGOs, multilateral aid donors, 
and government employees involved in conservation and development in 
Vanuatu shows that the problems affecting management of Tangoa’s CPRs are 
relatively common in communities across Vanuatu. The main reason for this is 
that many of the underlying drivers are related to widespread processes of 
cultural change associated with globalisation, change in national governance, 
and institutional structures.  
 
 This chapter uses literature and interview data gathered from Port Vila during 
February 2007, to show the relevance of the case study findings for other 
communities in Vanuatu. The first two sections provide a brief overview of 
natural resource use and of community resource management in Vanuatu. The 
last section looks at the drivers of Tangoa’s commons management problems in 
the wider Vanuatu context. I explore the effect of economic pressures, social 
cohesion problems, and governance problems on local level commons 
management in Vanuatu. Finally, I highlight some important factors which were 
not identified in the case study. These include how Vanuatu’s current 
development pathway and economic development policies may affect local level 
commons management.   
 
5.1 Use of natural resources 
 As is the case for the Tangoa community, rural livelihoods across Vanuatu are 
inextricably linked to natural resources. The rural population makes up 77% of 
the total population (Vanuatu Statistics Office, 2007). A 80% increase in the 
rural population in the 27 years since independence (from about 95,000 in 1980 
to 170,815 now) has been supported by use of natural resources and the 
traditional, largely non-monetarised, rural economy (Baezely and Mullen, 2006; 
Vanuatu Statistics Office, 2007). About 80% of Vanuatu households (and 91% 
of the rural households) are engaged in some kind of small-scale commercial or 
subsistence forestry activities (Vanuatu Statistics Office, 2007). Forest resources 
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are also important for fuel-wood, herbal medicines, wild meat, edible nuts, 
thatch grass and other building materials, and plants used for ceremonial 
purposes and the manufacture of musical instruments (Whyte et al., 2002). An 
estimated monetary value of forest products for subsistence use could be as high 
as US$14 million per year (VDF, 2002). Reef fisheries provide an important 
source of protein for Vanuatu’s coastal communities and 78% of ni-Vanuatu 
households fish regularly for their own consumption (Vanuatu Statistics Office, 
2007). 
 
5.2 Community management of natural resources 
 Like on Tangoa Island, most community governance systems in Vanuatu make 
consensus-based decisions about management of collectively owned land, with 
the guiding authority of the chief (Whyte et al., 1998; 1999).  Traditional 
governance systems in Vanuatu are generally based on customs of reciprocity 
and cooperation for communal benefit (Kalontano et al, 2003), and resource 
management is based on traditional ecological knowledge (TEK). Taboos are 
associated with elabourate traditional practices and rituals underpinned by 
traditional cosmology, and are sanctioned through supernatural forces. These 
traditional rules were complied with out of fear and respect for the local deities 
involved (Hickey, 2006).Traditional beliefs and practices associated with NRM 
in Vanuatu often follow natural cycles of resource abundance, accessibility, and 
respect for customary rules enshrined in oral traditions (Hickey, 2006). Garu 
(pers. comm.) explains, “Life in the custom system hinges on time and way. The 
way you exploit the natural environment is defined by the time, and the way that 
will not deprive others from it.”  
 
5.3 Causes of degradation   
 
5.3.1 Population pressures 
 Population pressures and lack of gardening land are two key drivers of economic 
pressures as well as social and governance problems in Tangoa. However a 
recent census carried out by the Vanuatu Statistics Office suggests that the 
severity of the Tangoa population and land pressures may be one of the most 
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extreme cases in Vanuatu.  However, population growth is relatively high across 
the country. Census statistics from 1999 and 2006 show that Vanuatu’s 
population has grown 20% (from 186,678 to 221,507) over the last six years. 
Specific census data for Tangoa were unavailable from the agricultural census 
that came out in 2006, so Tangoa population data from the case study were 
compared with the Tangoa statistics from 1999. Tangoa population has grown 
about 34% over six years. Figure 5.1 shows that population growth varies 
between the different provinces with the highest growth in the province of Shefa 
where the capital city – Port Vila, has flowed into it. This reflects high rates of 
urbanisation (7.3%/yr; UNDP 1999) as many outer islanders moving to the 
capital and surrounding areas in search of work. Figure 5.1, also shows that 
Tangoa has a higher rate of population growth than any of the provinces.  
Population increase from 1999 - 2006 for Vanuatu, the provinces, and 
Tangoa
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Figure 5.1, Population increase from 1999-2006 for Vanuatu, the provinces, and Tangoa 
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5.3.2 Land and resource endowments 
 Without comparable agricultural census data for Tangoa Island, only an estimate 
is possible for how Tangoan land and resource endowments compare with the 
rest of Vanuatu. The basis of the estimates is limited data from key informants 
who provided information about the populations of the most well endowed clans 
which “all have gardens and most have their own coconuts” (see section 4.6.3) 
and about the number of Tangoa households with garden land and coconuts. As 
Tangoa is ‘rural’, it is most meaningful to compare the Tangoan estimate of 
households with garden land with the census data for rural Vanuatu households 
with their own garden plots. The Tangoa estimate is that about 70% of 
households have their own garden plots (see section 4.6.3). This is much lower 
than the 97% of rural Vanuatu households with garden plots (see figure 5.2). 
One Tangoan community member explained that many other communities do 
not experience the shortage of land as much as Tangoa people do, because they 
do not have such a confined resource area (Viji pers. comms. 2.02.07). 
 
 The Tangoa estimate for the number of households that have their own coconut 
trees is between 65-70%. This compares with the census data which says that 
85% of rural households have coconut trees. 96% of these rural households with 
coconuts are smallholders, which means that they operate on a subsistence level 
and generally with no organised management or record keeping (Vanuatu 
National Statistics Office (NSO), 2006).73  
                                                 
73
 Small holding is defined by the Vanuatu’s National Statistics Office as “all holdings which do not fall 
into the category of plantation.” (VSO, 2006, p.9) 
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Comparison of garden land and coconut endowments between 
Vanuatu and Tangoa
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 Figure 5.2, Comparison of garden land and coconut endowments between Vanuatu and Tangoa. 
(Data from NSO, 2006; and Tangoa key informants and local population census) 
 
5.3.3 Economic pressures 
 As seen in the Tangoa case study, economic pressures directly impact commons 
resource management by changing how resources are used. Economic pressures 
drive increased demand for resource utilization and a decline in traditional 
management practices. Selwyn Garu from the National Council of Chiefs 
explained the close link between natural resource management and natural 
resource use in Vanuatu:  
 
 “Environmental conservation has always been a way of life of the rural 
communities in Vanuatu. Communities’ techniques of conservation are 
not like a park, where you close a particular area off and leave it there. 
You can’t close places because people depend on those places for 
firewood, trees to make houses, custom leaf medicine from the bush, 
so you leave the bush but manage it in such a way that it continues to 
supply what you need.” (Garu, pers. comm.).  
 
 However, a representative from NGO Wan Smolbag explained that as 
communities face increasing economic pressures and new monetary needs, the 
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traditional systems of management are changing: “People will tell you about 
practices that were used traditionally that help to conserve natural resources, but 
over time, having to use the resources for money puts a lot more pressure on 
those resources, and forces people to give up the traditional ways of using 
resources.”  
 
 Participatory research with communities across Vanuatu shows that the link 
identified in Tangoa data between economic pressures and governance 
problems, is also relatively common in other communities (Kalontano et al., 
2003). Increased need and desire for money is having a negative effect on 
community governance capacity as community leaders struggle to accommodate 
and provide for the changing needs and desires of their people. Traditional 
governance systems in Vanuatu are designed around facilitating and managing 
subsistence socio-economic livelihoods and traditional values, which often clash 
with modern, capitalist pressures74 (Garu, pers comm; Kalontano pers comm.). 
As Chiefs struggle to provide for the additional community needs and desires, 
customary systems and values are being weakened and chiefs face declining 
respect and power (Kalontano et al. 2003).  
 
 An increasing need and desire for money negatively impacts community 
governance systems, in turn impacting environmental management and social 
systems of reciprocity, thereby increasing livelihood insecurity. Tangoa families 
that are less well endowed with gardening land are more dependent on cash to 
buy food, and are perceived to be suffering from poor nutrition as a result (see 
section 4.6.3). Port Vila based research suggests that this link between 
transitioning from a gardening-based to cash-based economy and increasing 
socio-economic vulnerability, can be seen in urban communities that do not have 
the livelihood security of gardens, or the social security of strong communities 
such as those living in Port Vila (Regenvanu, 2007). According to Regenvanu 
(2007) “Port Vila is the one place in the country where the most real poverty, 
                                                 
74
 Waddell and Connell (2007: 3) Describe this as a “condition where people are exposed to a bewildering 
range of new ideologies, lifestyles and goods…increasingly divorced from the needs and values of rural 
people”.  Weaver et al (2007, forthcoming) overviews issues surrounding this in a specific Vanuatu 
context.   
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homelessness, hunger (malnutrition) and lifestyle diseases are now being 
experienced.” 
 
5.3.4 Governance problems 
 A comprehensive study of community governance problems in Vanuatu by the 
Foundation for the People of the South Pacific – Vanuatu (FSP)75 shows that 
some of the governance problems seen in the Tangoa case study are widespread 
in Vanuatu. Across a range of rural and urban, modern and traditional Vanuatu 
communities, modern structures of governance are weakening customary 
community governance and the power and responsibility of traditional leaders 
(Kalontano et al. 2003).  National governance changes since independence have 
resulted in new institutional structures, including state government departments, 
police, courts, and new constitutional perspectives about rights (Garu, pers. 
comm.).  New values of individual rights and democracy conflict with 
customary governance, which is based on underlying communal values and is 
focused around ensuring the wellbeing of the collective. Selwyn Garu from the 
Malvatumauri (National Council of Chiefs) 76 explains that the constitutional 
governance structure conflicts with customary governance structures, with 
negative consequences for leadership: 
 
 “Everyday, forces from constitutional governance are bombarding 
custom, and custom is being challenged in such a way that it is 
struggling.”…  “Chiefs struggle with changes that come through 
education, church, NGOs, government, and ideas from outside coming 
in. Many Chiefs don’t know how to deal with the new daily changes. 
Some just don’t have the skills and capacities to manage these 
changes.”… “Custom leadership is very uncertain as to what to do 
when things go wrong in the community now. If they make a particular 
decision they may be taken to court by someone else. The courts can 
                                                 
75 FSPV produced a research report: Assessing Community Perspectives on Governance in Vanuatu. The 
report was an output from the “Voices and Choices Project” which involved participatory research with 
communities across Vanuatu. The project’s aim was to explore issues of community governance, identify 
its strength and weaknesses and develop an understanding of the challenges that are currently 
undermining both traditional community governance structures and modern adaptations. (see: 
http://www.devnet.org.nz/conf2002/abstracts/Whyte_Jenny_et_al.pdf (info about project) 
76
 The National Council of Chiefs is essentially an administrative structure to support governance at the 
village level as well as support traditional governance values at the national level. At the National level, 
the Council works to ensure they are consulted and allowed a chance to discuss and debate the merits of 
any proposals for custom related bills before they are tabled in parliament (FSP 2005).  
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take away authority from Chiefs and then all the customary ceremonies 
and ways of resolving disputes and problems are not valued.”  
(Garu, pers comms. 12/02/07).   
 
 Studies from around the world show that the difficulties Vanuatu communities 
are experiencing with transitioning governance structures are common for 
societies undergoing adaptation from chiefly systems to more modern systems 
(McCarthy et al., 2002; Fuys et al., 2006). Substitute organisations often 
struggle to fill the leadership roles previously undertaken by the chief 
(McCarthy et al., 2002). 
 
 Studies of community level commons management in Vanuatu show that the 
strength of traditional community governance systems (e.g., respect for rules and 
custom) and sustainable resource management are strongly correlated (Hickey, 
2006; Kalontano et al., 2003; FSP, 2005; Whyte, 2002). Garu (pers comms. 
12/02/07) explains the importance of customary systems and traditional leaders: 
“In Vanuatu, people need to be able to fall back on the Chief – not only for 
environmental conservation, but for peace and stability and everything.”  He 
explains that locally developed systems of governance are suited to local 
contexts, whereas the constitutional systems tend to standardise values, laws and 
practices, with negative effects on unique cultures: “Vanuatu is a nation made up 
of many nations. Each community, each society, each particular cultural area has 
its differences. They believe in different ways of doing things. Customary 
leaders are needed to deal with their own unique situations.” 
 
 The difficulty experienced by Tangoans in providing time and money for the 
different community responsibilities (i.e., for the Church and the schools) is 
common across many communities in Vanuatu.  Kalontano et al. (2003, p.100) 
describe this as an increased “burden of responsibility”, and explain that (as seen 
in Tangoa data) this is linked with a socio-cultural shift from communalism to 
individualism. The family, even to the level of the nuclear family, is becoming 
the focus of individual and household endeavor (Kalontano et al. 2003). This 
shows that the link between the community governance problems and social 
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cohesion problems seen in Tangoa are relevant for many communities, 
especially those that are struggling to coordinate the new governance structures. 
 
 Loss of traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) was identified as a problem that 
affects respect for custom governance in the Tangoa case study. Studies show 
that TEK is declining across Vanuatu and has been since the arrival of Western 
European cultures in the 19th and early 20th century. During this early colonial 
period, introduced diseases resulted in severe depopulation which had a major 
impact on Vanuatu people, their cultures, and their TEK (Hickey 2006).  TEK 
was also affected by intensive missionary activity on many islands which 
resulted in population movements and cultural shifts (ibid). TEK is impacted 
today by processes of urbanisation and cultural change. Studies show that 
urbanisation threatens TEK (Usher 2000), and Vanuatu has one of the highest 
rates of urbanisation in the world (UNDP 1999). 
 
 Several interviews indicated that the Tangoan identified link between loss of 
TEK, growth of monetary economy and related cultural change, is seen in other 
Vanuatu communities also. Charles Vatu (AusAID) worked for several years to 
help local people in East Santo establish the Vatthe Conservation Area and he 
explains: 
: 
 “Knowing the importance of conservation and protection of resources is 
not a new thing for the elders. Managing the natural environment has 
always been their way of life. But the youth today are affected by the 
forces that come with the cash economy. Youth absorb new culture. 
Transfer of traditional knowledge from elders to young is reducing. In 
some places the knowledge is being lost because it is not being taught. 
Formal education takes all the kids to school. They don’t spend time 
with their elders or they don’t go looking for this knowledge form their 
elders.”  
  
 Research from Vanuatu indicates TEK is important (and therefore loss of TEK is 
a problem) because practices based on indigenous knowledge foster pride, 
identity and ownership (Whyte et al., 1998; 1999; Environment Unit, 2003). 
People are more willing to work together for something that is their own, based 
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on their own knowledge, rather than something externally driven (Hickey, 2006; 
Johannes et al, 2004; Whyte, 2002).  Western models of conservation, such as 
marine protected areas, are poorly understood and are largely viewed with 
suspicion by rural communities. In most cases, these are unsustainable once 
outside assistance has ended (Johannes and Hickey, 2004).   
 
5.3.5 Social cohesion problems 
 Case study data from Tangoa show that social cohesion problems degrade social 
capital (see section 4.8). This inhibits the Tangoa community’s ability to 
cooperate for commons management, and to work together to solve problems 
and achieve goals. Kalontano et al. (2003) found that social cohesion problems 
are common for many communities across Vanuatu, and that this can be seen in 
the decline of respect and cooperation. In Vanuatu, respect is shown through the 
practice of acceptable ways of behavior in society, including either fear or 
support of leaders. Cooperation includes the concepts of working together, 
willing participation, support and contribution (Kalontano et al. 2003).  
 
 Similar to the case study findings, participatory research with other communities 
has identified the interrelated factors involved in declining respect and 
cooperation as: increasing individualism; weakening leadership and governance 
systems; disputes over land, resource access, and authority; jealousy; and 
increasing economic pressures, including growing need and desire for money 
(Kalontano et al. 2003).  One environmental NGO explained: “Land disputes are 
everywhere in Vanuatu”; and “Land disputes are often an indicator of poor 
respect between people.”  Informants iterated that land disputes in Vanuatu are 
both an indicator and driver of social cohesion problems.  
 
 As seen in Tangoa, low cooperative capacity can be a barrier to accessing 
external assistance for development, training, funding etc. Interviews with 
government representatives and NGOs in Port Vila support this finding for 
Vanuatu in general. Community governance/cooperative capacity can determine 
whether government, NGO and donor assistance can be provided, and which 
communities are chosen as participants in projects. Interviewees described some 
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of the indicators that they use to identify and assess community cooperative 
capacity. One NGO explained: “A strong Chief is an indication that the 
community as a whole will work together. If he is present at things that he has 
been requested to be a part of, and if people respond to him well, that’s a strong 
indicator.” An individual from the government that does environmental work 
with communities considered indicators of leadership important: “When I first 
arrive at a community to do a workshop, if the leader comes and meets me, it is 
a good sign that people communicate with one another.” A volunteer 
organisation explained that community contributions of money and labour can 
also be indicators of collective commitment for an initiative: “When the 
community builds a house for the volunteer, it is a good indicator that having a 
volunteer is a collective goal, and that the community can work together.”  
 
 Poor social cohesion is problematic for communities such as Tangoa, which may 
need to develop new management practices and rules in order to deal with 
environmental problems that are inadequately managed under customary rules or 
where the customary systems are weak (see section 4.4.2). One Pt. Vila 
interviewee who has been working on conservation and development initiatives 
with his own community explained: “It is difficult for people to change how 
they use natural resources unless it is a very strong community, or unless they 
have assurance or proof that it will benefit them.”  
 
5.3.6 Commons management threats associated with Vanuatu’s national 
development policies 
 National policies and practices aimed at supporting productive sector growth 
facilitate investor’s access to land and natural resources. This has resulted in a 
rapid increase of long term leases (Rockell, 2007). The government also seeks to 
encourage development of the tourism industry and the extractive industries 
such as logging, and mining (Department of Economic and Sector Planning, 
2006). Low government capacity to develop and implement policy means that 
external investors meet minimal barriers and constraints in their endeavor to 
exploit natural resources. This section outlines several issues associated with 
Vanuatu’s development policies that may have serious impacts on local 
communities and commons management.  
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Land  leasehold sale 
 The Vanuatu government seeks to encourage and accommodate external 
development interests but has to do this within a constitutional framework that 
outlines the government’s responsibilities to uphold the rights of indigenous 
land owners. Under the 1988 Land Lease Act, different lease categories were 
defined according to land use, and extension of leases to 75 years became 
prevalent.77 In his thesis on land tenure issues and their effect on development in 
Vanuatu, Dennis Rockell (2007, p73) argues that there is a struggle of interests 
between the return of indigenous lands as promised in the constitution and the 
needs of foreign investors and developers: “The preponderance of 75 year leases 
appears to be a triumph for the developer.”  
 
 Privatisation marginalises people from their land and the resources on which 
they depend.  Communities are increasingly selling leasehold interests to 
alleviate needs for cash, but they do this without understanding what the 
consequences will be (Garu, pers. comm.; Hickey, pers. comm.). Often land 
owners do not realise that leasing land can permanently jeopardise their access 
to, and use of resources. Once their land is leased, they have no control over 
what happens to it. Investors can do what they like, often degrading and 
permanently altering natural resources. Furthermore, landowners’ ability to 
benefit from land sales is limited due to poor education about how to use and 
save money (Hickey, pers. comm., 7.02.07). Often money made from sale of 
land is gone in several years, and then families have no land on which to support 
livelihoods.  
 
 Once people give up options for subsistence livelihoods they face increased 
problems and vulnerability associated with urban, cash-based livelihoods. 
Selwyn Garu explains that the trend of leasehold land may have political 
ramifications along with the social and cultural impacts: “Life is land in 
Vanuatu. This mass selling of land like on Santo and Efate, means that 
communities are refrained from using it. People will feel alienated. This will 
                                                 
77
 The island of Efate has the highest concentration of leases - approximately one quarter of the island 
(26,000ha) is now under registered leasehold. By the 1990s at least 50% of alienated land still did not 
have custom ownership determined (Farran, 2002, cited in Rockell, 2007). 
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create discontent and a new situation that has never been managed before.” 
(Garu, pers. comm.) 
 
 As seen in the Tangoa case study, where there is ambiguity about tenure rights, 
people feel that they do not have the authority to govern water taro patches 
within leasehold land. Tenure ambiguity is common in areas of Vanuatu where 
privatisation of land and resources through longterm leases is occurring. It can 
cause a decline in customary institutions that manage natural resources. One port 
Vila Based NGO explained: “Investors are buying up coastal areas for resorts in 
Efate and East Santo. Local people are often not aware of whether or not they 
can still manage marine resources in the area, or what their rights are.”  
 
Extractive industries and tourism development 
 Other examples of how the current development model may be considered 
environmentally and socially unsustainable include: poorly implemented 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process; no mandatory social or 
cultural impact assessment for development projects; no effective land use 
planning or zoning; problems with unregistered loggers, and environmentally 
damaging practices even though there is a Code of Logging Practice78  (VDF, 
2002); and no official process for undertaking genuine consultation with 
communities about what kind of “development” they would like to see take 
place (Regenvanu, 2007).79 While Tangoa has not yet faced pressures from 
logging, mining, large tourism operators etc., many other Vanuatu communities 
are facing these pressures.80    
 
                                                 
78
 The code of logging practice sets operational guidelines and rules and requires loggers to know these 
and abide by these in order to get a timber extraction license (Vanuatu Forestry Department, 2004) 
79
 Vanuatu government has precious little capacity to undertake scenario-planning around future policy 
and public investment options. The Department of Economic and Sector Planning (DESP), in charge of 
policy development, is pre-occupied with administration matters including overseeing, literally hundreds 
of small development projects (Baezely and Mullen, 2006). 
 
80
 The Tangoa community was aware that a community further inland had just agreed to allow a coal 
mining operation go ahead. While it may be the landowners that have to agree to such a project, many 
other communities that may be effected by the downstream environmental effects of mining, including 
water pollution, are not consulted.  
Chapter 6 – Discussion 
 
 
 
 
143 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 - Discussion 
 
 The purpose of this study is to determine locally identified commons 
management issues for the Tangoa Community, to put the case study results in 
the wider Vanuatu context, and to identify opportunities overcoming commons 
management problems. The research undertaken involves literature review 
(“literature”), the case study (“case study”), and the wider Vanuatu based 
research (“Vanuatu research”).  My research results contribute to commons 
research in several ways. In particular, it addresses a gap in identified in the 
literature about knowledge of the interaction between context and factors at 
multiple levels. It also contributes to a gap in research on commons management 
in Vanuatu.  
 
 I have developed a model to describe and analyse the findings from the 
literature, the case study and the Vanuatu research. It is a model of community 
cooperative capacity for commons management, or for the sake of giving it a 
title – it is a Cooperative Capacity Model.  In the remainder of this discussion, it 
will simply be called the “model”.  The model emphasises two central 
arguments that arise from this study: that the important factors affecting local-
level commons management are context specific; and that local capacity for 
commons management is affected by drivers at multiple levels.  The model is 
intended to help facilitate the analysis and discussion of the study results.  
 
 This discussion chapter has three main sections. In the first section, I describe 
and explain the model. Throughout the discussion I highlight how the findings 
link to commons literature. The second section of this chapter acknowledges the 
limitations of this study, and highlights several gaps where further research is 
needed. The third section of this chapter builds from the major findings to argue 
that development needs to be appropriate for particular social, cultural and 
ecological contexts. Finally, I identify various opportunities and solutions that 
may support local commons management. 
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6.1 Cooperative Capacity Model  
 The case study and Vanuatu research can be summarised in the model, which 
shows the most important factors involved in Tangoa’s commons management. 
Figure 6.1 is a general illustration showing Important changes that drive local 
commons problems are influenced by processes that occur in different contexts 
at the local, national and global levels. The two major determining factors of 
Tangoa’s cooperative capacity are social cohesion and governance capacity. 
Community cooperative capacity lies in the intersection of these two main 
factors, and is nested within multiple contextual levels of influence. As 
described in the introduction, ‘cooperative capacity’ is the ability for the 
community to work collectively to achieve shared goals, and solve collective 
action problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 6.1 Model of community cooperative capacity for Tangoa, Vanuatu 
 
 The link between local situations and wider contextual influences explains why 
Tangoan issues are relatively common across rural Vanuatu. This supports the 
premise arising in literature that people, places and environments are never 
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separate, isolated realities. They are subject to regional and global forces of 
economic, political and environmental change (Waddell and Connell, 2007).  
The key drivers at different levels that influence local cooperative capacity are 
outlined in table 6.1.   
 
 Table 6.1 Global level, national level and local level factors that influence community 
cooperative capacity  
 
Global level National level Local level 
 Global transfer of 
ideas, values, 
people, cultures, 
and products  
 International 
market prices of 
copra 
 
 Cultural change 
 National institutional change i.e. 
formal education 
 Constitutional governance 
structures and values  
 Government development 
policies  
 Low economic development i.e. 
limited income generating 
opportunities  
 Problems with land claims 
processes 
 
 Economic pressures 
 Socio-economic 
heterogeneity 
 Cultural change i.e. 
desire for modern 
lifestyles 
 Loss of TEK 
 Declining respect for 
chiefs and custom 
governance institutions  
 Disputes and conflict 
 Exclusion of women 
from community level 
decision-making 
processes and 
institutional structures 
 Tenure ambiguity 
 
 
 Figure 6.2 illustrates in more detail how drivers at multiple levels influence 
community cooperative capacity for commons management in Vanuatu. The 
following section will describe the model and explain how the drivers at each 
level affect the two essential elements of cooperative capacity – social cohesion 
and governance. The discussion will use the literature, case study and Vanuatu 
research where they strengthen the analysis.  
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Figure 6.2, Model of cooperative capacity for local commons management in Vanuatu  
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6.1.1 Social cohesion  
 Social cohesion is vital for Tangoa’s cooperative capacity for commons 
management. Other studies from around the world have also identified that “a 
major threat to community-based management is the lack of internal cohesion in 
the communities themselves.” (Neumann, 2005). Social cohesion affects trust 
and social capital within a community, and can determine people’s motivation to 
work for collective benefits. Commons research provides theoretical and 
empirical evidence that intra-community social capital is required for innovative 
change in NRM. As Pretty and Ward, (2001, p.225) explain: “NRM innovation 
in a collective action setting requires high levels of trust and networking to 
promote knowledge sharing and confidence in reciprocal support from the group 
in the face of risk.”81 The case study data support Ostrom (1990) and Kahan’s 
(2002) emphasis on the importance of trust to enable people to make contingent 
strategies to cooperate.  This can be seen in the case of drinking water 
management, where no institution or rules have emerged to manage a 
longstanding problem of shared concern due to people “not wanting to do 
anything others will benefit from” (section 4.8.2). 
 
  In the Tangoa community, the main issues associated with declining social 
cohesion include increased individualism as well as conflict, divisions, and 
disputes. As figure 6.2 suggests, national and global level contextual factors 
influence these local drivers in several ways. Market integration and growing 
local monetary economy affects social cohesion and intra-community reciprocity 
(see section 4.8.3). Local people find it especially difficult to address economic 
pressures and achieve economic development goals due to volatile (and low) 
market prices for copra and few employment opportunities. Problems with 
national land claims processes also constrain local resolution of land disputes. 
 
 Tangoa results also support the findings of Krishna (2003), that social capital 
(including trust) is needed for the utilisation of human capital assets within the 
community. In the Tangoa community there are individuals that could be 
described as ‘organisational entrepreneurs’ (Molinas, 1998), or ‘village agents’ 
                                                 
81
 Increasing amounts of capacity for collective action are needed along a scale of remedial measures to 
change current practices, to innovation (Pretty and Ward, 2001). 
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(Krishna, 2003) “who act and bring about change” (Sen, 1999 p. 18-19). 
However, their ability to provide leadership beyond their own clans is limited by 
lack of trust between clans (see section 4.8.4).  
 
6.1.2 Governance  
 Figure 6.2 indicates that local governance issues include cultural change, 
leadership problems and lack of governance authority over commons resources 
within private leaseholder land (section 4.7.4). Strong community governance is 
important to enable local communities to manage local issues as well as adapt to 
or control the impacts of external pressures and processes of change (Garu, pers 
comm.; Kalontano et al., 2003). Emphasis on strong community governance that 
facilitates cooperative capacity is supported by commons research. Case studies 
from literature show that cooperative capacity has empowered communities to 
influence policy at the national level (Shrestha, 2005); to gain greater 
recognition of their rights to govern commons resources (Galudra, 2005; 
Kijtewachakul, 2005); and to act collectively against external threats to resource 
dependent livelihoods (Bachir et al., 2005; Ghate, 2005) 
 
 Cultural change comes from formal education, the media and popular culture 
which actively promote individual interests as distinct from the collective good 
(Waddell and Connell, 2007). In the Tangoa community cultural change 
includes the desire for more modern lifestyles, loss of TEK resulting from the 
crowding out of traditional forms of education and intergenerational transfer of 
knowledge by modern, standardised education systems. This is seen in other 
studies where acculturation (the acquiring new language skills, attitudes, and 
values) associated with integration into new economic markets can cause the 
loss of traditional knowledge (Benz et al, 2000; Godoy, et al., 2005; Zent, 2001; 
Neumann, 2005).  
 
 Tangoan concern with loss of TEK is related to increased socio-economic 
vulnerability.  For example, young people are not learning about gardening 
practices that reduce vulnerability to the impacts of cyclones.  Some scholars 
have recognised this link between loss of TEK and socioeconomic vulnerability 
(Levin, 2000; Loureau et al., 2003; Perrings, 2007). Perrings (2007, p15180) 
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explains that globalisation leads to homogenisation of communities “threatening 
the resilience or robustness, and hence the sustainability, of both the individual 
communities and the metacommunity.” 
 
 Respect for kastom and traditional leaders are essential elements of community 
governance capacity in Vanuatu. Tangoa’s governance system is highly 
dependent on the capabilities of the Chief and the willingness of people to 
cooperate with one another, the Chief, and kastom rules. While the importance 
of respect for the collective and for traditional leaders is emphasised in some 
studies (Fuys et al., 2006), such cultural variables are generally under-
represented. Commons literature places more attention on the particular 
institutional arrangements i.e. monitoring and sanctions (Ostrom, 1990). This 
indicates a gap in the literature about less tangible factors such as ‘respect’ for 
custom and cultural norms and values. 
 
  National level political and institutional changes impact local level governance 
structures and capacities. As explained in section 5.3.4, traditional community 
leaders are struggling to adapt to constitutional governance structures and 
values, and their authority is undermined by central authority structures such as 
formal courts and tribunals. Vanuatu chiefs are also losing the respect of the 
people as they struggle to provide for increasing monetary needs. Furthermore, 
government policies that support privitisation of land and natural resources can 
challenge the authority of customary systems, and cause tenure ambiguity and 
uncertainty about management rights and responsibilities. Commons literature 
has established that local communities need secure access rights and autonomy 
to govern as basic incentives for the improvement and development of commons 
management systems, and the emergence of them where they do not exist 
(Ostrom, 1990, Guys et al., 2006). 
 
 There is a strong link between social cohesion and governance in the Tangoa 
community, and in other communities in Vanuatu. The governance system is 
highly dependent on cooperation for consensus decision-making and respect of 
rules for shared resource management. Cooperation is affected by factors such as 
conflict management and leadership which impact social cohesion. This link is 
Chapter 6 – Discussion 
 
 
 
 
150 
 
 
 
represented by the overlap of the two elements in figure 6.2. The relationship is 
illustrated by looking at how one factor – the exclusion of women from 
community level decision-making processes and institutional structures – can 
inhibit both social cohesion and governance capacity. On the other hand 
including women could enhance these two elements of cooperative capacity.   
 Women expressed that if they had more influence at the community level they 
could improve community governance cooperative capacity (Section 4.8.4). 
International literature supports this and indicates that the exclusion of women is 
a barrier to building community social capital and cooperative capacity.    
 
 Women have different ecological knowledge which is important for natural 
resource management (Batterbury, 2001) and their participation greatly 
increases their capacity for collective action (Westermann et al. 2005). Studies 
have found that compared with men; women have strong social networks and 
values of collabouration, lower levels of conflict, and higher capacity for 
conflict management (Agrawal, 2001; Meinzen-Dick, 2006; Westermann et al., 
2005; Molinas, 1998).  In a study of 104 peasant cooperatives in Paraguay, 
women’s participation in committees enhanced the achievement of collective 
action goals and initiatives (Molinas, 1998).  Similarly, a recent study involving 
33 rural programs in 20 countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia showed 
that collabouration, solidarity, and conflict resolution all increase in natural 
resource management institutions where women are present (Westermann et al., 
2005).  This evidence shows that enabling greater participation of Tangoan 
women would likely build the cooperative capacity and wellbeing of the whole 
community. 
 
 Youth are another social group within the Tangoa community that has strong 
social capital which is utilised in regular collective action (sec. 4.8.4) but less is 
known about this influence. This highlights a gap in commons research about 
the role of youth in motivating and initiating collective action for natural 
resource management 
 
Chapter 6 – Discussion 
 
 
 
 
151 
 
 
 
6.1.3 Cause and effect feed-back loops  
 There are feedback loops between various drivers of cooperative capacity as 
well as between the drivers and their outcomes at the different levels of the 
model. Some key outcomes of low cooperative capacity in Tangoa and wider 
communities include: social cohesion and governance problems; economic 
pressures; resource degradation; conflict; increased livelihood dependence on 
cash; socio-economic and wellbeing heterogeneity; and livelihood vulnerability. 
Many of these outcomes, however, are also drivers of low cooperative capacity. 
The illustration of this view if the model would look very much like figure 6.2 
with the arrows pointing in opposite directions. 
 
 Kahan’s (2002) reciprocity theory and explanation of how cooperation has 
multiple equilibria are useful to help explain why the state of social cohesion 
and governance capacity within a community is not always stable. Equilibrium 
may be reached or a process of change may be triggered where cooperative 
capacity becomes stronger, or where it declines and weakens. This section will 
look at feedback loops related to: economic pressure, socioeconomic 
heterogeneity, and social cohesion; social cohesion, governance, and conflict; 
resource degradation, women’s disempowerment, socioeconomic heterogeneity; 
and resource degradation and livelihood vulnerability. I have chosen to explain 
these feedback loops because they illustrate dynamic processes that have 
significant consequences for both local people and commons resources.  Results 
from all three sources (literature, case study and Vanuatu research) are used in 
analysis of these relationships, and separate figures are used to illustrated and 
simplify the discussion.  
 
Economic pressure, socioeconomic heterogeneity, and social 
cohesion 
 Just as economic pressures drive social problems in the Tangoa community, 
poor social cohesion can be a barrier to addressing economic pressures and 
achieving economic development goals.  Social problems contribute to the 
difficulties of accessing external assistance from the provincial government’s 
Chapter 6 – Discussion 
 
 
 
 
152 
 
 
 
REDI program and NGOs such as Peace Corps. Figure 6.3 shows this feedback 
loop between social cohesion and economic pressures.  
 
 There is also a feedback loop between social cohesion and socioeconomic 
heterogeneity.  Social cohesion problems, such as declining reciprocity, can 
cause increased socio-economic and wellbeing disparities. This is illustrated in 
the patterns and effects of reciprocity after a severe cyclone. Families without 
gardens often rely on copra as a main source of income and therefore are 
severely impacted when copra crops are destroyed in cyclones. When this 
happens they may not have enough money to buy food or housing materials, and 
they have to rely on commons resources and on reciprocity from others (sec. 
4.6.3).   
 
 However, reciprocity is becoming more restricted to intra-family or intra-clan 
networks. The people that are impacted most severely may only have the support 
of others in their clan who are also likely to be in similar extreme need. 
Declining reciprocity results in greater socio-economic and wellbeing 
inequalities between those who have gardens and those who do not. Garcia et al., 
(2006) also highlighted the role of reciprocity in providing a safety net for the 
most vulnerable.  Increasing heterogeneity within communities is particularly 
problematic for natural resource management as it becomes more difficult to 
devise strategies that will meet increasingly diverse needs and interests 
(Neumann, 2005).  
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 Figure 6.3, Feedback loops between social cohesion, economic pressures and socioeconomic 
heterogeneity 
 
Social cohesion, governance, and conflict  
 Conflict is both a cause of social and governance problems, and an outcome of 
low cooperative capacity (sec. 4.7.4 and 4.8.2). Declining social cohesion 
coupled with declining respect for the Chief and custom governance systems, 
results in increased conflict. When the local traditional leaders lose power and 
influence, the potential for conflict increases and the ability of communities to 
solve and manage conflicts decreases. A vicious feedback circle results as 
conflict continues to degrade social cohesion. See figure 6.4. 
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 Figure 6.4, Feedback loop between governance problems, conflict and social cohesion 
 
Resource degradation and cooperative capacity 
 The consequences of social and governance problems for the resource systems 
include resource degradation. Resource degradation, in turn, affects social and 
governance systems. Those whose livelihoods are most dependent on commons 
resources are likely to be most severely impacted.  Commons resources are 
important for all Tangoans. However families who do not have garden land are 
more reliant on commons resources for cash and for food security in times of 
extreme need (refer to fig. 4.20 sect. 4.6.3). Therefore, resource degradation may 
exacerbate heterogeneity in wellbeing (see figure 6.5).   
 
 Degradation of resources that women rely on to earn money may also inhibit 
women’s empowerment, and constrain their further participation in community 
level decision-making processes (see figure 6.5 above). Women’s ability to earn 
cash is an important source of respect and empowerment at the household level, 
which in turn enables them to have more influence at the community level (refer 
to section 4.4.2).  Therefore, degradation of resources which are important for 
women’s income (crab collecting areas and dark bush) is also degradation of an 
important source of empowerment for women.  
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 Figure 6.5, Feedback loop between low cooperative capacity and resource degradation  
 
Resource degradation, cash dependency, and increased livelihood 
vulnerability 
 In the case of Tangoa Island, resource scarcity and degradation is one of the 
factors that drive a transition from subsistence-based to cash-based livelihoods. 
Lack of gardening land has led to an increased dependency on cash (section 
4.6.2).82  In other parts of Vanuatu it is caused by Vanuatu government’s 
development policies that encourage privitisation of land and natural resources 
via long-term leases (section 5.3.6). Increased cash dependency can drive 
livelihood vulnerability when the economic environment provides few 
opportunities (i.e. when there is high unemployment); when cash markets are 
volatile as is the case for copra; and when the value of economic goods is 
variable (i.e. copra crops affected by cyclones). Figure 6.6 shows that cash 
dependency and associated economic pressures also affects livelihoods by 
driving resource degradation and undermining social and governance systems.  
 
 A relationship between cash dependency and commons resource governance 
problems is illustrated in figure 6.6. As Tangoan livelihoods move away from 
economic self-sufficiency (garden-based livelihoods) to further market 
integration (cash-based livelihoods) there has been an increased utilisation of 
                                                 
82
 When people do not have access to their own gardens they are more dependent on cash generated by 
labouring on copra plantations, harvesting from the commons i.e. fishing, and small businesses 
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natural resources for money. This is a well documented pattern in literature 
concerning the effect of markets on local commons management (Vadez et al., 
2004; Mertens et al., 2000). Increased use of commons resources for money is 
associated with decline in respect for custom NRM rules. For an example, 
Tangoan fishermen explained that earning cash from fishing took priority over 
abiding by kastom rules about only harvesting large fish.  Use of modern fishing 
nets which make it impossible to abide by custom rules is evidence of their 
prioritised decision. This relationship is illustrated by the arrow that points both 
ways from resource degradation to cash dependency in figure 6.6. 
 
 Figure 6.6 illustrates that cash dependency can also increases Tangoan 
livelihood vulnerability when associated economic pressures further undermine 
social cohesion (refer back to fig. 6.3). Tangoa data support findings of Garcia et 
al. (2006) that economic pressures weaken social security systems (i.e. 
reciprocity). This pattern of increasing livelihood vulnerability related to a 
transition from subsistence-based to cash-based livelihoods can be seen in 
communities across Vanuatu (Kalontano, 2003) and around the world (Bury, 
2004; Putsche, 2000).   
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 Figure 6.6, The relationship between resource degradation, cash dependency and livelihood 
vulnerability 
 
 The relationship between resource degradation and increased livelihood 
vulnerability can be illustrated further by looking at the link between resource 
degradation and loss of TEK.  An example of resource degradation of one 
particular resource type within the Tangoa resource area – coastal forests, helps 
to show this relationship. A kastom medicine expert specialises in the use of one 
particular species of plant for his medicine. He uses the roots, stems, leaves, and 
flowers to treat a wide range of illnesses some of which include asthma and 
diabetes. The plant grows only in the coastal forest.  
 
 Degradation of the coastal forests not only threatens the livelihood of this 
traditional medicine man, but also impacts the livelihoods of other Tangoans. As 
abundance and use of this medicinal plant declines, so does knowledge about the 
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plant and how to use it. The consequences of loss of knowledge and use of 
traditional medicine may be an increase in livelihood vulnerability of the Tangoa 
community as the health benefits of the plant are lost. Without traditional 
medicine local people are forced to use  modern alternatives, which cost money. 
Furthermore, the medicine specialist considered that loss of knowledge about the 
plant could contribute to lack of interest in respecting custom rules that protect 
its habitat (rules include: a taboo against clearing coastal forests). This 
relationship is represented in figure 6.7 by the arrow from loss of TEK to 
governance problems. 
 
 
 
 Figure 6.7, Relationship between resource degradation, loss of TEK and livelihood vulnerability 
 
 
 
6.2 Study limitations and areas for further research 
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 Several limitations of this study are associated with the scope and the chosen 
methodology, as well as various biases. The scope of my thesis is limited to only 
one in-depth case study.  I was able to comment on the wider relevance of the 
Tangoa findings by extending the research to the national level with the 
literature review and interviews.  However, more research is needed to be able to 
accurately assess the wider relevance of local factors and processes identified in 
the Tangoa case study. Further study of how local contextual variables create 
unique local situations and how they create commonalities among other local 
and national issues may better indicate the relative importance of local level 
action vs. structural change.  
  
 Identifying important cultural variables and studying their effect would also 
require multiple case studies of a cross section of communities at a different 
stage of cultural change, or studies over long time periods. As cultural change 
may be having a significant impact on natural resource use, traditional 
ecological knowledge and respect for leaders, it may be important to generate 
more understanding about how cultural change is impacting commons 
management. Other feedback loops in the model are also important to study. 
Although outside the scope of my thesis, this knowledge may be useful to 
support and or develop initiatives that can contribute positively to commons 
management within such a context of cultural change. 
 
 The Vanuatu research was also limited in scope.  Interviews and literature 
indicated there was a wealth of information about unsustainable development 
policies related to specific developments and unsustainable international 
development aid and assistance.  The analysis of that information was beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but my results and the model indicate that these different 
levels of policy will impact many of the drivers of cooperative capacity and 
commons management.  
 
 Another limitation is associated with a methodology based on grounded theory.  
A grounded theory approach was chosen for my case study because I had little 
previous knowledge about the important factors involved in commons 
management for Vanuatu and the Tangoa community specifically.  The 
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limitations of this methodology are that it does not allow systematic information 
gathering about preplanned or identified factors. Grounded theory allows the 
important factors involved in commons management to arise from local 
perspectives and knowledge. If research such as this thesis adds to the base of 
understanding about commons management in Vanuatu, further research could 
build from what local people have identified as important. Then perhaps these 
factors can be studied more systematically and at more depth. 
 
 The other limitations involve biases. My position as an “outsider” and a western 
female researcher, with little previous knowledge of the local culture and 
language is likely to bias the information provided by the community, as well as 
my interpretation and representation of it.  A major recommendation of this 
study is that ni-Vanuatu research and researchers should be encouraged to 
undertake research in their own communities. Supporting ni-Vanuatu 
researchers is important, as they will be better positioned to understand local 
cultures. The case study and Vanuatu research shows that there may be a gap in 
understanding about the role of cultural factors such as respect for custom, and 
traditional leaders, and the collective. 
 
 There are also biases associated with the research, such as those discussed in the 
methodology chapter related to using an interpreter. Another limitation may 
arise from sample biases. Information about changing youth culture and the 
effect this has on respect for custom rules about natural resource management 
came primarily from adults. Adult perceptions that there is declining respect for 
rules among youth contrast with the concern about natural resource management 
problems expressed by youth groups. Further research into young people’s goals 
for the future, and concerns about natural resource management, might be useful 
to inform how programs can help mobilise youth collective action for commons 
management.  This research may be particularly useful for educational NGOs 
such as Wan Smolbag, who are well respected by youth for their entertaining 
and educational participatory theatre.  
 
6.3 Finding solutions and an appropriate development pathway 
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 As local commons management problems are interlinked with wider processes 
and contexts of development and change, researchers and scholars face debates 
when looking for ways of addressing such problems. Vanuatu is opening open 
up to foreign investment and land and resource mobilisation with resulting 
negative effects for livelihoods. These national global influences result in 
negative effects at the local level. There is loss of autonomy to govern; 
marginalisation of people from their land and resource base; social and cultural 
disruption from rapid development of monetary economies (sect. 5.3.6). Low 
government capacity to control and mitigate against the external negative effects 
of resource exploitation from investors, means that it is largely up to 
communities to stand up to such livelihood threats.  
 
 This leads me to my final argument – that development needs to be appropriate 
for particular social, cultural and ecological contexts. Development should be 
defined by local people. This perspective supports the premise that culture is not 
a threat to development, but a core element in it (Curry, 2003). The ability of 
Vanuatu communities to manage change, adapt, and determine their own futures 
comes from the strength of their social systems and of their governance systems. 
Therefore an appropriate approach should be to strengthen these systems and 
mitigate processes that threaten them. There is an increasing emphasis upon the 
importance of alternative grassroots approaches to development, starting from 
the empowerment of local communities (Mayo and Craig, 1995, Mohan and 
Stokke, 2000). 
 
 While development should be locally defined and ‘bottom-up’, local initiatives 
also need to be supported by people at various levels and institutional structures 
(Galudra, 2005; Berkes, 2007).  Berkes (2007, p. 15192) explains: “The panacea 
of community-based conservation is probably no more effective than the 
panacea of exclusively state-based conservation, because they both ignore the 
multilevel nature of linkages and multiple partners required for any project to be 
successful.”83 One NGO who has worked with communities to establish a 
                                                 
83
 Understanding the significance of these inter-linkages has leaded some to redefine community-based 
conservation: so that it refers to “governance that starts from the ground up and involves networks and 
linkages across various levels of organization.” (Berkes, 2007, p.15188) 
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protected area in Vanuatu explains: “Community ability to achieve local goals 
and stand up to investment interests depends on the level of capacity at the 
provincial level as well as in local communities.”  
 
 This section looks at the ‘lessons’ from the research results and the analysis of 
the model to suggest what an approach for communities like Tangoa might look 
like. This involves a synthesis of local and national perspectives to identify 
interventions and external support that may help to address the drivers of 
commons problems.  
 
6.3.1 Addressing local level economic pressures 
 Economic pressures underlie both social cohesion problems and governance 
problems. In Tangoa, alleviating these pressures is likely to improve community 
cooperative capacity. Initiatives at the local level could assist communities to 
achieve their economic development goals. For the Tangoa people, goals 
include: finding more secure and diverse ways to generate income; developing 
more efficient market links; accessing training to improve employment 
opportunities; accessing training and awareness about how limited land can be 
used more effectively; and accessing family planning services (section 4.6.4). 
 
 At the national level, policy could be targeted at development aimed at 
alleviating local economic burdens. As school fees and medical expenses are 
two of the main cash expenses for communities across Vanuatu. National 
initiatives to subsidise these costs or to find alternative payment options are 
likely to have a significant positive effect.  
 
 Information and education to raise communities’ awareness about the 
consequences of selling leaseholds can come from within communities, through 
national or international programs from NGOs and governments. Organisations 
such as the Vanuatu Cultural Centre and the National Council of Chiefs are 
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already working to improve land policy and to educate communities about the 
negative effects of selling land, and these initiatives should be supported.84  
 
 Another national level policy would be to support development of the traditional 
subsistence economy. The traditional economy includes the customary 
institutions that sustain subsistence livelihoods. It includes customary systems of 
tenure, forms of currency, insurance, savings, and exchange. The traditional 
economy is increasingly recognised as a viable alternative or supplement to a 
monetary focused approach to development (Bazeley and Mullen, 2006). These 
customary systems can be developed and applied to satisfy non-traditional basic 
needs, in particular, access to health and education (Regenvanu, 2007).  For 
example, instead of struggling to save enough cash for school fees three times a 
year, some communities have arranged exchanges of food and labour for school 
services (Nari, pers comm.).  
 
 Further support could be given to work being done by the Vanuatu Cultural 
Centre on the traditional economy and its role in future Vanuatu society. The 
Cultural Centre is looking at how the traditional economy can be further 
developed, validated, and institutionalised in national development policies.85   
 
 Incorporating development of the traditional economy into the national 
development policy may require widening conceptualisations of ‘development’. 
Currently, the government is focused on generating a monetary economy, raising 
GDP and balancing trade deficits in order to lift Vanuatu from its status of a 
Least Developed Country.  A more encompassing definition of development 
may need to include additional measures of ‘modern’ growth: wellbeing; 
stability; equity; social cohesion; and sustainable livelihoods may enable 
(Baezely and Mullen, 2006. p.12). The traditional subsistence economy is 
considered by some as the basis for sustainable, self-reliant development that 
                                                 
84
 See the Vanuatu Cultural Center’s website for details and related documents including the 
‘Recommendations to the 2006 Land Summit’ made by the Malvatumauri, (the National Council of 
Chiefs), the National Self Reliance Coo mmiii ttt tttee ee ,,,    aa nn dd    ttthh ee    Add vv oo cc aa cc yy    Coo aa lll iii ttt iiioo nn    oo nn    Ecc oo nn oo miiicc ss    (( ACE)) :::    
(( hh ttt tttpp ::: /// ///www...vv aa nn uu aa tttuu cc uu lll tttuu rr ee ...oo rr gg /// ttt rr m///22 00 00 66 00 99 22 55 __ lllaa nn dd ss -- ss uu mmiii ttt ... ss hh tttmlll))    
85
 See the Vanuatu Cultural Center’s website for details and related documents including the Vanuatu 
Self Reliance Strategy 
(http://www.vanuatuculture.org/projects/050628_traditionalmoneybankproject.shtml)  
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will foster equity, environmental sustainability, food security, social security, 
and good governance (NSRC, and ACE, 200686).  
 
6.3.2 Empowering women 
 Initiatives to empower women can build cooperative capacity. International 
literature suggests women’s greater participation in community level 
institutional structures will benefit conflict management, community cohesion 
and community governance (Westermann et al., 2006).  Tangoan women play a 
vital role in providing for the subsistence and income needs of families as well 
as organising and coordinating community initiatives. Tangoa data indicate a 
link between women’s ability to earn money and their empowerment at a 
household and community level. Initiatives to empower Tangoan women might 
include: establishing small businesses in cooking and sewing, and developing 
strong networks and links to markets for selling baskets and weaving products. 
 
 Women’s initiatives can be supported through external assistance or by 
supporting existing networks and organisations that are already mandated to 
support women’s development. One such organisation is the National Council of 
Women. The Council is a self funded organisation which works to support 
women’s development and build the capacity of women to be involved in 
decisions from the local to the national level. They have an extremely effective 
network with 6 provincial Women’s Councils, and two municipal offices. The 
Council has strong communication and support links right into the communities. 
Many villages have women representatives on area councils. Through this 
network, workshops and training in such things as leadership, rights, budgeting, 
small business creation, cooking, and sewing (National Council of Women 
representative, pers. comm.).  
 
6.3.3 Addressing community social cohesion issues 
 Targeting the underlying drivers of declining social cohesion will improve 
cooperative capacity. Initiatives could address economic pressures, improve 
                                                 
86
 National Self Reliance Committee, and the Advocacy Coalition on Economics (ACE) ‘Vanuatu Self 
Reliance Strategy’ 
Chapter 6 – Discussion 
 
 
 
 
165 
 
 
 
conflict management and dispute resolution processes, and facilitate the 
utilisation of social capital within the community.  
  
 Some community projects can generate social capital.  The Tangoa example of 
the Pelviji clan’s collective action achievements shows that social capital can be 
generated when people experience the benefits of cooperation.  One Pelviji man 
explained that successfully building a Nakamal had a powerful symbolic effect: 
“It helped people to see they can work together and achieve things.” Several 
interviews with people that have worked with communities to help them 
overcome social and governance problems reported similar findings. A 
representative from one NGO explained that targeting funding for projects that 
can build cooperative capacity may have many positive secondary effects: 
“Achieving initiatives that require cooperation can build confidence. You have 
to start with small projects that have a lot of shared support and are easy to 
achieve. When people achieve their goal, they feel they can do a lot more, and 
they start working together more.”   
 
6.3.4 Addressing community governance issues  
 Various initiatives at the local, regional, and national levels can address 
governance issues including: local disputes and conflicts, leadership problems, 
tenure ambiguity, and loss of TEK. 
 
Participatory processes for disputes and conflicts 
 Several NGOs such as the Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific 
Vanuatu (FSPV) and Wan Smolbag, as well as the government’s Environment 
Unit, are involved in helping communities overcome governance problems. 
Participatory processes have been used to facilitate dispute resolution and 
address other governance issues. A representative from the Cultural Centre 
explained: “Ultimately communities have to solve their own problems so you 
have to be insightful enough to see what they need and give that to them. So if 
it’s creating an environment where they can start talking, that’s a start.”   
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 The literature suggests building on strengths in the culture by supporting the 
existing methods of conflict resolution or by creating a new hybrid that is a 
combination of customary and modern mechanisms (Barsky, 1998; Fisher et al, 
1999; Chevalier and Buckles and Rusnak, 1999). A representative from the 
Government’s Environment Unit iterated this point: “If a community has no 
expertise solving an issue then we can import it from outside. But if they have 
the resources there to help them solve it themselves, like a respected chief, it is 
better if they do it themselves.”  
 
 The Environment Unit has had experience assisting communities understand that 
disputes can be separated from conservation initiatives.  A representative from 
the Luganville office explained: “You need to help the community see that 
disputes are about benefits for one particular person or family, and conservation 
initiatives will benefit everyone.” An NGO in Port Vila explained that people 
are able to put aside disputes when they understand that there is a court process 
for the disputes, but that in the mean time, they can go ahead and address 
conservation and development needs. The concept of removing disputes as a 
barrier to a community’s progress was expressed by one person as “disputes, 
hemi gat wan road blong hem” which translates to “Disputes have their own 
road.”  
 
Building leadership capacity  
 In order to adapt to changing social, economic and institutional contexts 
community leaders may benefit from capacity building in areas of literacy and 
record keeping, financial management (Kalontano et al. 2003). They may need 
new skills to enable them to govern communities which are larger and 
increasingly diverse and complex (ibid). They may also benefit from greater 
understanding about new constitutional governance values and principles, the 
role of government institutions and NGOs, and how to communicate with them 
(Ibid).  
 
 The Malvatumauri (National Council of Chiefs) is an administrative structure to 
support governance at the village level as well as support traditional governance 
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values at the National Level.87 The Malvatumauri structure reaches from the 
national level to island councils, area councils, sub-area councils, village 
councils and the Nakamal (Chief meeting house).  The Council structure helps 
communities strengthen traditional governance systems and builds the capacity 
of community chiefs. The Council trains village chiefs to deal with the changes 
and challenges that are affecting communities and provides capacity building to 
retain the custom values that community governance needs (Garu, pers comm.).  
 
Building awareness and capacity to negotiate tenure ambiguity 
 Tangoa data highlight the need for greater awareness about rights and 
responsibilities for managing resources where ambiguity exists for tenure and 
governance authority for shared resources on leaseholder land. Communities 
may benefit from improved systems of support to help them negotiate and 
communicate with external stakeholders such as leaseholders and investors.   
 
Reviving and developing TEK  
 Options to prevent further loss of traditional ecological knowledge include 
building TEK into school the curriculum, encouraging community-based 
research and documentation of TEK, and utilising TEK in local ecotourism 
ventures. Support can be given to several projects already doing work in this 
area, including the Rethinking Vanuatu Education Initiative and the Landholders 
Conservation Initiative.  
 
6.3.5 Avoiding negative effects of external intervention  
 Interventions from ‘outside’ agencies can have a negative impact on local 
people. Garu (pers comm.) explains that despite honest good intentions, the 
influence of external people coming into a community can upset community 
power relations and governance systems. This is reflected in literature that 
shows how the failure of a development or conservation project can damage 
community empowerment, respect and trust in each other (Fuys et al, 2006).  
                                                 
87
 At the National level, the National Council of Chiefs is working to ensure the National Council of 
Chiefs is consulted and allowed a chance to discuss and debate the merits of any proposals for custom 
related bills are tabled in parliament (FSP 2005).  
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Therefore, the type and implementation of assistance to support local commons 
management must not further undermine local social and governance systems. 
  
 The Vanuatu National Cultural Council has developed regulations for people 
wanting to do research in Vanuatu. The regulations require that researchers gain 
permission and involvement of community leaders and that there are tangible 
benefits from research (Regenvanu, 2006; Scheyvens et al. 2003). The 
Malvatumauri (National Council of Chiefs) can also provide advice.  
 
 Another way to improve development approaches in Vanuatu is to ensure that 
the valuable knowledge and experience, gained by those that have worked with 
communities, is effectively utilised. A lot of knowledge has been generated 
about the processes and approaches that are empowering and effective in 
building cooperative capacity as opposed to approaches that are potentially 
disempowering. This thesis has only skimmed the surface of that body of 
knowledge. However, several interviewees in Port Vila expressed frustration 
that they do not have the time and resources to transfer the knowledge and 
experience they have gained to others, or to provide policy advice. External 
resources and support could be targeted at enabling the transfer and utilisation of 
knowledge and experience that exists in Vanuatu.  
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
 
 The sustainability of the Tangoa community is dependent on the successful 
long-term management of local ecosystems. The purpose of the case study of 
Tangoa Island was to explain what resources are important for local livelihoods, 
as well as how those resources are used and managed. The case study results 
(Chapter 4) described the natural resource use practices that are causing resource 
degradation. Four main underlying drivers of resource degradation include 
population pressures, economic pressures, governance issues, and declining 
social cohesion.   
 
 Results of the wider Vanuatu context (Chapter 5) showed that the local Tangoan 
issues are experienced by many other communities across Vanuatu. The primary 
reason that the local problems in Tangoa have relevance for other communities 
is that they arise from a context of wider socio-economic, cultural, political and 
institutional change. Local social systems, governance systems and commons 
resources are affected by external influence, such as state development policies, 
privatisation of commons resources in long-term leases, and institutional 
changes at the national level in education and governance structures. At the 
international level there are influences of globalisation.  
 
 Chapter 6 presents a model to facilitate discussion about how the results from 
the literature review, case study, and Vanuatu research interact to answer the 
objective questions posed by this thesis.  The model describes the essential 
factors involved in cooperative capacity for commons management. The model 
also assists in the analysis of how factors at multiple levels influence 
communities, and how various factors interact to reinforce and drive the process 
of change. The analysis shows how Tangoan livelihoods are affected by the 
change in their community, and how they might be further affected if the drivers 
persist and the feedback loops continue.   
 
 Some of the lessons learned from this research point to alternative development 
approaches.  My hope is that this study can be used to engage in development 
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debates about how to help build local capacity for commons management in a 
culturally and ethically appropriate way. Assistance can be targeted multiple 
levels, from local to national in a way that ensures external assistance or 
intervention does not become a driver of declining cooperative capacity.   
 
 My study shows that a grounded theory approach to commons management can 
be useful to build understanding from a local perspective. Communities engaged 
in commons management carry out primary production in rural areas, and are 
historically grounded in their local realities.  These communities in general, and 
Tangoa in particular, have a great deal to contribute to global environmental and 
development debates in terms of knowledge and experience (Waddell and 
Connell, 2007).  The Tangoa community has shown that they want to protect 
and enhance what they value, and to manage their challenges and issues. They 
also perceive that appropriate initiatives to achieve these goals should strengthen 
the social and governance systems, which are seen as essential for preserving 
valued knowledge as well as encouraging innovation and change. 
 
 One real option for Vanuatu is to choose indigenous rather than Western 
solutions to its development needs because the country has a strong cultural 
heritage. Ralph Regenvanu (2007), Director of the National Cultural Council 
argues that it is both necessary and possible to develop the strength, identity and 
traditional values that will enable the people of Vanuatu to determine their future 
and choose development paths wisely.  Russel Nari from the Lands Department 
explains that local level development must build from, and not damage, natural 
and social endowments: “The two most important things that people possess in 
this country are the land that we have, and the social relationships that we have 
with each other. We depend on each other. You break those two things without 
putting in place a social security net – then Vanuatu will be in trouble.” This is 
supported by scholars who argue that “the maintenance of social and cultural 
practices may be as important as income gains and poverty reduction for many 
local communities.” (Waddell and Connell, 2007, p.11). 
 
 Although Vanuatu communities may have a strong basis to work from, placing 
all the responsibility on local communities to solve commons management 
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problems is unfair. Many of the drivers of local problems are influenced by 
changes at the global and national level, which are outside the control of local 
communities. For the individuals and organisation wanting to assist Vanuatu 
communities, this study has identified various practical ways to support local 
solutions to commons management problems. These may be considered the 
‘recommendations’ arising from this study: 
 
 Support the work of the Cultural Center in developing, validating, and 
institutionalising the traditional economy in national development policies. 
 Support locally generated projects that can increase social capital and build 
cooperative capacity.  
 Support the work of organisations involved in helping communities retain 
traditional governance values and strengthen customary processes of dispute 
resolution. Some of these organisations include: Malvatumauri; The 
Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific Vanuatu; Wan Smolbag; and 
the Environment Unit.  
 Assist national level policy development aimed at alleviating local economic 
burdens. This may include exploring how major monetary costs of education 
and healthcare could be subsidised or spread. 
 Support networks and organisations such as the National Council of Women 
to influence and achieve their community goals. 
 Improve awareness about rights and responsibilities for managing resources 
where there is tenure and governance authority ambiguity (i.e. for shared 
resources on leaseholder land).  
 Support work to build community awareness about the consequences of 
selling leaseholds in land.  
 Build systems of support to help local people negotiate and communicate 
with diverse stakeholders such as leaseholders and investors. 
 Support capacity building for community leaders to help them manage 
changing social, economic and institutional systems.  
 Support initiatives to prevent further loss of traditional ecological 
knowledge. 
 Support the work of the Malvatumauri and the Vanuatu National Cultural 
Council in providing guidelines for researchers and development agents to 
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ensure they approach and work with communities in a way that is culturally 
appropriate, ethical, and which will ensure that communities get tangible 
benefits from research.  
 Enable the utilisation and transfer of knowledge and experience that has 
been gained by individuals and organisations working with communities. 
Ensure these individuals and organisations are encouraged to advise and 
support culturally appropriate approaches to working with communities.  
 
Recommendations for further research: 
 Investigate what projects have potential to improve social cohesion and build 
social capital. 
 Support further research and policy development about how external 
assistance can benefit local communities in sustainable and culturally 
appropriate ways.  
 Encourage collabourative research, particularly where Western researchers 
can gain access to grants to support fieldwork carried out with ni-Vanuatu 
researchers.  
 Conduct research into cultural change in youth to determine goals, 
aspirations, and NRM/conservation interests with a view to utilising youth 
social capital and potential for collective action. This may involve 
collabourating with NGOs such as Wan Smolbag, who undertakes 
conservation work with youth. 
 Determine options for diversifying and securing income from limited land 
resources for communities, which may involve research into alternative land 
use or livelihood options, increasing productivity, or diversification. 
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